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Foreword
Knowledge Sharing Across Cultures: Useful Guidance and Recommenda-
tions for Growing International Companies is a book written with its out-
set in the experiences of one particular company that encountered great
knowledge sharing diﬃculties as it expanded internationally. This phe-
nomenon is not unique – countless ﬁrms experience growing pains
when expanding internationally, however, many of them never realize
the origins of these pains or how to remedy them.
This book seeks to provide valuable insight for ﬁrm managers that
havemade this realization; as organizations increases in size and scope,
knowledge sharing capabilities decrease as a result of larger variances
between the organizational members. As such this book is useful as it
depicts the stances taken by diﬀerent subsidiaries of one largemultina-
tional corporation on a knowledge sharing initiative. By reading the de-
scriptive accounts of the subsidiary interviews, companymanagers can
better contextualize potential problems of a similar nature that they
might encounter when confronted with a comparable situation. As a re-
sult of some interview subjects being pro knowledge sharing, and oth-
ers less enthusiastic, the book provides a well rounded depiction of the
problems associated with boosting knowledge sharing activities within
large companies and provides workable solutions to overcome these.
9

1 Setting the Stage
Knowledge for companies has always been critical. However, as we ap-
proach the close of the ﬁrst decade after breaking the millennium bar-
rier, the signiﬁcance of optimizing your knowledge base can be argued
to be more vital now than ever before. The ongoing authority of the
it revolution and globalization, and the whirlwind of implications they
have on companies, leave no room for compassion; either companies
optimize their knowledge base and remain competitive or they are re-
moved, one way or another, from the playing ﬁeld.
Creating and sustaining an atmosphere in which people of an orga-
nization are willing and able to disseminate knowledge is thus pivotal
to success in any modern knowledge sharing initiative. Yet, as count-
less companies have discovered, the perception that knowledge equals
power is an instinct diﬃcult to dissolve; the natural inclination of hu-
mans at every level in almost every organization is to hoard knowledge
and unless the right environment is established any attempt to encour-
age eﬀective knowledge sharing will ultimately prove futile (Atkins and
Bridger 2001).
Add to this bleak outset a multicultural environment and the prob-
lems related to knowledge sharing are further exacerbated. Companies
that have successfully expanded to encompass a variety of diﬀering cul-
tures also have the problems of diﬀering perceptions of how, who and
what knowledge sharing should pivot around. Thus, for the multina-
tional company that seeks to circulate useful knowledge around its pe-
ripheries, knowledge sharing is a complex matter that most times is
never fully utilized.
This book sheds much needed light onto this complicated subject. It
is based on the experiences of one particular company that has under-
gone a rapid acquisition expansion process and nowhas a very large and
wide array of subsidiaries with very diﬀering corporate cultures under
its operating umbrella.The problems the company underwent are how-
ever not particular; they are typical representations of knowledge shar-
ing diﬃculties that most large multinational corporations (mncs) ex-
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perience when subjected to rapid international expansion.The analysis
and derived insights of this particular case therefore lend themselves
to a broader scope of companies and industries and are applicable to
any international company suﬀering from deﬁcient knowledge sharing
practices.
1.1 Background
Theproliﬁc utilization of knowledge, for humanity, has always been and
continues to be a source of great power that is both revered and feared.
Centuries ago, while still in the midst of expanding the limits of their
empire, the Romans came to the Egyptian city of Alexandria. There, in
order to assert the supremacy of the emperor over the conquered land
and to install a feeling of fear that, it was hoped, would deter any po-
tential local rebellion, the legionaries set the Great Library of Alexan-
dria on ﬁre. The results were catastrophic: the building, which acted as
the repository of most of the human knowledge that had been accu-
mulated until then, and the 500,000 books it housed, were completely
destroyed.
Historically, the event is now considered as the cause of the so-called
Dark Years in Europe and it is believed to have set mankind back by
several centuries in our continuing quest for knowledge.The full extent
of the long-term consequences of the loss, however, will forever remain
unknown. All we can do is ask ourselves where we would be if it had not
happened, if the works contained in the Great Library had continued to
be available for the researchers to study them. The sharing of existing
knowledge is the essential base on which to create new knowledge.This
holds true at the scale of humanity as for modern organizations.
World trade, especially within the developed countries of the world,
is on the rise. In large, we chose to label this rise in world trade as
‘globalization’ and in its wake lie multitudes of assorted international
mergers, acquisitions and joint ventures that aim at making organiza-
tions more eﬃcient. Common for them all, if they truly hope to reap
the beneﬁts from higher eﬃciency, is their acute need for international
knowledge sharing systems that integrate strategies for tackling diﬀer-
ences in corporate and national cultures. We see that many, otherwise
ﬂourishing, ﬁrms fail to accomplish this and nullify a good business op-
portunity that seemed promising at the outset. Surprisingly often, the
cause lays in misunderstandings attributable to corporate and national
cultural diﬀerences, as well as communications systems that are poorly
equipped to handle intercultural issues.
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Scholars have researched the topic for many years and consequently
the related theory is extensive. Although careful attention has been al-
located to analyze the problems of knowledge sharing systems involv-
ing intercultural communication possibilities, they nevertheless still
cost multinational ﬁrms lots of time, eﬀorts andmoney. Consequently,
it is clear that it is important to understand and accept that knowledge
sharing in an international setting is, simply put, very diﬃcult and en-
tails many pitfalls and barriers. It is only once this realization has been
made that one can begin to conduct the initial steps towards improving
the situation.
TheCopenhagen basedmultinational company iss is a company that
has made this realization. Through their rapid growth, the iss group
now operates in a global environment, an environment completely un-
like the original mono-cultural setting the company was born in. As a
result, iss is experiencing numerous problems with their implemen-
tation eﬀorts of a global knowledge sharing system. In this book, I set
out to analyze the imperative issues of one of these problems, namely
the problems related to overcoming the knowledge sharing diﬃculties
stemming from diﬀerences in corporate cultures across amultinational
organization. The goal of the analysis is to emerge with several recom-
mendations as to how iss, and companies in similar situations as iss,
canovercome these problems and share knowledge globallywithout los-
ing out to corporate cultural diﬀerences.
1.2 The Corporate Partner, iss
Integrated Service Solutions (iss) is a Danish company founded in 1901
where it was a small local player but has since grown to become one
of Europe’s largest employers. The company plays a consolidating role
in the facility support services industry (cleaning, maintenance, and
tailor-made service packages targeted to speciﬁc types of customers)
and, following a recent period of organic growth and acquisitions on
the international scene, iss now takes the form of a group of wholly
owned, yet relatively independent subsidiaries that operate in 38 coun-
tries worldwide. Its market position is particularly strong in Europe,
South America and Asia. The headquarters of the group, iss, are lo-
cated in Copenhagen and together, the diﬀerent entities that form the
company employ in excess of 265,000 employees, servicing more than
75,000 business-to-business customers.
iss has a set of four pivotal corporate values that are supposed to
guide the decisions and actions of every subsidiary of the group. Hon-
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esty is said to be a fundamental value of the company, on which a
strong reputation, long-term relationships with the customers, open
communication and a better overall working environment can be devel-
oped. Entrepreneurship is highly valued, as actions should prime over
words. Ideas that can improve the service oﬀered to the customers are
welcomed and encouraged to thrive. The importance of responsibility
towards colleagues, customers, shareholders, the company itself, and
other stakeholders is embodied in the decentralized decision-making
process. Finally, quality and professional conduct are ensured by adher-
ing to, and often creating business standards for the industry.
According to its stated strategy, iss aspires to advance and lead its in-
dustry on a global basis. More speciﬁcally, the company wants to evolve
from oﬀering multi-services to oﬀering facility services; to shape the
industry; to be considered as the premier employer in the industry; to
deliver global concepts through a strong local presence; and to part-
ner with their customers to enhance their competitiveness. In order
to achieve these goals, iss has launched a strategic plan that entails
the internationalization of some speciﬁc business sectors (Aviation,
Food Services, Damage Control, etc.), a redeﬁnition and re-branding of
their services, the development of incentives for their employees, the
rapid addition of new relevant businesses, the continued transforma-
tion and consolidation of the industry, and the spin-oﬀ of some busi-
nesses, when it is deemed beneﬁcial for the group. These strategic ele-
ments, it is believed, will lead to a doubling of the operating revenues
in 2008 (from Euro 4,632million in 2005 to Euro 8,530million) and to a
stabilization of the growth rate at 6 (there have been wide variations
during the recent years).
The implementation of the strategic elements that will render the at-
tainment of these targets possible builds on the afore-mentioned core
values of the company, but also on a new, innovative vision of their busi-
ness. The central control of the international subsidiaries of the group
has traditionally been limited to the examination of ﬁnancial perfor-
mances, while they were left alone to operate independently in their re-
spective market. Little was ever done to inculcate a commonworldwide
corporate group-culture to the companies thatwere acquired or started,
which resulted into the parallel development and continued existence
of a series of independent and often diverging corporate sub-cultures.
Given the eﬀective non-existence of a common corporate culture and
the high level of independence traditionally enjoyed by the subsidiaries
14
Identifying the Problem 1.3
of iss, they are in fact operating as separate commercial entities that
have nothing but their parent in common. In the absence of something
that can be treated as an iss corporate culture, I chose to consider the
corporate sub-cultures of the subsidiaries as diﬀerent corporate cul-
tures and to treat them accordingly in this book.
1.3 Identifying the Problem
iss considers the ability to eﬀectively share knowledge across units a
premium source of competitive advantage that has the potential to in-
crease its corporate value and improve the entire organization. Con-
sequently, the company has, for several years, tried to set-up a knowl-
edge sharing system called Business Insight throughout its various sub-
sidiaries located around the world. Some subsidiaries appear to be on
the knowledge sharing ‘band-wagon’ and share the headquarters’ ea-
gerness tomake Business Insight a success; other subsidiaries are reluc-
tant to give the knowledge sharing initiative a sincere eﬀort. The dras-
tic variation in corporate cultures present throughout the 38 national
subsidiaries of the group is considered to be the paramount cause of
the diﬃculties experienced in sharing knowledge between these units.
It is also used as the main argument to explain the reluctance of some
subsidiaries to join the knowledge sharing initiative. Accordingly, the
subsequent portrayal and analyses of the intricacies present at iss at-
tempts to identify solutions to optimize knowledge sharing activities
across its diﬀering corporate cultures.
key issue of analysis How can iss optimize its global
knowledge sharing activities across varying corporate cultures?
In order to be equipped with the necessary knowledge to give a sat-
isfactory answer to the issue formulation, it is essential to thoroughly
analyze two underlying research questions that are related to the above.
Proceeding in that manner will facilitate arriving at a complete and
well-argued result that will, at the same time, be logical and coherent
for the reader to follow. The ﬁrst research question (hereafter called
‘Research Question 1’) therefore seeks to shed light on how knowledge
sharing is optimally done across diﬀering corporate cultures, according
to theoretical models and conceptions.
research question 1 How is knowledge sharing optimally
done across corporate cultures?
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The second research question (hereafter called ‘ResearchQuestion 2’)
delves into the speciﬁcs of iss and seeks to illuminate the problematic
areas of global knowledge sharing within iss today.
research question 2 What are the problematic areas
of global knowledge sharing within iss?
My attempt at formulating a satisfactory answer to the key issue of
analysis will ﬁrst come once these two research questions have been
answered.
1.4 Delimitations
The focus of this book is not on the broad topic of knowledge manage-
ment, but solely on the integrate sub-topic of knowledge sharing. This
distinction is very important to make; as will become apparent in the
next section (From Knowledge Management to Knowledge Sharing),
knowledge management is a much more encompassing concept with
which I do not take arms as its magnitude exceeds that which I can
credibly confront in this small book.The current work consequently fo-
cuses exclusively on knowledge sharing in relation to varying corporate
cultures, and on how iss can achieve optimal results with its current
knowledge sharing system and diﬀering corporate cultures. There are
numerous other elements that aﬀect iss’ ability to share knowledge
between its units, but elements such as geographical hindrances, tech-
nical restraints, etc., are purposely excluded from the core focus of this
book in order to raise the intensity of the results pertaining to the is-
sues of corporate culture.
The book is not aimed at providingmultinational corporations with a
blueprint of how to successfully integrate a knowledge sharing system
into their organization. I am convinced that there is no golden formula
for a globally applicable, successful knowledge sharing system and each
initiative must take into account the speciﬁc needs and situations of
the corporate, national and international environments of the individ-
ual organization. I thereforemake a conscious move away from propos-
ing a universal knowledge sharing solution, as this would be doomed
from the beginning. Instead, I propose several knowledge sharing im-
provements that are tailored to the speciﬁc situation of one company,
iss but can be applied to a wide scope of companies.
This analysis begins after the original impulsion that pushed the
company towards making the strategic decision to establish a knowl-
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edge sharing system, after the initial required investments had been
made, and after the company had embarked on the implementation
of its strategy. As a result, I will not discuss the competitive and envi-
ronmental factors that were at the base of iss’ decision to step up its
knowledge sharing activities.
Finally, although technical intricacies and complicated jargon are in-
herent to a modern knowledge sharing system, this book will not cover
the technical functionalities and speciﬁcations of any network-based or
computer-based supporting systems.
1.5 From Knowledge Management to Knowledge Sharing
Ashas just been established, this book solely concerns itselfwith knowl-
edge sharing, and notwith knowledgemanagement at large. As a result,
I ﬁnd it imperative to deﬁne the topic, to precisely determine its posi-
tion in the realm of the overarching knowledge management concept,
and to situate it in relation to other essential phases of the process.Only
in this manner can one fully understand what is covered by the topic of
knowledge sharing and what is not, and appreciate the extent to which
knowledge sharing has an impact on knowledge management.
Many authors choose, often for the sake of managerial simpliﬁca-
tion (e. g., Stevens 2000; Bowman 2002; Oakes and Rengarajan 2002),
to consider the area of knowledge management as a uniﬁed topic to
tackle completely, without subdividing it into smaller parts until fur-
ther down the road of their research process. Other authors, mainly the
ones writing within academia, jump right into one precise area and are,
from the beginning of their work, very clear-cut in their writings and
concentrate on one or a few of the diﬀerent steps that, together, con-
stitute knowledgemanagement (e. g., Kautz andVendelø 2001;Mahnke
1998). Similarly, Jeﬀrey Tan (2000) distinguishes between the diﬀerent
phases of knowledge management and suggests an all-encompassing,
yet well-divided and precisely deﬁned set of six subdivisions for knowl-
edge management:
1. Identiﬁcation
2. Creation
3. Encapsulation
4. Sharing
5. Retrieval
6. Application
17
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I will use this categorization and the explanations that Tan gives of
the diﬀerent stages in order to situate the area of interest in its environ-
ment and surroundings. Accordingly, a very brief explanation of each
sub-point follows, with an emphasis on the fourth point on knowledge
sharing.
Knowledge Identiﬁcation is the process duringwhich anorganization
that is hoping to better manage its knowledge has to ﬁgure out what
interesting knowledge it possesses, as well as where in the organization
that knowledge is held.
Knowledge Creation occurs through two diﬀerent channels. Internal
sources generating knowledge are, for example, the actual execution of
contracts for clients, the in-house investigations of general or societal
trends, and even the mere sharing of ideas between the organization’s
employees. External sources also produce knowledge that the company
must be ready to draw on.
Knowledge Encapsulation covers two distinct processes. The ﬁrst
process, that mostly leaves knowledge in a tacit form, is the indexing of
the sources of the knowledge available to the ﬁrm. The documentation
phase constitutes the second process and aims at transforming some of
the tacitly held information into a readily shareable and explicit form.
Knowledge sharing is described by certain authors in terms of phys-
ical web-infrastructures that allow for information retrieval by organi-
zational members (e. g. Kautz and Vendelø 2001), while Dirlam (2000)
deﬁnes it as ‘a set of principles and practices that encourage listening
and responding positively to others. It bridges the gap between ideas
and results and turns strangers into colleagues and customers into part-
ners.’
Such a wide array of deﬁnitions, some building on technological
arguments and others on human networking abilities, implies that
the process of knowledge sharing aﬀects all parts of an organization.
Knowledge sharing is the pivotal step that actually allows organiza-
tional members to beneﬁt from a common pool of knowledge that has
been created by the completion of other operations (Tan 2000). The
sharing of knowledge has as its principal goal the dissemination of ex-
isting knowledge within the organization. It involves the sharing of
data in verbal, written or any other form that allows data to be trans-
mitted from a source to a recipient and consequently entails creating
the ability of people throughout the company to search out others and
work eﬀectively with them (Dirlam 2000). Prerequisites for knowledge
18
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sharing include a common understanding of the communicative form
and of its underlying assumptions, and the previous occurrence of the
ﬁrst three steps of the knowledge management process. It is impor-
tant to recognize that knowledge sharing involves at least two parties
who can communicate in a collective forum. A typical way for an or-
ganization to jump-start the actual sharing of knowledge is to adopt a
push strategy towards its members. Under such a strategy, the areas
of interest of a team or an individual are mapped by the organization,
so that any knowledge that is later identiﬁed as relevant to that given
person or group will be pushed onto them so that they cannot ignore it
altogether.
Knowledge Retrieval relates to the pull approach to knowledge shar-
ing. At this step of the process, members of the organization have de-
veloped the reﬂex of looking themselves at the knowledge bank of the
company whenever they are faced with a challenge.
Knowledge Application justiﬁes and supports the knowledge man-
agement infrastructure of the company. At this stage, the ﬁrm moni-
tors which pieces of knowledge are used for which purposes, and with
which results, in order to ensure that the available knowledge is used in
an eﬃcient way. From then on, it should be required for new projects
to assess the already-known elements of knowledge that are going to
be used, thereby avoiding ineﬃciencies.
Knowledge identiﬁcation, creation, encapsulation, sharing, retrieval,
and application are the building blocks of the overarching principle of
knowledge management. Although all these steps are essential for an
eﬃcient knowledge management system to be put in place in an orga-
nization, I believe that knowledge sharing is the most crucial phase. Its
success justiﬁes both the preceding and the following actions; its failure
makes knowledge identiﬁcation, creation, and encapsulation appear as
wastes of money, while it is likely to hinder the rolling-out of the re-
trieval and application phases. Given the relative importance of that
part of knowledge management, it becomes the topic I dedicate the re-
mainder of the present book to.
1.6 Book Structure
I decided to construct this book in a manner that promotes ﬂuency
while simultaneously allowing for in-depth analysis of a few selected
areas. The book is therefore organized in two main parts. The ﬁrst part
forms the theoretical background to the study (chapter 3), while the
19
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second part is empirical and covers an analysis of the interviewed sub-
sidiaries (chapters 4 and 5).
The ﬁrst chapter, the present introduction, provides the reader with
an overview of the issues that will be treated in subsequent parts of the
text, as well as with a general idea of the direction in which the work
will be heading. It is in this part that the delimitations of the ﬁeld of
interest are stated and the topic of knowledge sharing is situated in the
more encompassing realm of knowledge management.
Chapter two deals with the methodology that has been employed to
complete this research project.There, I thoroughly explain the choice of
methodology linked to the primary and secondary data. I also make an
in-depth analysis of my motivations for preferring certain techniques
of data collection, analysis and interpretation, and utilization of the pri-
mary and secondary data, and justify the selection of somemethods of
analysis that allow me to extract meaningful data from the interview
material.
Chapter three marks the beginning of the work that will lead to an-
swering the research questions. Having situated the topic of knowledge
sharing in its broader environment in chapter one, I here proceed to in-
troduce a series of theoretical views, referring to several authors, that
identify diﬀerent environmental and organizational factors inﬂuencing
the processes of knowledge sharing in a modern, multinational organi-
zation. I then go onwith a look at the founding theories behind the idea
of corporate culture. Although both areas are of pivotal importance, I
analyze the theoretical aspects of knowledge sharing ﬁrst, as it is of the
utmost importance for a thorough understanding of this to be acquired.
Furthermore, having acquired anunderstanding of the fundamentals of
knowledge sharing that are particularly relevant to this work, it will be
easier for the reader to understand in which context knowledge sharing
should be applied with respect to corporate culture. The explanation of
the theoretical aspects of corporate culture thus comes after the the-
oretical views concerning knowledge sharing. From the knowledge ex-
posed in the ﬁrst parts of the chapter, I will proceed to answer Research
Question 1.
Chapter four and ﬁve are closely connected. The former covers the
description of the speciﬁc organizational and environmental character-
istics of the four international iss subsidiaries with which interviews
were conducted, and reveals the observations and ﬁndings for each one
of them. In the latter, the gathered data is systematically arranged into
20
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Introduction
Methodology
Theoretical
Foundation
Empirical Findings
with Analysis and
Interpretation
Research Question 1
How is knowledge sharing
optimally done across
corporate cultures?
Research Question 2
What are the problematic
areas of knowledge sharing
within iss?
Recommendations
How can knowledge sharing be optimized
across varying corporate cultures?
Conclusion
figure 1.1 Structure of the book
four areas that are recurrent for each subsidiary, thus preparing it for
further processing. I ﬁrst analyze the data trying to identify interesting
similarities and diﬀerences across national subsidiaries.The trends and
patterns that emerge alongwith the part-conclusions I can ascertain are
thenprojected against the theoretical backdrop, in order to spot the dis-
crepancies and similarities of what is actually being done, compared to
theoretical suggestion as to what should be done. I then proceed with a
further analysis of the same data, identifying the linkages between the
areas of the individual subsidiaries, and explaining the possible causes
and implications of these links. The knowledge acquired from the anal-
yses and interpretation of the empirical data, along with the projected
results onto the theoretical ﬁndings, lay the path towards answering
Research Question 2.
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Having answered Research Question 1 in chapter three and Research
Question 2 in chapter ﬁve, I proceed, in chapter six, to provide delib-
erated recommendations as to how iss can better the implementation
of their knowledge sharing strategy, taking into account the numerous
diﬀerent corporate cultures of their national subsidiaries.Thereby, Iwill
also develop an answer to the key issue of analysis.
Figure 1.1 graphically illustrates the structure of thework throughout
the present book. The two smaller rectangular boxes on the left side of
the ﬁgure represent the twomain parts, which each lead to the answer-
ing of a research question, represented by the triangular shaped poly-
gons to the right. Please note that Research Question 2 is answered in
part by the empirical analysis, but also by the answer to Research Ques-
tion 1, as is indicated by the arrows. This is because it is the combined
ﬁndings from the speciﬁcs of iss, alongwith the theoretical interpreta-
tion and its compatibility, or lack thereof, with iss’ speciﬁcs, that pro-
vides the fodder for answering Research Question 2. This step-by-step
process, aided by two research questions, seeks to simplify and struc-
ture the analytical approach towards being able to answer the ultimate
key issue of analysis. I found it useful to progress in this manner, as
a book dealing with ethnography and the tumultuous human repercus-
sions that this can have on dispersion of knowledge can quickly become
confusing and unclear in direction. Hence, I, and hopefully the ambi-
tious reader as well, are better served by dividing the project as a whole
into manageable and digestible portions.
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The central purpose of the present chapter is to provide the reader with
an understanding of the methodology employed throughout the bear-
ing pillars of the various aspects of this research initiative that tran-
scends national borders and empirically investigates the intricacies of
human behaviour.This understanding is not a content summary of the
pages that follow, as it is more of a structural nature. My aim with it
is not to uncover what is to come, but to explain the procedures I have
used to reach the result.
The work has given rise to a series of methodological issues on which
a stand had to be taken. Theories on which to base my ideas and work,
type of data, collection methods, analytical frameworks, validity, relia-
bility and utilization of data were all topics that required critical con-
templation and called for decisions that would aﬀect the rest of the
working process. In order to suﬃciently and thoroughly be able to cover
all these areas, I decided to proceed in the followingmanner: in the ﬁrst
section of this chapter, I begin by covering the topic of how the pri-
mary data was handled. The primary data used in this book consist of
qualitative data obtained through interviews at the headquarters and at
various local subsidiaries, complemented by quantitative data obtained
directly from the iss headquarters. Within this ﬁrst section, I start by
analyzing under which circumstances qualitative and quantitative data
are optimally utilized. This, in essence, sets the scene for justifying my
choice of primarily utilizing qualitative data opposed to quantitative
data throughout the book.This is followed by an illumination of the sec-
ondary data. The secondary data used in this book consists of already
existing theories on knowledge sharing and corporate culture proposed
by several noted authors, complemented by relevant pamphlets and ar-
ticles from iss on their knowledge sharing attributes and corporate
culture. The secondary data has laid the foundation on which I base my
theoretical analysis of knowledge sharing and corporate culture. Upon
completion of this, I continue by explaining the methodology used in
connection with the primary and secondary data. In this part, I discuss
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the procedure in which the data has been collected, the approach used
for analyzing and interpreting the data, along with a discussion of the
precautions that were taken in order to ensure that the data I was using
was relevant, valid and reliable; and ﬁnally comments are made about
how the data can be best utilized. In the third section of this chapter, I
comment on the interview guide and survey questionnaire, where the
style and use of the guide and questionnaire are relayed. This is con-
cluded by a section that reveals my own personal shortcomings and the
restraints that are inherent to a research endeavour of this nature.
2.1 Primary Data
The empirical data that was collected in the initial phase of this work
forms the backbone of the present research project. In this section, I
present a detailed discussion of the data that will be used later. I begin
by brieﬂy looking at the debate between the use of qualitative and quan-
titative data in order to rationalize my use of a combined approach, and
then go on to explain themethods that will be employed to collect, ana-
lyze and interpret the data. Lastly, I will list some organizational issues,
closely related to the two research questions, that are helpful in further
understanding my ultimate choice of data utilization methods.
TheQualitative-QuantitativeData Conundrum
There is great ambiguity, within the research community, regarding
the respective merits and shortcomings of qualitative and quantita-
tive data. Qualitative data helps understand the peculiar; quantitative
data helps explain the general. Notwithstanding the more recent de-
bate about the dissociation of types of data and collection methods
(Hentschel 1998), I believe that there is an unavoidable link between
the two.Therefore, data collection methods are still, to a certain extent
and often for reasons that are of a practical nature, dependent on the
type of data to collect. A choice therefore has to be made between qual-
itative and quantitative data before one is able to identify the optimal
methods. That choice will aﬀect the rest of the study and it is therefore
not an easy issue; it poses a dilemma thatmust be resolved in the course
of just about any research work. A team that embarks on the journey
represented by the study of a sociological phenomenon of some order
will have to decide on the type of data it wants to collect but, although
that decision is consciouslymade, it might not be completely voluntary.
Rather, it is suggested that the research questions that are formulated
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in the beginning, the object of the research project, its general topic
and ultimate goals should be determining factors in deciding the ex-
tent to which one gravitates towards a qualitative or quantitative bias
(Andersen 1990; Mechanic 1989).
The present project is the result of a collaborative process between a
small research team at the Copenhagen Business School and a company
that has solicited outsiders’ help to shed light on an internal problem-
atic situation. While it would (and surely will) be interesting for both
parties to discover principles and rules of thumb that are generally ap-
plicable to situations similar to the one that is being studied, there is
an avowed interest to get a more speciﬁc analysis, directed at the ac-
tual issues. Accordingly, this work presents a unique opportunity to get
virtually unrestricted access to the sources of data connected to knowl-
edge sharing and corporate cultures that I deem relevant for analysis.
The company understands the potential beneﬁts of this collaborative
process and therefore opens itself fully to the investigation and frees
the emerging results for the beneﬁt of a wider audience.
The possibility for me to be close to the organization as a whole, as
well as to some of its individual members, is an incentive to try to get
an understanding of the issues, rather than to merely explain them. By
reaching that comprehensive and contextual view of the problems, my
ambition is not simply to explain their nature and their occurrence, but
to help iss, and companies suﬀering under similar situations, to bet-
ter their situation by ultimately providing some key recommendations.
The peculiarities of this project, being much more contextually based
in the speciﬁcs of unique situations rather than formalized statistics,
made it a natural choice to focus much more on qualitative data than
on quantitative, and my collection methods were selected accordingly.
According to Andersen (1990), an increasing number of academics
believe in the power of a mixed use of the two types of data, as a way
to check their respective validity, their relevance, or simply because of
their availability. In the following, I have used quantitative data that
was made available by the corporate partner regarding the use of the
knowledgemanagement systemby the individual national subsidiaries.
This quantitative data is represented in a spreadsheet displaying the
number of hits (how frequently it is used) the current knowledge man-
agement system gets from the users at the various local subsidiaries
over a speciﬁc time period. From this, it becomes obvious which sub-
sidiaries use the system more frequently than others. My main goal
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in establishing this aspect ﬁrst was to identify the subsidiaries that
were located at the extremities of the hits’ continuumand consequently
would be particularly interesting to studymore attentively.Therefore, a
quantitative analysis of the number of hits on the established corporate
knowledge sharing system by the individual subsidiaries allowedme to
single out the speciﬁc parts of the organization that would yield the
most interesting and useful results in face-to-face interviews, as well
as the topics that I would have to bring up with them. In other words,
quantitative data is at the basis of, and a guide for, my further work
with qualitative data.
2.2 Secondary Data
Thesecondary data used in this book is based on theworks of several au-
thors who have proposed theories pertaining to knowledge sharing and
corporate culture. Furthermore, iss has been an important provider
of secondary data in the form of pamphlets and articles concerning in-
formation about the diﬀerent local subsidiaries and the headquarters.
This information spans from speciﬁc knowledge sharing approaches
throughout iss, down to illustrations of how corporate culture is per-
ceived at the subsidiary level. Naturally the Internet and school based
research tools and banks, such as ebsco and pro-quest, have supple-
mented the depth of the secondary data, allowing for an all-rounded
depiction of corporate culture and knowledge sharing.
Although the importance of the secondary data used has repercus-
sions throughout the entire book, it clearly plays a paramount role in
the theoretical foundation. In the chapter addressing the bearing pil-
lars, it was consciously decided that the secondary data should solely
plough the way towards answering the ﬁrst research question without
the aid of empirical data. In this manner, we will receive an untainted
and pristine impression of how noted authors believe knowledge shar-
ing across corporate cultures is to be accomplished, without polluting
it with the speciﬁcs of iss. Consequently, the secondary data attained
from iss was not used in this chapter as it was ﬁrm speciﬁc and not
‘neutral’ to the topics of knowledge sharing and corporate culture.
Throughout the rest of the book, neutral secondary data, such as that
used in the theoretical foundation, along with speciﬁc secondary data,
such as that obtained from iss headquarters and local subsidiaries,
united help answer the succeeding research question and the overall
issue formulation.
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2.3 Methodology Used in Connection with the Primary
and Secondary Data
In order to construct a solid foundation on which to help base the re-
sults, it was absolutely essential to advance in an extremely structured
manner when dealing with and managing the primary and secondary
data. Hentschel (1998) proposes a four-step research approach compris-
ing of data collection, data analysis, data interpretation and the utiliza-
tion of data, which helps structure and, more important, make sense of
the empirical, as well as the theoretical, parts of the research. Although
this approach is of the utmost relevance when working with quanti-
tative data, I believe it to be more laborious to respect clear-cut divi-
sions of the diﬀerent steps when gathering and processing qualitative
data. Therefore, I have modiﬁed Hentschel’s proposed approach into a
three-step scheme where the analysis and interpretation of data are in-
tertwined since I feel that these two steps are practically inseparable
when dealing with qualitative data. While quantitative data allows for
an analytical part that yields numerical results that can later be inter-
preted, it is diﬃcult to conduct an analysis of qualitative data that never
refers back to the desired or actual situation. Such a comparative way
of analyzing qualitative data invariably entails some interpretation and
consequently, I have chosen to merge the two steps into a single one.
As a result, I follow a three-pronged approach which, when viewed in
its entirety, can be thought of as the research design. The three steps,
which will be discussed in detail below, are data collection, data analy-
sis and interpretation, and the utilization of data. Within the ﬁrst two
steps (data collection and data analysis and interpretation) the primary
data and secondary data are tackled individually, a separation notmade
in the ﬁnal step (data utilization) since it is the combination of the two
data forms that I use to answer the overarching research issue formu-
lation.
Data Collection of the Primary Data
Within the data collection process, there are two important aspects that
must be considered which deﬁne the base onwhich the subsequent em-
pirical analysis builds; namely the methods of data collection used and
the data type that is collected (Hentschel 1998, 4).
As has been established in the above section, the data collection
method has primarily been rooted in the qualitative approach. To be
able to obtain the exact data we were searching for, I decided to further
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narrow the scope within the spectrum of qualitative data, to contextual
data. I found this type of data appropriate as contextual data, like quali-
tative data, attempts to understand the human behaviour within social
environments but furthermore, it also speciﬁes its focus to speciﬁc lo-
calities (Hentschel 1998, 9). Exactly this was of primary importance as
the interviews in the local subsidiaries were being conducted. There-
fore, in accordance with this, I proceeded to conduct the interviews in
the following manner with the following purposes:
The Interviews
At the outset, interviewswere conductedwith the staﬀ at the headquar-
ters, the main initiator of the common knowledge sharing system and
the entity that deals with the problems on anup-close basis.This helped
identify possible problem areas as seen from the headquarters’ and an
implementer’s viewpoint. This data was useful as it provided an idea of
the complexities involved with the situation and introduced me to the
speciﬁcs of the iss situation. Furthermore, data from this early inter-
view helpedmould part of the interview guide, which was a helpful tool
during the subsequent interviews with the diﬀerent subsidiaries.
Subsidiaries at both ends of the knowledge sharing spectrum were
identiﬁed; the subsidiaries that diligently use the current knowledge
sharing system and those that are more hesitant. The purpose of se-
lecting extremes was to provide insight into the factors that might pro-
mote the use of the knowledge sharing system, and the factors that are
present when not using it. Interviews were conducted at the headquar-
ters of iss a/s in Copenhagen, Denmark, along with four subsidiaries:
iss France in Paris, iss Italia in Milan, iss Österreich in Vienna and
iss Danmark in Copenhagen. The speciﬁcs of each interview are por-
trayed below:
iss (Headquarters): Several interviews were conducted with diﬀerent
employees who had relevance to knowledge sharing within the iss
headquarters. All of these interviews were conducted in Danish so to
minimize language deﬁciencies in the respondents.
• Interview 1:with Peter Ankerstjerne, GroupBusinessDevelopment
Manager at iss, who is in part responsible for the integration of a
well functioning corporate knowledgemanagement systemwithin
iss. Peter Ankerstjerne was a crucial person to interview as he
represents the main link between the company’s upper level head-
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quartermanagement and the subsidiary level contact person. Fur-
thermore, Ankerstjerne’s role in relation to the knowledge shar-
ing system and its corporate wide implementation made his com-
ments even more relevant. No interview guide was used for this
initial interview, as it would have been premature to have speciﬁc
questions about iss at this early stage.The interview lasted about
two hours and helped mould my perception of the iss situation
along with the interview guide that would prove useful in the suc-
ceeding interviews. The atmosphere throughout the entire inter-
view was very relaxed and informal, yielding a productive brain-
storming of ideas, as no momentum was lost due to formalities.
This free-ﬂow of ideas is especially helpful in the initial phase of a
research project such as this one, as it reduces the risk for poten-
tially relevant topics to be overseen.
• Interview 2:withMartin Broberg, Group CommunicationManager
at iss, who works on a daily basis to ensure a smooth ﬂow and
operation of the current knowledge sharing system. Mr. Broberg
was deemed relevant to interview because of the pivotal role he
plays in, and his in-depth involvement with, the knowledge shar-
ing processes throughout the entire iss corporation. Essentially,
Mr. Broberg’s function is to act as the screen through which all in-
formation, be it between subsidiaries or between subsidiaries and
the headquarters, normally transits. I thus considered him to be of
utmost importance to the knowledge sharing process and I conse-
quently devoted extra time and eﬀort to extract data fromhim.The
then structured interview guide was applied to help cover the in-
teresting areas of concern throughout the interview. Having dual
interviews with headquarter representatives allowed for a stereo-
scopic interpretation of the revealed elements which helped add
validity to the emerging results.
iss France: Interview with Chouky Le Quilliec, Communications Man-
ager for the French subsidiary of the group. At the level of the national
subsidiary, she acts as the portal through which information that cir-
culates between the headquarters and the subsidiary transits. As such,
she receives, interprets and relays corporate information, ensuring that
relevant pieces of data reach the right people within the organization.
The interview was conducted in French, the native language of both
the interviewee and one of the research assistants who was conduct-
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ing the interview, at the head-oﬃce of iss France, in Paris. The inter-
view lasted two hours, entirely spent solely with Ms. Le Quilliec, in her
oﬃce. The interview guide proved very useful for this particular inter-
view as the research assistant had to rely on a preset structure. There-
fore, the interviewer could draw from the guide to ensure that all top-
ics were thoroughly covered. However, the French subsidiary quickly
revealed itself as not being very participative in corporate knowledge
sharing initiatives and consequently, the interviewer was forced to re-
orient and modify questions so to be applicable to the unique French
situation.Note takingwas particularly important during this interview,
since the notes and the oral comments of the research assistant would
be the unique source of knowledge about the interview.The atmosphere
was semi-formal and the interviewwas sometimes interrupted by some
of Ms. Le Quilliec’s colleagues who needed her assistance in other mat-
ters. This proved helpful, as it provided a candid and real impression of
the seemingly haphazard working methods of the French iss employ-
ees.
iss Danmark: Interview with Steen Otterström. Mr. Otterström is the
Communication Manager of the Danish subsidiary of iss and as such,
his functions include concerning himself with the knowledge shar-
ing system. The interview was conducted entirely in Danish, at the
head-oﬃce of the subsidiary, in the Greater Copenhagen area. This in-
terview was especially interesting and relevant, as iss Danmark op-
erates under a completely diﬀerent corporate culture as the headquar-
ters. Furthermore, iss Danmark is one of the least diligent users of
the existing knowledge sharing system, among the subsidiaries of iss.
The interview lasted almost two hours and was characterized by a very
informal atmosphere. Once again, the interview guide was utilized in
order to orient the discussion towards relevant topics.
iss Österreich: Interview with Magistrate Gudrun Heiden at the Aus-
trianhead-oﬃce inVienna.Ms.Heiden is the assistant to the chief com-
munication manager of the Austrian subsidiary. Although it was not
possible to go directly to the communication manager himself in this
interview, Ms. Heiden proved very competent and was able to deliver
extremely detailed and concise information regarding the knowledge
sharing activities throughout the subsidiary. This was a direct conse-
quence ofMs. Heidenworking on a daily basis with the knowledge shar-
ing system and being employed by iss for a signiﬁcant length of time.
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Her organizational position being slightly lower than the other inter-
viewees’, special care was taken to stress the importance of her answer-
ing in a manner representative of the entire subsidiary. He interview
was conducted inGermanand it lasted about onehour. As thiswas a sin-
gle researcher representative interview, the interview guide once again
played a key supporting role throughout the interview.The atmosphere
throughout the interview was formal yet relaxed; although formal lan-
guage was used, the conversation was casual and free-ﬂowing.
iss Italia: Interview with Carlo, Gianfranco and Roberto Garavaglia,
the two sons and the grandson of the founder of the original Italian
company. The interview lasted 6 hours and took place at the Italian
subsidiary’s head-oﬃce in Milan and was conducted by the research as-
sistant who speaks ﬂuent Italian. Carlo Garavaglia is the oﬃcial presi-
dent of the rather small Italian subsidiary; Gianfranco, although not
allocated the title of president, shares top managerial responsibili-
ties with his brother; and Roberto, third generation of Garavaglia in
the company, is responsible for marketing. Due to the relatively small
size of the subsidiary, the three fulﬁl many job roles that would oth-
erwise be delegated to separate individuals, and are consequently not
endowed with diverse titles such as communication manager. As a re-
sult, all three play key roles throughout the communication ﬂow of the
subsidiary and hence were deemed interesting to interview. The ﬁrst
three hours were spent in the president’s oﬃce, where the actual in-
terview took place. The interview guide set the structure that loosely
guided the conversation for the duration of the interview. The atmo-
sphere for the actual interview was initially formal but soon turned
more casual as a relation of conﬁdence was established between the
parties. Nevertheless, the polite form of the Italian language was con-
tinuously used by the interviewer to address the two senior inter-
viewees. Upon completion of the actual interview, the entire group
proceeded to lunch where the topics were discussed in a much more
casual setting. This part of the visit, although unplanned, also pro-
vided valuable insight into the relevant topics and how they are per-
ceived. After lunch, the interviewees gave a tour of the premises where
further insight was gained as the topics were further discussed and
illustrated. During the last three hours of the interview, the inter-
view guide was naturally left aside. However, directly upon comple-
tion of the more informal parts of the visit, the interview guide was
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consulted and the informal, yet relevant bits of data where added to
the guide.
Logic behind the Chosen InterviewMethodology
Since data fromone interviewmight not correspondwith data from an-
other interview andmay even conﬂict, albeit being in similar situations
(Fielding and Fielding 1986, 59) it was necessary to conduct several in-
terviews. Therefore, by interviewing several subsidiaries; two located
at the poor end of knowledge sharing activity spectrum and two at the
high end, it was hoped to broaden the sample variety and the inputs
from the interviewees, thereby giving more credibility to the emerging
outcome (the broadened sample variety is still very modest and would
be better served with evenmore interviews. More on this in the section
Personal Delimitations, 42).
When possible, the interviews were conducted by in duality by me
andmy research assistant so to avoid personal inﬂuence of the obtained
data. According to Andersen (1990), the interviewer is inﬂuenced by the
study andpossibly also inﬂuences the study in amanner that is not pris-
tine.The consequent result is that the data gets ﬂawed as it is tainted by
personal judgment and individual viewpoints. Thus, having two people
conduct the interviews decreased the chance of misleading the data.
Interviews were conducted in person at the various local subsidiaries
in Denmark, France, Italy and Austria. The purpose of this was three-
fold. First, to be able to receive an up-close and personal understanding
of what the interviewee deemed relevant tomention about their knowl-
edge sharing aspects. This approach limited the barriers or static that
can occur when interviewing over the Internet or telephone and conse-
quently increased the intensity of the ﬁndings. Face-to-face meetings
favour a fuller exchange between the interviewer and the interviewee,
which ultimately contributes to the richness of the interpretation of the
words. Second, since the interviewee is not always aware of the prob-
lematic areas present at the subsidiary, I was able to receive a candid in-
terpretation of the aspects that were deemed connected to knowledge
sharing but were not directly expressed by the interviewee. Third, for
me to be able to discreetly note and receive an impression of the local
corporate cultures, an impression the interviewee might not be able to
voice himself.
Interviews were conducted in the local language, i. e. French, Ger-
man, Italian and Danish.The purpose of this was twofold. First, by con-
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versing in the local language the interviewee would not be hindered by
language barriers to express herself in the exact manner she found ap-
propriate. I found this to be of the utmost importance as my primary
goal was to receive an exact depiction of the variables at the local sub-
sidiaries. Second, I felt that by conducting the interview in the local
language, it would promote a casual atmosphere; an atmosphere more
prone to disclosing information. Furthermore, it allowed me and my
research assistant to identify the contextual meaning of the words, as
well as alternative meanings that could suggest other interpretations
of what was actually being said. Details of the actual construction and
development of the conversation were useful to reach a higher level of
understanding. Silences, gaps, hesitations, jokes, and laps of the tongue
are all factors that help determine both the ﬁrst-degree meaning of the
words, and possible alternative interpretations, exemplifying the mul-
tiple senses carried by the speech. Selecting the native language of the
interviewee ensured that the value of these elements was not lost.
Although mostly coincidental, the interviews were conducted about
one year after the introduction of the current knowledge sharing sys-
tem. This turned out to be an excellent time frame to follow up on the
progress or lack of progress on the diligent use of the system, as one
year is adequate time to allow people to get accustomed to using the
system.
The interviewees were notiﬁed by the headquarters that they would
soon be interviewed and were given a brief update as to what the in-
terview was about. The purpose of this was to install a sense of impor-
tance and urgency about the interview. The fact that the headquarters
promoted the interviews to the international subsidiaries increased the
seriousness in which I, as a researcher, was approached with. The brief
update allowed the interviewee to prepare herself mentally for the ap-
propriate topic and helped her understand what I wanted to get out of
the interview. I speciﬁcally did not send an interview guide in advance
for the interviewee to study, as I feared this might aﬀect the validity
of her response if she has had time to cater them. I felt this was best
served by asking her the speciﬁcs of the inquiry directly on the spot.
The interviews began by assuring that I and my research assistant
were not corporate ‘spies.’ I was aware that the interviewee might have
some reservations about disclosing information to us because of the
fact that the headquarters would, at some point, receive this informa-
tion.This was rectiﬁed by introducing the topic, the intents and overall
33
2 Procedural Considerations
purpose of the interview in an honest and non-threatening manner.
This eased the tension the interviewee might have been harbouring re-
garding the inquiry, as she realized that the outcome would be purely
productive and non-incriminating down the road.
The pre-made interview guide was only loosely followed and used
more as a guide to conduct topic-focused interviews, as suggested by
Casley and Kumar (1988). As the cultures and situations of the various
subsidiaries diﬀered dramatically, I found it inappropriate to follow a
predetermined standard for conducting the interviews. In order to ex-
tract as much data as possible and cover all areas of relevance in each
subsidiary, I found it more useful to suggest a question or idea and al-
low the interviewee to roam freely around the topic; disclosingwhat she
found important about that speciﬁc topic. In this fashion, I received a
holistic impression of the speciﬁcs in each subsidiary.The guide was di-
vided into four broad areas of investigation that would later facilitate
the codifying process.
Throughout the interview, a form of verbal triangulation was con-
ducted. Questions and issues on a speciﬁc topic would be reformulated
and addressed from various angles, thereby testing for consistency in
the interviewee’s responses. If diverse approaches on a singular topic
support a unanimous outcome, then conﬁdence in the results was in-
creased (Fielding andFielding 1986, 24) and conversely if no consistency
was found, the obtained datamay lose some credibility. Hence, the pur-
pose of this was to conﬁrm the data that I was receiving so to have a
more credible foundation on which to base the results.
Towards the end of the interview, the discussion would carry over
into more of a socializing phase. The purpose of this was ﬁrst, to pro-
vide the interviewee with a little feedback and second, andmore impor-
tantly, to build up goodwill and conﬁdence in the interviewee so I would
be received positively when asking follow-up questions.
The Survey
In order to complement the data sets collected during the interviews
that were conducted with the managers of the selected national sub-
sidiaries, some data that was collected through a survey question-
naire was also utilized. In collaboration with the corporate managers
in charge of the knowledge sharing projects at iss, a qualitative ques-
tionnaire was developed that covered a series of areas similar to the
ones covered during the live interviews.
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Since the survey questionnaire formed part of a project that followed
up on the progress of the implementation of the knowledge sharing sys-
tem a year after its launch, the headquarters of iss maintained con-
trol over the practicalities and ensured the validity of the results. Re-
spondents were selected from the group of users of the system in each
national subsidiary, who were notiﬁed that they were to complete the
questionnaire electronically; this greatly simpliﬁed the treatment of the
answers, a process that the data handlers at iss were competent to take
care of. I subsequently had access to the results of the survey, as well as
to the individual, anonymous answers that were given to the questions.
Note on the General Validity of the Empirical Data
Having collected the empirical data, yet before progressing to the me-
thodological issues pertaining to its analysis and interpretation, I stron-
gly believe that it is essential to discuss the validity of the collected
data. In the context of natural sciences, the observer’s paradox is a dis-
turbance that has been described as the impossibility to truly examine
a phenomenon, since the conditions that are necessary to enable the
researcher to study the given phenomenon have an inﬂuence on it.
In an organizational research such as this, the problem is unavoid-
able. I am aware that, being sent from the group’s headquarters (all of
the appointments for interviews were facilitated by my contact at the
head-oﬃce, while the survey was directly administered by the head-
quarters), some people within the subsidiaries might paint rosy pic-
tures on their eagerness to use the knowledge sharing system, and on
their diligence in using it. This is what I have chosen to label as the ob-
server’s paradox in this research; as I came to observe the natural be-
haviour of iss employees, they changed their ways for speciﬁc reasons.
I worked especially hard on preventing this during the interviews and
purposely aimed at installing a very relaxed atmosphere that facilitated
a feeling of trust and opportunity for improvement. In doing so, I re-
mained conscious of the imminent danger of losing some of the objec-
tivity that I enjoyed as an outsider to the organization but was able to
convey the message of mutual beneﬁts and insuring a good balance of
our combined interests. The necessity to reach such a balance is central
to the productive outcome of face-to-face interviews and inﬂuences the
genuineness of the data (Fielding and Fielding 1986, 54).
A further technique that was employed to increase the degree of
validity of the data was a form of investigator triangulation (similar
35
2 Procedural Considerations
in type to the triangulation method discussed in the previous sec-
tion on Data Collection, subsection Logic behind the Chosen Interview
Methodology’) where more than one researcher examines the same
situation (Fielding and Fielding 1986, 25). In the cases where I and my
research assistantwere present at the same time in the interview-room,
the same topics were coveredwith each of the interviewees individually.
In the course of each single interview, the same topics were approached
from several diﬀerent angles, and the same questions were asked using
diﬀerent formulations and at diﬀerent moments of the conversation.
Whenever possible, we attempted to resolve any evident discrepancy in
the answers that were given in the course of the interview.When incon-
sistencies were discovered later, (e. g., while reading interview notes),
complementary questions were sent to the relevant persons, in order
to shed further light on the situation.
Data Collection of the Secondary Data
Thecollection of relevant secondary datawas accomplished through the
research tools available at the numerous university libraries, notes, doc-
uments and pamphlets made available from professional sources at the
Copenhagen Business School, the Wirschaftsuniversität in Vienna, the
Budapest University of Economic Sciences and Public Administration
and ﬁnally from the iss headquarters and subsidiaries. The collected
secondary data is directly applicable to the topics this book concerns
itself with.
The data obtained from the above sources, along with previous ac-
quired knowledge obtained through earlier research initiatives of a sim-
ilar nature, provided an earnest overview of the issues pertaining to
corporate culture and knowledge sharing from a theoretical perspec-
tive. However, since the literature on corporate culture and knowledge
sharing is very extensive and varied, it quickly became apparent that
a limitation for appropriate literature was in some manner needed. I
therefore proceeded to collect literature that diﬀered in context and
style so to bring as many views and opinions to the topics. By doing
so, I hoped to avoid getting drawn into a form of group-think by the au-
thors’ partiality and rather receive an array of view-points from which
I could compare results and draw carefully heeded conclusions.
Analysis and Interpretation of the Data
Being content with the data collection method, I proceed to explain my
procedure of turning the data into usable knowledge. Therefore, the
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next logical step involves the selection of a method to analyze and in-
terpret the data in a fashion that is clearly deﬁned and agreed upon in
advance.
Primary Data
Most learning from qualitative interviews is obtained by writing de-
scriptive summaries about the interviews and thereafter collating and
sorting these summaries into categories of responses (Casley and Ku-
mar 1988, 9). This essential analytical procedure of sorting summaries
into categories of responses is termed ‘coding,’ which essentially aids
in recontextualizing data, thereby providing a new context for viewing
and analyzing it. However, coding extends further than simply giving
categories to data; it also conceptualizes the data, allowing for the for-
mulation of new questions and levels of interpretation to rise (Coﬀey
and Atkinson 1996, 31). Coding is therefore about breaking the data
apart into analytical relevant parts, thereby allowing for the progres-
sion towards a further understanding of the data. I found this technique
to be very auspicious and it was consequently selected as the preferred
method of analyzing and interpreting the primary data.
The segmenting of data using coding can be achieved in a variety
of ways as long as the coding process is compatible with the research
framework. The key thus lies in choosing a coding process that corre-
lates with the research framework and the overall intent and research
objective. Keeping this in mind, I opted to choose the method of cod-
ing from the foreshadowed issue formulation that inspired the research
project as suggested by Coﬀey and Atkinson (1996).
I only applied the coding process to the empirical interview data, as
it alone had the richness and depth necessary to support the extent to
which I wanted the data analyzed. This richness and depth stem from
the interviewees’ comprehensive perception of the knowledge sharing
intricacies within iss, which sometimes led them to bring up side dis-
cussions. Although many of these discussions did not seem to be di-
rectly relevant to the topic of knowledge sharing from the outset, they
often yielded interesting and important results by allowing me to bet-
ter understand certain conditions speciﬁc to the subsidiary, as well as
their implications for the rest of the group. In fact, interviewees have
oftenused these deviations fromwhat should have been the focus of the
ﬁeld research as a possibility to tell us about the speciﬁc conditions that
seemingly justiﬁed their reaction or standpoint towards the rest of the
company. Being of a more superﬁcial nature, the survey data obtained
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from the questionnaire is deprived from such richness and depth and I
consequently found codiﬁcation to be inappropriate for it. As a result,
the survey data played a complementary role, principally representing
the thoughts and opinions of the group of subsidiaries that I could not
practically interview. Throughout the analysis and interpretation, the
input from the survey data therefore helped conﬁrm certain deductions
and ﬁndings from the codiﬁed interview data.
The Codiﬁcation Process
The codiﬁcation process began by grouping the interview data into four
generic areas fromwhich a general thematic content would emerge.The
generic areas are in the form of short phrases and read: (a) the local
corporate culture, (b) Business Insight’smatch with the existing knowl-
edge sharing processes, (c) the ideal knowledge sharing situation and,
ﬁnally, (d) hindrances to the achievement of the ideal knowledge shar-
ing situation. Naturally, for each area, multitudes of supporting ques-
tions were asked during the interview to allow me to arrive at these
broad areas. The rational of dividing the interview guide into four ar-
eas was to aid inmaking easier comparison of the responses that would
emerge in the same areas across all interviews.This is a key step in codi-
fying as it allows for the categorization of responses and it sets the stage
for the interpretation of data.
Having selected, fragmented, coded and categorized the obtained
data, I was now ready to systematically explore it so to generate mean-
ing. Correctly interpreting the coded data is vital as it lays the founda-
tion for the further analysis of this research. Therefore, it was without
coincidence that this particular phase of data handling was devoted
particular attention.
The Interpretation Process
As was just explained inThe Codiﬁcation Process, the recontextualized
data was arranged in a systematic fashion thus comparing the same
areas across interviews was easily readable. This was accomplished by
bundling together the relevant data bits relating to each area so the
data was not only easily readable but also able to be explored further. By
having four or ﬁve codes to plainly sum up one area of an interview, it
becamemuch easier to explore the data as a result of being able to easily
see the codes repeat themselves.These repeated codes within the same
areas but across diﬀerent interview sections suggested the emergence
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of patterns, themes or regularities that then could begin to be scruti-
nized. Similarly, irregularities and contrasts between data areas were
also interesting phenomena to scrutinize, as it became interesting to ex-
plore why there were discrepancies. Essentially, the bundled codes pro-
vided dimensional interpretation of the data and allowed me to think
more creatively about some of the themes, or lack of themes, that were
identiﬁed in the coding process and it paved the way for posing further
questions, enablingme to speculate and hypothesize instead of remain-
ing anchored in the interview notes and observations alone.
These speculations were subsequently projected against the earlier
obtained theoretical ﬁndings and compared to the survey data, shed-
ding light on the diverse, or unanimous, outcomes and implications of
these diﬀerent sources of data. Thereafter, I referred back to the sit-
uation and viewpoints of the diﬀerent subsidiaries I had interviewed,
which enabledme to identify the organizationally poor knowledge shar-
ing features and characteristics, an essential step towards the comple-
tion of this work. Thereto, in the cases when there still remained un-
certainty and ambiguity with the outcomes, I would refer back to the
raw, un-coded data in the hopes of extracting more insight to further
illuminate the subject matter. An unfortunate side eﬀect of coded data
is that some data gets lost in the codifying process. Therefore, return-
ing to the un-coded data, still embedded in the actual context of the
speciﬁc situation, sometimes allowed for deeper insight into a speciﬁc
event (more on this in the following section, Shortcomings of Codiﬁca-
tion). Only once a form of agreement among the diverging data parts
emergedwas it possible to draw conclusions and claim that the data had
been satisfactorily interpreted.
Shortcomings of Codiﬁcation
Although I am pleased with the results the codiﬁcation process is able
to deliver, I feel it is warranted to denote the shortcomings that this
particular procedure harbours since coding has been used as the chief
method of analyzing and interpreting the primary data.
To beginwith, the codes used in this book are structured according to
my personal interpretation of organizational behaviour and are conse-
quently unique creations identiﬁed and selected solely bymy composite
understanding of the theme.This is important tomention because oth-
ers might have coded the data diﬀerently as their perception of organi-
zational behaviour diﬀers from mine. This implies that a researcher’s
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preconception of a situation can, and most likely will, have repercus-
sions on the project outcome. Therefore, there will always be a certain
level of ambiguity connected with coding.
The reasoning behind constructing the interview guide in four areas
was to facilitate the extraction of topic speciﬁc data for each interview.
However, the nature of qualitative data means that data relating to one
particular topic or area is not found neatly bundled together at exactly
the same spot in each interview (Coﬀey and Atkinson 1996, 35). Hence,
it was not uncommon to have to delve into, for example, the second or
third area in order to ﬁnd data relating to the ﬁrst area. This form of
skipping back and forth in order to extract topic speciﬁc data muddles
the analytical approach and suggests that codifying according to areas
is not as pristine and straightforward as it appears at the outset.
Finally, when conducting the interviews, the interview informant
would seldom reply to the inquiries with a simple and direct response
but rather lead an answer down a long and complicated path of reminis-
cences inwhich he couldmore easily illustrate his point. However, when
codifying the interviewee’s elaborate explanations, I essentially dissect
his ‘stories’ and am thereby in danger of losing the context in which the
point was told. This implies that the codifying process leaves out bits
of information that are, at the time, considered fruitless to codify but
nevertheless supply the context in which the coded data is imbedded.
The current codes tried to represent the essence of the entire story, but
I acknowledge that some data gets omitted in order to be able to sum
up a 10-minute story with two or three suitable codes.
Secondary Data
For the secondary data, the analysis and interpretation of the collected
data involved less complicated procedures than exercised with the pri-
mary data. Nevertheless, special care was taken in order to fully com-
prehend and conceive the pertinent data, which often resulted in revis-
ing and restudying it.
Since the data had already been processed by the original authors
who had ﬁrst hand insight into the material, the work that was based
on this data was essentially an assimilation and re-projection of the au-
thors original works. The major risk one runs when using secondary
data is that the analyzed data is somehowbiased by the original author’s
bearings.These bearings can sway the objectivity that other researchers
may desire when applying the data and hence, not provide others with
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a pristine view on the topic. I sought to overcome this problem when
analyzing and interpreting the data by not relying heavily on one single
perspective but rather gather a multitude of impressions from several
authors who, united, could provide an undeﬁled impression of the topic
at hand.
Utilization of Data
Once the primary and secondary data had been collected, analyzed, in-
terpreted, and its validity veriﬁed within reasonable limits, the deci-
sive ﬁnal stage of correctly utilizing it remains.Without this last step of
the process, the data remains meaningless to the overarching purposes
of the research initiative; the organizational data has been applied in
the previous sections, but the results of the analysis and interpretation
have to yield some kind of answers in order to be fruitful.
My ambition with the present research is to utilize the gathered data
in a manner that provides insight for the corporate partner that lays
the foundation for the research and to make these insights applica-
ble to a wider audience of corporations in similar situations that as-
pire towards achieving healthier knowledge sharing practices. Remain-
ing within this vein, I seek to utilize the primary and secondary data to
arrive at well deﬁned answers to the two research questions and ulti-
mate issue formulation. Accordingly, utilization of the data will occur
three times throughout the research process.The ﬁrst will be to answer
research question 1, an answer solely based on theoretical secondary
data. The second will be to answer research question 2, where the em-
pirical data is projected onto the secondary ﬁndings.The ﬁnal time will
be to answer the problem identiﬁcation where recommendations relat-
ing to optimizing knowledge sharing initiatives across cultures are dis-
pensed.
2.4 Comments on the Interview Guide and Survey
Questionnaire
As mentioned earlier, the interview guide was used more as a leader
than as a manual through which point-by-point aspects were method-
ologically followed during the interviews. Because of its guiding role,
it is short and the interviewer always formulated the requests in an
open-ended form, giving precisions whenever necessary.The interview
guide covered mainly four broad topics: an investigation into the lo-
cal corporate culture, already existing knowledge sharing processes, the
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ideal knowledge sharing process and, ﬁnally, the factors hindering the
attainment of the ideal knowledge sharing situation. Accordingly, di-
viding the interview guide into four easily digestible sections was an
important part of facilitating the codifying process in which I would
later analyze and interpret the obtained data.
The interviewees were on no occasions given access to the guide.This
‘restriction’ was considered important in order facilitate the possibil-
ity of the respondent feeling completely free to bring up any topic they
deemed relevant at any point in time, rather than keeping bits of in-
formation for a potentially upcoming later moment. This procedure al-
lowedme to uncover interesting linkages between topics that, although
they appeared unrelated in the beginning, were of paramount impor-
tance in the reasoning processes of the people at the subsidiaries.
The survey questionnaire that was sent to selected users of the
knowledge sharing system aimed at providing qualitative inputs simi-
lar to the ones that were gained through the use of the interview guide.
The questions covered two main areas: the general state of knowledge
sharing within the company, and the particularities of utilization of the
existing knowledge sharing system. Speciﬁcally, there were questions
about the general opinions and viewpoints on the company’s knowl-
edge sharing processes; the perceived obstacles to knowledge sharing
in the company; the intensity of use of the knowledge sharing system
and the reasons motivating this intensity; the possible improvements
to the system; the possible improvements to the communications re-
garding the system; and the users’ expectations to form and content.
For the details of the survey questionnaire, see the Appendix.
2.5 Personal Delimitations
Since most of the current data concerns itself with qualitative data,
i. e. that dealing with human behaviour, emotions, practices, etc., it en-
tails a certain implicit complexity that is far greater than that of quan-
titative data (Andersen 1990, 28). The aspects of the human psyche
cannot be thoroughly scrutinized by pure logic reasoning and hence
demands at least some level of psychological understanding. Whether
I, as author of this book, am endowed with an understanding suﬃ-
cient to tackle these issues therefore becomes a reasonable question to
raise. Although I feel adequately equipped to discuss the issues pertain-
ing to the human capital in this book, I must pay respect to the fact
that the human psyche, lying clearly outside the realm of my educa-
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tion, is a subject whose intricacies stretch beyondmy academic comfort
zones.
Furthermore, the chance exists that the data obtained from the iss
employees can, in some way, be misleading. This acknowledgement re-
sides in the academic limitations of the iss staﬀ to appropriately ex-
plain the actions and complex behavioural traits of the entire unit. The
middle managers that were interviewed throughout the iss corpora-
tion correspond to the deﬁnition of key informants put forth by Casley
andKumar (1988), who can provide information about themselves, oth-
ers and about speciﬁc situations or conditions existing within the dis-
cussed ﬁeld (Casley and Kumar 1988, 24) and consequently were the
employees best suited to answer inquiries regarding knowledge sharing
and corporate culture. However, these employees are not experts onhu-
manbehaviour and are subject to personal judgment and interpretation
when delivering their impressions of the entire subsidiary.Their stand-
points are essentially susceptible to biases that stem from any inaccu-
rate or distorted judgments that the interviewee might possess. Con-
sequently, it is not certain that the interviewee has correctly depicted
the illuminated topic in a manner that the rest of the subsidiary would
agree with. Although the interviewee was asked to reply not only for
himself, but for all intended users of Business Insight and several inter-
views were conducted so to minimize occasional misleading data, I do
recognize the risk that, due to the tough nature of this topic and due to
the potential shortcomings of the interviewees’ ability to answer holis-
tically, the interviewees may unwillingly deliver incorrect data. Along
the same vein, I too am susceptible to biases and hence, my shortcom-
ings and consequent distorted perceptions of the interviewees’ remarks
might also have added to the imprecision of the actual outcome.
Finally, it would have been desirable to interview more iss sub-
sidiaries and attain a broader sample of data to support the results.
The beneﬁts of this would be colossal as the accuracy of the recommen-
dations could be increased and the possibility of ﬂawed data decreased,
as the founding researchwould have becomemore individualistic. How-
ever desirable this may have been, it was unfortunately never a possi-
bility as personal limits on time and economy would not allow for it.
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Bearing Pillars
The purpose of this chapter is to establish the underlying fundamental
aspects of the theoretical issues pertaining to knowledge sharing and
corporate culture, and to provide a thorough depiction of the complex
features related to these aspects. By supplying these rudiments, I hope
to raise the intensity in which knowledge sharing and corporate cul-
ture can be discussed throughout the remaining part of this book, and
thereby allow for more topic speciﬁc issues to be addressed. Therefore,
attaining a complete understanding of the present is essential in order
to follow the evolution this book will undertake in the following chap-
ters.
As an initial step in this chapter, I begin by investigating several as-
pects of knowledge sharing, as this acts as the bearing pillar of the anal-
ysis. Thereafter, I shift my focus towards an analysis of the dimensions
of corporate culture. I believe that proceeding in this manner facili-
tates the ﬂow in which corporate culture will be perceived in relation to
knowledge sharing, making it more intuitive. Upon reaching the con-
clusion of this chapter, the then-exposed theoretical perspectives will
build the bedrock on which I ultimately answer how knowledge sharing
is optimally done across corporate culture, my ﬁrst research question.
3.1 Knowledge Sharing
Knowledge itself is power (Francis Bacon, 1618)
Be they scholars or managers employed by companies, most people
who remotely have to deal with the value of knowledge in the course
of their daily work have shown an increasing level of interest for the
topic of knowledge sharing over the recent past (Kautz and Vendelø
2001;Mahnke 1998).Whilemanagers attempt to implement knowledge
sharing systems and measures to help their enterprise perform better
in our competitive world, academics are more preoccupied by study-
ing the phenomenon, the ways in which companies actually aﬀect it,
and the relative eﬃciency of the diverse corporate attempts (e. g., Chen
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1997; Dash 1998; Yang 2000). In the following sections, I do not rede-
ﬁne knowledge sharing, as my deﬁnition was already proposed in chap-
ter 1 ‘From knowledge management to knowledge sharing.’ Instead, I
focus on the organizational issues that signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the exis-
tence and eﬃciency of knowledge sharing within a multinational cor-
poration.
Decentralized vs. Centralized Knowledge Sharing
Theﬁrst organizational issue to take into accountwith respect to knowl-
edge sharing is the relative degree of decentralization of the organiza-
tion. Throughout the last decade, decentralization strategies have been
very popularmeans for companies to reap beneﬁts that required expert
knowledge of speciﬁc market conditions (Yang 2000). These strategies
are often met with success, but it is now clear that there exist areas
in which a certain degree of centralization of the activities is suitable.
Hence, we are currently witnessing an evolution that is likely to lead to
a new type of corporate equilibrium. Cerny (1996), through the account
he gives of the past evolution and of the present situation of Lexing-
ton Labs, describes a series of problems that are likely to plague any
decentralized organization that wants to introduce a company-wide
knowledge sharing system. Regional managers (often locally recruited
or incorporated in the company after the acquisition of a local enter-
prise), who have been left alone to conduct the totality of the oper-
ations of their subsidiaries for too long, are diﬃcultly convinced of
the advantages of using their valuable time to share their expertise
with colleagues that they have always considered as pertaining to a dif-
ferent, unrelated, organization. This kind of negative attitude towards
group-initiative is evenmore likely to arise in subsidiaries that are doing
relatively well at the time when the project is presented. In such situa-
tions, Cerny leaves no doubt about the suitability of a centralized orga-
nizational model of knowledge sharing, an opinion strongly supported
by Stevens (2000), who states that a centralized organization is in a bet-
ter position to implement a company-wide knowledge sharing system.
Taking these authors bearings into account, and the weighted debate
they present, I side with the notion that modern large companies, that
aremore reliant on ethnocentricmanagement techniques than on poly-
centric knowledge inputs, are best served with centralized knowledge
sharing structures that publicizes valuable knowledge from a central
origin.
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MiddleManagers
Knowledge sharing has everything to do with the employees of an or-
ganization (Dash 1998; Dirlam 2000; Stevens 2000; Yang 2000).The di-
verse levels of an organization’s management especially have speciﬁc
responsibilities that vary with the task at hand, with the project that is
being considered. The nature of these very same responsibilities, how-
ever, normally varies according to the relative rank of the manager in
the organization.The same holds true for the project of implementing a
knowledgemanagement system. But once the system is in place, knowl-
edge sharing activities have to continuously permeate every aspect of
the business. Managers at diﬀerent levels of the organization therefore
have an enduring responsibility to ensure that this does happen.
Because of their remoteness from ﬁeld activities, top-level managers
have an overall strategic responsibility that is limited to making the
rules and the atmosphere of the organization favourable to knowledge
sharing. However, the establishment and implementation of the actual
measures that will promote this sharing at the operative levels is the
responsibility of middle managers. In sum, they are the ones who have
to make the crucial decisions that will result into a successful start-up
phase of the knowledge sharing system, and who have to take the ac-
tions that are necessary to ensure the continuous adherence of key or-
ganizational members to this same system. Frontline managers partic-
ipate actively in the knowledge sharing system by giving helpful feed-
back to their hierarchical superiors, therebymaking sure that the inter-
nal activities of the ﬁrm and the manner in which they are carried out
are constantly connected to its environment.
As a simple consequence of their speciﬁc responsibilities, middle
managers appear as key elements in the process of establishing and
successfully maintaining a knowledge sharing system. Their strategic
position makes them the interpreters of top-management’s decisions
for the people who are actually going to carry out the tasks, the front-
line managers. Consequently, they detain a considerable power to in-
ﬂuence the way in which organizational strategies are carried out and
therefore, I deem that their case deserves special attention. Particularly
interesting, due to its similarity with the empirical part of this work,
is the research conducted by Janczak (1999), on which the following
classiﬁcation and explanations are based.
Depending on the speciﬁc types of actions middle managers under-
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take to search for, identify, and thereafter promote the sharing of rel-
evant knowledge between members of the organization, middle man-
agers can be classiﬁed into three broad categories: the problem solvers,
the entrepreneurs, and the negotiators.Through each stage of a project
– start-up, development, and closing – there are approaches to knowl-
edge sharing that are characteristic of the diﬀerent types of managers.
Problem solvers focus mainly on applying existing, often external,
solutions to organizational problems. They judge their accomplish-
ments according to the end-result of their actions and therefore, they
sometimes concentrate onﬁnding problems forwhich they alreadyhave
a solution.
In the start-up stage of a project, when organizational needs (op-
portunities, goals, and vision) and the necessary resources (budget,
material, manpower, equipment) must be identiﬁed, problem solvers
typically interact with their environment (internally and externally,
with regard to the organization) to ﬁnd matching solutions to the
sub-problems they can divide the project into. Once a set of appro-
priate solutions has been put together, problem solvers process the
newly acquired knowledge in order to present it to top management
in a digestible way, leaving the responsibility for decision-making at
the highest level. As stated earlier, the focus of a problem solver upon
completion of a project is on the attainment of an eﬃcient result. His
satisfaction is in having used already-existing knowledge to carry out a
task in a somewhat standard way. On one hand, the sharing activities
are limited to the persons who completed the search for knowledge,
mainly at the middle-management level. On the other hand, the ac-
quired knowledge is easily standardized and formalized, thus making it
readily transferable for later uses by outsiders.
Entrepreneurs are more preoccupied by the process than by the ﬁ-
nal result in itself. Their working methods can often be characterized
as trial and error, they experiment vastly, and pivotal for them is en-
hancing the knowledge the organization acquires and shares while the
actions are performed and the project completed. Entrepreneurs tend
to distance themselves from problem solvers in the initial phase of a
project, in that they act as investigators and catalysts. In other words,
entrepreneurs make sure that they are well aware of the organization’s
members’ respective ﬁelds of expertise, so that they later can gather
the relevant people and encourage them to collaborate in the comple-
tion of the task at hand. Far frombehaving like their colleagues pertain-
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ing to other categories, entrepreneurs normally put to work the knowl-
edge they have identiﬁed by making people interact together in new
and multiple ways. The results that will be presented to top managers
are not merely theoretically possible solutions to the problem; rather,
they are working prototypes of arrangements that are ready to be ex-
panded to the whole organization. The special working philosophy of
entrepreneurs favours the creation of new knowledge among collabo-
rating employees, and exchanges at all levels of the organization. At the
end of a project, this knowledge has normally become tacit and is deeply
embedded in the participants. The consequences of that are twofold:
while the employees who were implicated in the sharing process have
become experts and have acquired and developed new knowledge that
they can use in other areas, it remains diﬃcult for the organization to
eventually share that knowledge with outsiders to the project.
Negotiators are the political type of middle managers, in that they
generally proceed through a project by constantly negotiating on ex-
pectations, goals to be achieved, and on resources, with the inﬂuential
parties involved.This type ofmiddlemanagers will strive to satisfy each
individual at one point or another during the process and, although the
chosen solution might be eﬀective, it is not necessarily the most eﬃ-
cient one from the point of view of the organization.
The behavioural pattern of negotiators upon embarking on a new
task is similar but far from identical to the entrepreneurs’. While the
latter do not discriminate in their search for resources and capabilities,
negotiators tend to seek the approach to the problem that best suits the
resources they have previously identiﬁed as readily available, and they
establish connections between persons whose interactions they deem
will promote their favoured solutions. Substantially more original than
problem solvers but not as open as entrepreneurs to free knowledge
sharing at all levels of the organization, negotiators generally adapt ex-
isting knowledge to newproblems. By interactingwith their peers, their
subordinates, and topmanagement, they reach solutions that are based
on proven experiences that diﬀer only slightly from the situation at
hand.Thus, the possibility for radically new knowledge to emerge is low
but nonetheless existing. For negotiators, themost important source of
knowledge to be shared is not to be found in the outcome of a project
in itself, but in the codiﬁcation of the adaptive process that led the or-
ganization to that precise outcome. Competitors can easily and rapidly
replicate anoutcomebut if anorganization can internally spread knowl-
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edge about its own development process, it has acquired an advantage
that is not easily imitated.
This analysis of the diﬀerent categories ofmiddlemanagers allows us
to discern the various inﬂuences theywill have on the process of knowl-
edge sharing in the organization. In resume, each type ofmanager takes
on a particular role in the organization and consequently has a diﬀerent
role in respect to knowledge sharing: problem solvers are generally the
ones promoting the swiftest knowledge sharing about concrete tasks,
entrepreneurs favour the creation of new tacit knowledge, and negotia-
tors are good at sharing procedural and methodical knowledge.
TheCosts and Beneﬁts of Knowledge Sharing
While knowledge management at large and knowledge sharing in par-
ticular have now for quite some time been considered as premium
sources of competitive advantage for organizations and their value-crea-
ting strategy (Davenport and Prusak 1998), the costs that are related
to these operations are often overseen (Mahnke 1998). However, once
the fact that these costs do exist is acknowledged, a more thorough
cost/beneﬁt analysis of the knowledge sharing process should occur, in
order to determine whether the whole strategy is actually creating or,
on the contrary, destroying corporate value and competitive advantage
(Mahnke 1998). Notwithstanding the possible drawbacks implied in the
process of sharing knowledge, some researchers argue that a company
that mainly relies on tacit knowledge limits its own ability to leverage
and control the corporate body of knowledge eﬀectively enough to cre-
ate a competitive advantage (Sanchez 1997). In light of this dilemma
between potential competitive advantage and competitive disadvan-
tage, I here review some of the costs and beneﬁts pertaining to the
processes of knowledge sharing, based on the work of Mahnke (1998).
As already mentioned in the introductory chapter (the section From
Knowledge Management to Knowledge Sharing), the establishment of
a knowledge sharing system by an organization implies some sort of
prior codiﬁcation and standardization of the body of tacit knowledge
that is ‘contained’ in its individual members. The tacit-explicit trans-
formation is the ﬁrst step (after having identiﬁed the knowledge, of
course) that the organization that envisions increasing its degree of in-
ternal knowledge sharing must take, in order to allow the members to
beneﬁt from each other’s competences. Before that can be achieved,
however, the people who actually detain the tacit knowledge to be
50
Knowledge Sharing 3.1
codiﬁed and eventually shared must be convinced that the whole op-
eration is virtuous and that they too can beneﬁt from it. First, the
time and means that are consumed winning the favour of these key
people, to overcome their natural tendency towards protecting their
self-interest, result in agency costs that will have to be taken into ac-
count when calculating the total cost of the sharing system. Second,
once the sought-after bits of knowledge are standardized and/or cod-
iﬁed, the infrastructures that will actually allow the sharing to occur
(be it by means of meetings if the system is an arrangement of hu-
man networks, or by means of computer networks in the cases of
database-based systems) have to be set up and their constant eﬃcient
functioning assured.Third, the time that workers will use to search and
retrieve relevant knowledge in the system should also be accounted for.
It should be seen as an investment insofar it yields satisfying results and
reduces the time dedicated to reinventing already-existing solutions.
The above-mentioned costs are all real and unavoidable for the wan-
nabe-sharing organization. There is, however, one more type of costs
that is worth taking into account, although it is only potential: the
knowledge that once was tacit having taken an explicit form, the dan-
ger for leakages that would beneﬁt competitors increases considerably.
Such leakages can happen in diﬀerent ways: workers can get hired by
other ﬁrms and share what they know with their new employers, net-
work hacking can give competitors access to the system if it is computer
based, etc.
Fortunately for organizations, knowledge sharing systems are not
only about costs; there are also some substantial beneﬁts to be gained.
One of the obvious advantages of systematically putting knowledge
into an explicit form is that it allows the organization to better integrate
useful information that was previously dispersed among its members,
often in a tacit form. This pooling of information creates a possibility
for leveraging the body of knowledge of the organization across users
and uses, thereby yielding economies of scale and scope. Furthermore,
the knowledge, having been transformed from a tacit into an explicit
form, is bound to the organization in a stronger way; should the ex-
pert-member leave, the knowledge will remain. Insofar the system is
built in a logical and intuitive way that entices the employees to use
it, it should reduce the costs related to knowledge search and retrieval,
and almost eliminate the relatively costly operations involved in repli-
cating and recreating knowledge that already exists in the organization.
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Last but not least, the creation of new knowledge is likely to be boosted
by the facilitated exchange of knowledge, which can eventually leave
the company with an increased competitive advantage. It therefore be-
comes important that these vantages are visible and realized by all in-
tended knowledge sharers so they do not simply focus on the costs.
Hierarchical Structure
Marschan (1996) suggests another issue closely related to a company’s
ability to share knowledge and understand foreign inputs better. Ac-
cording to her, less-hierarchical companies operate like networks, be-
yond the constraints of formal, bureaucratic structures. They are coor-
dinated and controlled through informalmechanisms, such as personal
relationships and interlocked boards of directors, which inadvertently
results in complex ﬂows of knowledge (Marschan 1996, 436). Conse-
quently, less-hierarchical companies can experience diﬃculties sharing
knowledge as the knowledge ﬂows become personal and private ex-
changes rather than publicly accessible for all to share.Therefore, in or-
der to un-complicate the ﬂow of information and ease the knowledge
sharing process, adopting a more hierarchical structure canmake some
information more understandable to others as it is no longer imbed-
ded in personal understandings of the informal mechanisms and social
networks.
CommonGoals
Hill and Storck (2000), following their analysis of a successful system
transition at Xerox, identiﬁed a series of key principles that were found
to signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the success of the implementation of new pro-
cesses, such as those involved with the introduction of a knowledge
sharing system. The existence of mutual interests is one of these key
principles that they emphasize in their analysis of the implementation
process. They argue that smooth implementation of a new system is
best achieved by jointly setting common goals from the outset, involv-
ing all categories of intended users of the system. Such an early per-
sonal involvement in the strategic development of the system is likely
to motivate the diverse organizational members to cooperate towards
the achievement of objectives that are important to all of them (Hill and
Storck 2000). With respect to knowledge sharing, this implies that the
entire organization shares thewill,motivation and goals the knowledge
sharing initiatives set forth.
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Managerial Commitment
Another organizational issue related to the intricacies of knowledge
sharing involves the level of commitment expressed by the top man-
agers of the organization. These managers must ensure the genuine
commitment of the whole organization to the knowledge sharing strat-
egy, a pivotal factor involved in the successful implementation of a
new system (Zack 1999). To ensure the active participation and the
maximum eﬀorts from all organizational members, top-management
must take visiblemeasures that demonstrate the high priority they give
the strategy. Zack explains that the management of the organizations
that are best at managing their knowledge generally follow three steps.
First, they understand their organization’s strategic knowledge require-
ments; then, they devise a knowledge strategy that ﬁts the ﬁrm’s busi-
ness strategy; andﬁnally, they implement anorganizational and techni-
cal architecture that is appropriate to the organization’s knowledge pro-
cessing needs.Themastery of these three steps plays a considerable role
in the successful implementation of a knowledge sharing system, and it
enables the entire organization to apply maximum eﬀort and commit-
ment to knowledge sharing (Zack 1999).
Incentives
A further issue organizations must consider in relation to their knowl-
edge sharing strategy is the extent to which incentives should be given.
Winning the approbation of the targeted users when implementing a
knowledge sharing system is of crucial importance. However tempting
it may be for a company to develop an incentive program to get its em-
ployees to use the system in the intended fashion, there seems to be
evidence suggesting that this might not always be a good idea. Nomat-
ter how justiﬁed some national subsidiariesmay seem to be in requiring
incentives to share their knowledge, real-life examples show that this is
often not an appropriate long-term solution. Ellis (2001) describes the
case of a company that tried to jump-start inter-unit knowledge shar-
ing by oﬀering direct incentives proportional to the knowledge being
shared. Although the strategy proved eﬃcient as long as the incentives
were given to teams and individuals, it did little to develop a genuine
sharing spirit among them and most of the sharing activities were dis-
continued when the incentive program was rolled-back. The system in
itself was simply not deemed good enough by its users. Other compa-
nies have been very successful in adopting diﬀerent approaches, keep-
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ing clear from the use of direct incentives. Stevens (2000), for example,
advocates the long-term advantages stemming from the involvement
of individual organizational members in multiple teams pertaining to
diﬀerent units.This kind of strategy, as opposed to the attribution of di-
rect incentives, has proved very eﬃcient in achieving durable employee
participation that lasted beyond the introductory phases.
System Speciﬁcations
A ﬁnal issue that organizations must consider is the actual setup of
the system that is going to be used to implement the knowledge shar-
ing strategy. Although authors are unanimous about the idea that the
user interface of any computer-based system should be friendly enough
to encourage the targeted users to actually use it, there are diverging
standpoints in the literature as to what ‘friendly’ means. In an arti-
cle that sums-up a conversation she had with one of her colleagues,
Orubeondo (2000) exposes and discusses diﬀerent opinions. While de-
veloping a system, an appropriate balance has to be reached between
making the system easy to use even for novice users and satisfying the
demands of more experienced users for advanced features; depending
on the use that will ultimately be made of the system (technical, ac-
counting, communicating text or images, etc.), it should involve more
or less typing and mouse clicking. Furthermore, the degree of layer-
ing of the information and the customizable features should be ad-
justed in accordance with the level of ﬂexibility required, and with the
computer literacy of the intended users (Orubeondo 2000). Referring
speciﬁcally to network-based knowledge sharing systems, Kautz and
Vendelø (2001) give an example of successful development of such a
system, in which end-users were involved and ready to accept the sys-
tem. Such a real-life example supports the idea that the clarity and the
user-friendliness of the part of the system that is seen by the users (the
interface) promote the success of the venture. Gross (2001) touches the
topic of user-friendliness only brieﬂy in his article, but his observations
and reﬂections summarize in a very concise way the relative character
of this issue. According to him, it is important for a knowledge sharing
system tomake the information available to its intended users in a way
that is clear and makes sense to them, and at the time and place that
suit them best.
In further accordance with this, Kletter (2001) suggests that the es-
tablishment of smaller communities assembling members with com-
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mon professional interests is an essential success factor for a wider
knowledge sharing system.The creation of such sub-groups along func-
tional lines but across national subsidiaries, for example, will stream-
line the topics discussed internally within these groups, making them
more focused and therebymore relevant to the organizationalmembers
who will have chosen to participate. The increased interest that should
naturally follow the higher degree of relevance of the discussions for
the individual, it is believed, will lead to a higher perceived usefulness
of the system (Kletter 2001).
Criticism of Knowledge Sharing
In the above section, I have identiﬁed a series of organizational issues
that authors have identiﬁed as exerting an inﬂuence on the implemen-
tation of a knowledge sharing strategy into an organization.This selec-
tion of issues corresponds to my perception of pertinent factors that I
suspect will be useful in the course of the further empirical work. I con-
sequently acknowledge that there potentially exist other organizational
issues that also can aﬀect the process of knowledge sharing but that are
not included in the above assertions.The cause of this weakness resides
in the possibility of me having falsely deemed certain factors not rele-
vant to include within the realm of organizational issues that actually
do aﬀect knowledge sharing.
A further criticism is that the theoretical development of the above
mentioned organizational issues makes them vague in calibre because
they are eﬀectively impossible to directly apply to an organization that
ﬁnds itself in the midst of implementing a knowledge sharing strategy.
Such an organization would demand each of the above issues to be deli-
cately intertwinedwith its own intricacies in order for them to be useful
and applicable. It is my opinion that a purely theoretical deﬁnition de-
prives managers of this beneﬁt.
3.2 Corporate Culture
Most everyone has an idea of what Corporate Culture is but only very
few can accurately depict it. Fact is, most people cannot readily tell you
what their (corporate) culture is, any more than ﬁsh, if they could talk,
could tell you what water is. (Schein 1999)
It is tempting, and at some level also valid, to state that corporate
culture is ‘the way things are done around here’ or ‘the company cli-
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mate.’ Although these deﬁnitions are simplistic, they satisfy the lay-
men’s understanding of corporate culture and deliver a common per-
ception of what corporate culture is. However, in this following section,
I make a conscious move away from ‘common speak’ towards provid-
ing an in-depth and more accurate deﬁnition of the term Corporate
Culture in order to thoroughly comprehend the complexity and conse-
quences of it.
Unfortunately, even scholars, who specialize themselves within the
ﬁeld of corporate identities and business, at times, deliver basic deﬁni-
tions. CharlesHill (2005), establishedwriter in the ﬁeld of international
business and corporate strategies, enthusiastically supports the view
that corporate culture is plainly ‘the organizations norms and value sys-
tems’ (Hill 2005, 518) without further developing that statement. Per-
haps itwasnotwithinhis interest to further develop the idea but the cu-
rious readerwill nevertheless demand to knowwhat ismeant by ‘norms
and value systems’ and to what extent are people involved when refer-
ring to the ‘organization.’ Therefore, in attempt to answer these and
other issues pertaining to corporate culture, I, in the following, draw
from several authors, who I feel contribute constructively to deﬁning
corporate culture, in order to provide an in-depth and all-rounded de-
piction of the complex term ‘Corporate Culture’ and answer the ques-
tion of what is meant by corporate culture and how extensive it is.
Corporate Culture Deﬁned
The fact that corporate culture cannot be seen, nor touched nor eas-
ily observed makes it a complex phenomenon to deﬁne. It reﬂects the
organizational atmosphere and leadership which inﬂuence the partic-
ipation and attitude of the personnel (Asp and Uhmavaara 1992, 4). It
is a set of elusive, soft variables that are usually regarded as important
but nevertheless oftenmistakenly seen as having no direct inﬂuence on
the fate and direction of a company. Corporate culture refers to the un-
derlying values, beliefs and principles that serve as a foundation for a
company’s social system as well as the set of practices and behaviours
that both exemplify and reinforce that organization (Denison 1990, 2).
A productive method of conceiving corporate culture is to realize and
accept that it exists at several levels and view it from several perspec-
tives so a greater understanding emerges (Schein 1999, 15; Martin 1992,
4). To help visualize the diﬀerent levels of corporate culture, ﬁgure 3.1
illustrates a four-layer model that depicts corporate culture from its
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figure 3.1 Four levels of corporate culture (adapted from Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 37)
more superﬁcial, easier recognizable levels to the deeper, less under-
stood levels.
Cultural Artefacts
Themost visible and superﬁcial level of corporate culture in any organi-
zation begins with its cultural artefacts. It essentially represents what
you see, hear and feel as you enter a speciﬁc organization (Schein 1999,
15). The company’s physical facilities, formal policies about promotion
requirements, hours of work, oﬃcial documents such as an organiza-
tion chart that reveals the hierarchical levels of the company, etc. can
provide some clues as to what the ﬁrm values and thereby suggest a
certain corporate culture that this ﬁrm operates under (Fairﬁeld-Sonn
2001, 36).
To further explain this level, it can be helpful to examine opposing
scenarios of corporate cultures each located at their extreme of the cor-
porate culture spectrum. In one organization employees are very in-
formal, talk openly, share oﬃces and desks and it appears that every-
thing is very fast-paced. In another organization, everything is very for-
mal, employees work behind closed doors and there is a sense of care-
ful deliberation and slow movement in the corporate atmosphere. Al-
though it is tempting to already here label these companies with spe-
ciﬁc corporate cultures, it would be premature. All that is known from
these impressions are that these organizations have speciﬁc and partic-
ular ways of presenting themselves and dealing with each other (Schein
1999, 16). To understand what it all means and make sense of their
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actions, it is necessary to delve deeper into the essence of corporate
culture.
Cultural History
With the exception of newly founded start-ups, all companies have, to
some extent, at least the beginning of a cultural history. Exploring a
company’s cultural history can undoubtedly be rewarding as it contains
insights into operating procedures that are rarely gained from even the
most thorough review of oﬃcial company handbooks on policy and pro-
cedures (Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 38). For insight into the corporate culture
at this level, it is necessary to talk to insiders or informants who can ex-
plain the organization and reveal the collective internal memory of that
which is truly rewarded and punished within the corporation (Schein
1999, 17; Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 38). These memories represent strategies
or actions from the past that have either worked well and ensured sur-
vival or failed and left scarred memories in the employees (Denison
1990, 2). These corporate memories that are collected by longstanding
employees manifest themselves through rites and rituals, stories told
about corporate heroes or heroines or through symbols (Fairﬁeld-Sonn
2001, 38-39). Occurrences of each could be rewarding employees for a
job well done, a story told about a speciﬁc employeewho procured rapid
promotion, or company logos, respectively.
Core Ideology
Rather deeply imbedded in a company’s corporate culture is the core
ideology which, in essence, can be compared to the company’s over-
all vision and ethical standards. The core ideology usually consists of
statements that are highly informative and sacred and can display the
cultural imperatives, in order of priority, that guide decision making
within the ﬁrm (Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 40). It can be in the form of doc-
uments, pamphlets or short papers that describe the company’s basic
values, principles, ethics and visions (Schein 1999, 17).The core ideology
is very helpful in determining the nature of a corporate culture in that it
reﬂects the mindset that the management is trying to install through-
out the corporation’s employees. If eﬀective, this mindset will, in turn,
have repercussions on the manner in which employees conduct their
daily professional routines and hence, thereby constitutes a major part
of a company’s corporate culture. However, even at the depth that this
level reaches, it is necessary to delve even deeper into the ﬁnal level of
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corporate culture to get a comprehensive and undiminished deﬁnition
of the term.
Core Values
At the deepest level of corporate culture lie the core values. Normally
the core values are imposed onto the organization by the founders of
the company and represent the values, beliefs and assumptions of what
they think successful business is about (Schein 1999, 19). These values,
beliefs and assumptions can be highly visible and explicitly discussed
within the group or they can be so deeply rooted that they become
undiscussable and translucent (Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 41). In either case,
the core values are powerful guides as to how business should be con-
ducted, and consequently, management tries to attract and retain oth-
ers who can align themselves with these beliefs (Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001,
41; Schein 1999, 19).The diﬃculty in fully understanding this ﬁnal level
of corporate culture stems from the fact that these values, beliefs and
assumptions gradually come to be shared and taken for granted and, in
eﬀect, become tacit assumptions about how success is achieved, at least
within this speciﬁc company (Schein 1999, 19). This essentially means
that the employees themselves may not be able to describe the values
and beliefs dominant within their ﬁrm, but are nevertheless complying
with them, probably at some unconscious level.
In sum, corporate culture is not the exclusive preserve of the ceo
or general manager but has much wider-ranging scopes and impli-
cations and embodies everyone and everything within the company
walls (Lessem 1990, 2). Consequently, the essence of corporate culture
actually ﬁrst gets exposed when all the four levels have been investi-
gated, rationalized and understood. With this in mind and having un-
derstood the complexity the four levels of corporate culture include, I
feel that corporate culture can justiﬁably be deﬁned as ‘the signiﬁcant
shared meanings that allow employees to collectively make sense of
their co-workers actions’ (Asp and Uhmavaara 1992, 4).
Criticism of Corporate Culture Deﬁned
The above deﬁnition of corporate culture is based on several noted au-
thors who give their contribution to the topic. As is often the case
when many researchers investigate one speciﬁc area, several impres-
sions are revealed, most of which contain a certain level of validity.This
multi-impressionistic result can further complicate a topicwhile, simul-
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taneously, also give it a deeper, multi-perspective twist. In the case at
hand, the authors cited in corporate culture deﬁned do not themselves
entirely agree upon an exact deﬁnition anddismemberment of the term
corporate culture and consequently leave much of the conclusion mak-
ing up to the individual reader andhis preconceptions ofwhat corporate
culture entails. Furthermore, since the authors’ work usually is done in
close collaboration with a speciﬁc company and its managers and em-
ployees, it is possible that their otherwise pristine view on corporate
culture gets tainted by the speciﬁcs of that particular company. These
two problem areas can present real barriers towards obtaining a holis-
tic understanding of the terms and thus it is helpful to develop them
further.
Pertaining to the ﬁrst problem area, many of the authors support
their arguments with an example of a single scenario at a particular
company. Although using examples is a helpful way of relaying a mes-
sage on a topic that is diﬃcult to deﬁne, it limits its value because it does
not provide a universal deﬁnition. Using a singular and memorable ex-
ample is entertaining and most likely true to that speciﬁc situation but
is not consistent enough to be considered necessarily applicable to all
organizations. Hence, if the author’s deﬁnition lies mostly or solely in
an example, he may be limiting himself from a common deﬁnition of
corporate culture.
Pertaining to the second problem area, several of the above men-
tioned authors have attempted to dissect corporate culture into various
layers. When doing so, there is no unanimous decision on how many
layers exist and what pertains to the diﬀerent layers. Fairﬁeld-Sonn
(2001) proposes four layers whereas Schein (1999) proposes three lay-
ers and others, such as Lessem (1990), propose only one layer that is
intertwined with many diﬀerent aspects. Since corporate culture is a
complex term, the fact that the authors do not all share the same ex-
act view is understandable and maybe even helpful in providing an
all-rounded deﬁnition of it. However, it becomes problematic when
the authors disagree on which levels are deeper and which are more
superﬁcial. Schein (1999) believes corporate history to be the most
deeply imbedded element of corporate culture (Schein 1999, 19) where
as Fairﬁeld-Sonn (2001) ranks corporate history as rather superﬁcial
(Fairﬁeld-Sonn 2001, 37). The fact that the authors themselves have
not reached a unanimous decision on the layering of corporate culture
implies that my above deﬁnition of corporate culture is equally ques-
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tionable as its foundation is based on the ambiguous results of several
authors.
The Importance of Corporate Culture
Corporate culture plays a dominant role in the thoughts of the gen-
eral management, the employees and the overall success of a company
(Lessem 1990, 3). If themanagers of an enterprise are able tomake good
use of the prevailing corporate culture, and with the help of it can ﬁnd
a suitable strategy, then the enterprise increases its potential for suc-
cess (Asp andUhmavaara 1992, 4). Likewise, a productive corporate cul-
ture can increase job satisfaction for all employees, intensify their am-
bitions and work-level and aid in recruiting a more sought-after staﬀ,
thereby further lifting the potential of that company. Consequently,
corporate culture matters because it is a powerful, latent and often un-
conscious set of forces that determine both our individual and collective
behaviour and contribute to determining strategies, goals and modes
of operating which, in turn, can improve survival chances (Schein 1999,
14). Hence, paying particular attention to the nature and applicability
of an organization’s corporate culture can be the key tool in aligning the
combined eﬀorts of the employees within that organization.
Corporate Culture inMotion
The asserted deﬁnition of corporate culture given above provides a
thorough description of the term, its respective parts and determi-
nants and the elements connected to each. However, at the same time,
it also only provides a snapshot of corporate culture; a static impression
of a complex term that is constantly evolving. Therefore, it seems only
fair to give corporate culture momentum so it may viewed in its natural
environment; namely that of a rapidly changing world.
Below is a modiﬁed depiction of Denison’s (1990) impression of cor-
porate culture inﬂuenced by the current environment and time. It pro-
vides a dynamic illustration of the above-mentioned determinants of
corporate culture while also providing direction. This illustration gives
insight into how the four levels of corporate culture are positioned, how
they interact andhow they, through aunited front, constitute corporate
culture.
Everything represented within the enclosed bold lines of the above
framework denotes the elements expressed in the deﬁnition of corpo-
rate culture. History, being an integral part of corporate culture, inﬂu-
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figure 3.2 A framework for studying corporate culture in motion (modiﬁed
framework from Denison 1990, 5)
ences the three other elements which, in turn, all interact to various
degrees. (Note that the diﬀerent font sizes illustrate the varying im-
pact that the four levels have on corporate culture.) The current envi-
ronment is an external power that can inﬂuence the direction in which
the company goes and, equally important, inﬂuence the nature of the
corporate culture within the ﬁrm. However, since it is possible for two
ﬁrmsoperating in the samegeographical andbusiness area tohave com-
pletely diﬀerent corporate cultures, the extent to which the current en-
vironment has a direct inﬂuence on corporate culture is questionable.
Despite this, when speaking of corporate culture in dynamic terms, it is
nevertheless fair to include it as an important external factor that can
inﬂuence corporate culture since it is imaginable that a sudden or grad-
ual change in the current environment could have some impact on the
nature of a company’s corporate culture. Hence, albeit not certain of the
exact extent of its impact, the environment in which a company is em-
bedded plays a role in forming the ultimate shape of an organizations
corporate culture.
3.3 Answering rq1: How to Share Knowledge Across Varying
Corporate Cultures?
In the present chapter, I have thus far been preoccupied with explain-
ing the exact meanings of the two core terms of the research work:
knowledge sharing and corporate culture. The deﬁnitions I have given
to each of these two terms, and the precise topics they engage, have con-
sciously not been subject to stringent restrictions. Nevertheless, their
ﬁnal shape and content have evidently been inﬂuenced by the fact that
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Knowledge sender Knowledge receivers
figure 3.3 Random Knowledge Sending (arrows – knowledge being transmitted
from unit)
they would have to lead us to what follows; a theory-based answer to
the research question that now arises: how to share knowledge across
diﬀerent corporate cultures.
In order for knowledge sharing across corporate cultures to success-
fully occur, it requires a two-sided strategic approach focusing on the
nature and conditions under which the knowledge is being sent, and
on the environment and conditions under which it is received. To help
guide the arguments of both sides throughout the following part, I use
the aid of ﬁgure 3.3 to visually support the reasoning. The left part of
the diagram represents any given organizational unit that attempts to
disseminate knowledge. Within the large bold circle there is an endless
supply of information, which at times gets transmitted in the hopes
that someone will receive and understand it. The arrows depict mes-
sages being sent from this unit in a random and standard fashion to
any eventual receivers, in forms that are characteristic of the original
unit’s particular corporate culture. The smaller circular shapes on the
right part of the diagram represent communication partners of the ﬁrst
unit.They vary in shape, positioning and size, so to illustrate their vary-
ing corporate cultures.
In the previous section, it was established that corporate culture con-
sists of four separate levels that united construct a ﬁrm’s corporate cul-
ture. It is the common understanding of these diﬀerent levels, span-
ning from the easily recognizable cultural artefacts to the more com-
plicated and implicit core values, that allows for a unit to collectively
decipher and make sense of their co-workers’ actions and messages.
Therefore, before attempting to send knowledge to employees operat-
ing under a diﬀerent perception of corporate culture, the utmost im-
portant question must be asked: Is the knowledge that is being sent
in a form that can be understood by the intended receivers of another
corporate culture?The knowledge sender must understand that not all
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Knowledge sender Knowledge receivers
figure 3.4 Directed Knowledge Sending (arrows – knowledge being transmitted
from unit, dashed arrow – knowledge sharing track,  – no symbol)
knowledge has the potential to be transmitted and properly received
by the intended unit, despite this knowledge making perfect sense in-
ternally within the sender organization. The speciﬁcs of one corporate
culture, for instance a distinct core ideology, may make certain knowl-
edge that is imbedded in this core ideology non-comprehensible to an-
other organization as a result of dissimilar core ideologies. Hence, the
knowledge is not properly received because a certain understanding of
the ﬁrst unit’s core ideology is required in order to correctly decode
the message. Consequently, the sending unit must acknowledge that
the array of potential knowledge that can be sent is limited and send-
ing knowledge that is rooted in a speciﬁc understanding of a corporate
culture might and probably will result in a failure to communicate if
the receiving unit does not share a similar corporate culture.Therefore,
all attempts to send knowledge that does not relate to another corpo-
rate culture are bound to encounter diﬃculties in being deciphered.
The medium and style that is used in the sharing process therefore
becomes of paramount importance. Oﬃcial documents, case studies,
technical descriptions, histories, anecdotes, articles, values, assump-
tions, etc. have to be in a form and nature that allow all the intended
users to easily and clearly understand what is meant. The message has
to get across with as little distortion as possible and that can only be
accomplished if the sender selects and possibly even adapts knowledge
so that it is understandable to a foreign corporate culture.
The knowledge that is rooted in a corporate culture too distant from
the intended receivers’ (represented by the arrowswith the ‘No-Symbol’
on them, in ﬁgure 3.4) will simply act as noise to the intended receivers
because they cannot understand the message. The knowledge that is
compatible with foreign corporate cultures (represented by the arrow
without a no-symbol on it) is the only knowledge that is fruitful to
transmit, as it is the only knowledge not too deeply imbedded in its own
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tacitness and that has the potential to be understood by the intended
receivers. The dotted arrow represents an extension of this knowledge
and is termed ‘the knowledge sharing track.’
Having determined that the knowledge sender must send relevant
knowledge in a manner that is compatible with varying corporate cul-
tures, it now becomes equally important to acknowledge that the ele-
ments of knowledge receiving have just as a profound impact on the
successful ability to share knowledge as knowledge sending. In order
for the knowledge receiver to understand the message being sent, the
unit must be willing and capable to interpret the message. Factors that
are susceptible of enhancing the willingness of the individual organi-
zational member to receive and correctly interpret pieces of knowledge
are often underestimated and it is taken for granted that all units are of
the mindset that sharing knowledge is constructive and beneﬁcial for
all partners. Therefore, before becoming capable of knowledge sharing,
it is important to get willing.
To get the individual organizational members willing to promote and
adopt a proactive attitude towards knowledge sharing, the participants
to the strategy must be convinced that there is a reciprocity principle.
In other words, they have to know that the beneﬁts they will enjoy
from actively participating to the strategy will in some way be related
to the extent of their input. These beneﬁts can take the form of useful
knowledge that will bemade available to the participants or recognition
granted for having productively used the opportunities created by the
knowledge sharing strategy (Angus 2000).
A further way of increasing the will to share knowledge is to openly
acknowledge that the successful exploitation of the knowledge shar-
ing strategy is for the overall beneﬁt of the company, an outcome that
should be in the interest of all organizational members. The setting of
common goals, as suggested by Hill and Storck (2000), is likely to mo-
tivate the diverse organizational members to cooperate with a knowl-
edge sharing initiative and increase the will with which they participate
in the related activities. The genuine commitment of the top manage-
ment or headquarters is an equally important factor that promotes the
general will of the employees to strive towards making the knowledge
sharing initiative a success (Zack 1999). The recognition that one’s su-
perior is completely devoted to the initiative increases the likelihood of
active participation from all the employees and raises the assertiveness
of their eﬀorts.
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The infrastructure and processes through which knowledge will be
shared are essential constituents of the knowledge sharing system, an
inherent part of an organization’s knowledge sharing strategy. Mak-
ing this system as simple and user-friendly as possible is another fac-
tor that will make the employees more willing to share knowledge with
each others. Orubeondo (2000), Kautz and Vendelø (2001) and Gross
(2001) emphasized the importance of the users encountering a simple
and straightforwardmeans in which to share knowledge in order to de-
crease user frustration and dissatisfactionwith the system. In addition,
focusing the knowledge that each organizational member gets exposed
to, through the system, in order to make it especially relevant to the in-
dividual, will work as an encouraging factor that will ultimately increase
the acceptance and long-term use of the system. As Kletter (2001) sug-
gests, the establishment of smaller communities assembling members
with commonprofessional interests orworking in similar functionswill
achieve this and consequently increase the employees’ will to address
the initiative sincerely.
Creating the will to share knowledge in the employees is a prerequi-
site for them to welcome a knowledge sharing initiative. According to
Scholes (1999), welcoming a new strategy and being open to the changes
and new concepts it bears is a vital mindset that the employees must
possess if the implementation of the strategy is to provide value to the
organization as a whole. In extension to this, the implementation of
an encompassing knowledge sharing strategy does therefore not occur
simply because it is considered to be desirable by the management; the
employees must be promoters of the change process as well and wel-
come the new strategy (Scholes 1999, 399). In order to achieve this, it is
extremely important that the employees perceive the strategy in a pos-
itive light. Boyd, Larréché, et al. (1996) state that the successful imple-
mentation of a given strategy is more likely when the employees regard
it as being functional and competent and possesses the appropriate
mechanisms for coordinating eﬀorts (Boyd, Larréché et al. 1996, 234).
In other words, themore useful and beneﬁcial a newly introduced strat-
egy is perceived to be, the more likely it is that the employees are eager
and willing to full-heartily address the implementation process. Taking
the implementation process seriously is an absolutely crucial step to-
wards being able to integrate a newly adopted strategy (Boyd, Larréché
et al. 1996; Weitz and Wensley 1984; Scholes 1999; Carroll, Dromgoole
et al. 2000).This implies that the mindset of all the employees must es-
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Knowledge sender Knowledge receivers
figure 3.5 Optimal Knowledge Sharing Across Corporate Cultures (arrows –
knowledge being transmitted from unit, dashed arrow – knowledge
sharing track,  – no symbol)
sentially be programmed to give the implementation endeavour a sin-
cere attempt or otherwise, the hoped-for results will not be attained. In
continuation, Schein (1999) suggests a ﬁnal factor that can increase the
will to share knowledge. He believes that if the employees of an organi-
zation are open, communicate freely and operate on an informal basis
prior to the introduction of the knowledge sharing strategy, the em-
ployees will have an easier time adapting to the new knowledge sharing
processes. In other words, the new knowledge sharing strategy will not
appear as alien if the employees already possess many of the ‘sharing’
qualities that an informal and open corporate culture harbours.
Assuming that the will to share knowledge is now present, being ca-
pable of receiving the knowledge from the knowledge sender becomes
the next problematic encounter. Although the knowledge sendermakes
an earnest eﬀort in not localizing the information to its own corporate
culture but tries to make it universally applicable through an array of
cultures, the knowledge will inevitably never be as straightforward as
the receiving unitwould have formulated it if it were for their own inter-
nal use. Consequently, the receiving unit must ‘stretch’ its patience and
abilities to adapt to other corporate cultures. In the ﬁnal depiction of
knowledge sharing across corporate cultures, ﬁgure 3.5, the other units,
with whom the original sender attempts to share knowledge, make mi-
nor alterations or adaptations within their local corporate culture so to
align themselves along the knowledge sharing track and thereby allow
themselves to be capable of understanding the intended message.
The corporate cultures of the receiving units are not transformed
but take on a wider adaptability spectrum so to be able to success-
fully process knowledge emanating from cultures peripheral to their
own. The units that want to ‘stretch’ their capabilities in order to align
themselves onto the knowledge sharing track can do so by ﬁrst, in-
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stalling an atmosphere that favours the development of speciﬁc indi-
vidual traits in itsmembers. Building oneself a reputation for being reli-
able and trustworthy, taking responsibility, forming enduring relation-
ships, exceeding job requirements, establishing rapports with others,
being well-prepared, and other similar behavioural patterns are gener-
ally typical of a well-functioning organization, and determining for the
success of knowledge sharing processes (Dirlam 2000). An organization
that succeeds in making its members develop such characteristics will
experience an increase in the conﬁdence level among colleagues and,
as a result, the members of the organization are likely to become more
prone to share knowledge (Stevens 2000).
Once the desired individual traits have been developed in organiza-
tional members, there remains the important step of increasing the
units’ level of knowledge about other units’ activities and particulari-
ties. The beneﬁts of the sharing communities as expressed by Kletter
(2001) above also help raise cross-unit awareness and understanding.
Through the incremental increase of the level of mutual understand-
ing and reciprocal knowledge, an organization can achieve a higher ef-
ﬁciency in its attempts to share knowledge, as having insight in the pe-
culiarities of the counterpart in the communication process enhances
contextualizationof the knowledge and allows for amore sensible inter-
pretation and intuitive understanding. This important step increases
an organization’s understanding of foreign corporate cultures and con-
sequently allows the unit to ‘stretch’ its capabilities of understanding
knowledge stemming from foreign corporate cultures, thereby enabling
it to align itself along the knowledge sharing track.
Another aspect that allows an organization to ‘stretch’ itself onto the
knowledge sharing track concerns the nature of the corporate culture.
Although a strong corporate culture is generally viewed as a positive ad-
dition to a company’s portfolio of strengths, the units must be cautious
not to get too internally oriented and focused on their own ways. Ac-
cording to Alvesson and Berg (1992), a shared way of thinking creates a
mutual understanding among the employees and thus a predictable ac-
tion, even when faced with a complex phenomenon that cannot always
be verbalized or written. This implies that employees working under a
shared way of thinking act in a speciﬁc manner that is not straightfor-
ward and simple to understand for outsiders and conversely also have
diﬃculty taking into account foreign information and actions external
to their limited organizational aspects (Alvesson and Berg 1992, 117).
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Therefore, in order to better understand knowledge originating from
sources external to their organization and to help other units interpret
knowledge from that speciﬁc organization, it is helpful to avoid having
the employees of the various units operate under a toonarrowor shared
way of thinking.
A ﬁnal consideration that can aid diﬀering units in ‘stretching’ their
capabilities towards being able to understand foreign knowledge better,
closely relates to Marschan’s (1996) hierarchical argument made ear-
lier. Less-hierarchical subsidiaries are prone to operate under complex
knowledge ﬂows, deeply imbedded in personal understandings of infor-
mal mechanisms and social networks, whereas more-hierarchical orga-
nizations free themselves of this impediment and have a consequent
easier time sharing knowledge.Therefore, adopting a more hierarchical
structure can help improve an organization’s explicit knowledge shar-
ing activities. Much in accordance with Marschan’s point, Cerny (1996)
points out how more centrally run organizations avoid problems of
diﬀering regional priorities that are likely to plague a company-wide
knowledge sharing strategy. He therefore advocates that the centrally
run organizations have an easier time coordinating global knowledge
sharing activities, which results in a more complete alignment of orga-
nizational units along the knowledge sharing track.
Through the accomplishment of the above points, the knowledge-sha-
ring track is now able to penetrate all designated units for whom the
knowledge was intended. Albeit this knowledge is likely to have a more
profound impact on some units compared to others, depending on the
extent towhich the characteristics of the corporate cultures are aligned,
they are all now capable of meaningfully accessing the knowledge that
is being shared.
In the example that I have used to illustrate the reasoning through-
out this section, I have consciously decided to keep both sender and
receivers constant, for the sake of consistency and clarity of the argu-
ment. One could however easily imagine a situation in which one of the
receiving units took the sender’s role, in which case the previous sender
would join the group of the receivers.
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4 Knowledge Sharing at iss:
A Description
The previous chapters of this book were dedicated to the exposition of
ground-laying information that forms the theoretical foundations of
this research. The theoretical background forming the backbone of the
work was deﬁned, and the choice of methodology was explained and
justiﬁed. This chapter marks the beginning of the empirical part of the
research, where the focus shifts towards the actual knowledge sharing
issues appearing in diﬀerent parts of the multinational organization of
the corporate partner, iss.
In the ﬁrst section of the chapter, I introduce the network-based
knowledge sharing system that iss has already introduced to its multi-
national organization, Business Insight. Intricacies pertaining to Busi-
ness Insight are important to disclose in order to allow for a thorough
understanding of the rest of the section, since the data obtained from
the subsidiaries are inﬂuenced by the existence of that system. I then
proceed to individually present the data pertaining to each one of the
four subsidiaries of iss with whom interviews were conducted (iss
Austria, iss Italy, iss Denmark and iss France).
The codiﬁcation method of analysis that I have applied to the in-
terview data has yielded recurrent themes and patterns that appeared
across the answers given by the interviewees, regarding four selected
areas: Corporate culture, Appropriateness of Business Insight, Char-
acteristics of the ideal knowledge sharing system, and Hindrances to
the achievement of the ideal knowledge sharing system. The opinions
and ideas that were expressed by the interviewees are exposed in this
chapter and subsidiary-speciﬁc codes are extracted from this data. The
purpose of this process is to yield the two elements (subsidiary-speciﬁc
knowledge and codes) required to complete the analytical process at the
core of the next chapter: iss: Analysis and Interpretation.
The data, descriptions and deductions exposed in this chapter ex-
clusively concern the management of the company, not the other cate-
gories of iss employees, e. g. the cleaners and maintenance crews who
are not directly related to the knowledge sharing initiatives.The knowl-
edge sharing strategy of the company does not take them directly into
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account and the system is not intended for their use. Moreover, their
relatively independent work and their typical isolation from the local
national circumstances prevent them from really inﬂuencing the cor-
porate culture of the subsidiaries.
The descriptive and analytical sections of this chapter and the next
concentrate on the subsidiaries. While the interviews that were con-
ducted with the managers of the local subsidiaries of iss provided the
speciﬁcs of the implementation and utilization of the knowledge shar-
ing systemat the subsidiary level, the aimof the interviewswith organi-
zational members pertaining to the headquarters of the group was dif-
ferent. These latter interviews were completed to acquire background
knowledge about the corporate knowledge sharing strategy. They al-
lowed me to learn more about the coordinating mechanisms used by
the headquarters, about their goals within the area of knowledge shar-
ing, as well as about the means that are favoured to reach them. I used
this information in order to better the interviews with the subsidiaries
and to evaluate their actual performance compared to the expected situ-
ation in the analytical sections of chapter 5. Furthermore, this informa-
tion contributes to the ultimate recommendations pertaining to knowl-
edge sharing across cultures.
4.1 Business Insight
Business Insight is the name of the network-based knowledge sharing
system that has been launched in March 2001, by the headquarters of
iss. Although there is a very small increase in the overall usage of the
system, it is still far from the level that is considered optimal for good
knowledge sharing activities to occur. The system is accessible to se-
lected end-users at various managerial levels in all thirty-six national
subsidiaries of the group, for a total of some 4000 organizational mem-
bers.The information that is readily available through Business Insight
in form of articles, technical data and case studies includes descrip-
tions of procedures for standard tasks, models of forms and contracts,
rules of conduct in various situations, etc. English has been adopted as
the standard language of the system and the responsible managers at
theheadquarters post the information, normally after having consulted
knowledgeable employees about the topic at hand.The headquarters of
iss want to retain the control of the system to ensure the quality and
the relevance of the information, but it is a stated goal for Business In-
sight to allow dynamic exchanges between subsidiaries.
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4.2 Subsidiary Speciﬁcs
The body of this investigation into each subsidiary is divided in four
parts, corresponding to the four codiﬁcation areas mentioned earlier.
The local corporate culture exposes ﬁndings related to the corporate
culture of the individual subsidiary, including how it is inﬂuenced by
such factors as national culture, managerial style, and previous evolu-
tion. I have purposely not divided the description of the individual sub-
sidiaries corporate cultures into the four layers exposed in the theoret-
ical ﬁndings because not all four layers reveal applicable elements. As
suggested by the second problem area in the section Criticism of Cor-
porateCultureDeﬁned, corporate cultures are not alwaysneatly stacked
in four easily dissectible layers. Consequently, the theoreticalmodel has
provided the understanding of what to look for, but needs not be fol-
lowed layer by layer. The second header, Business Insights match with
existing knowledge sharing processes covers the series of clashes and
adaptations that the subsidiary has to go through (or to reject) in order
to adapt (or to chose not to adapt) to the new group-wide knowledge
sharing system. Whether and how this adaptation process is made will
invariably determine how successful the subsidiary is at using the sys-
tem.
The last two areas, The ideal knowledge sharing situation and Hin-
drances to the achievement of the ideal knowledge sharing situation are
two aspects of one larger area. In the former, the goal is to identify the
criteria that, in the mind of the managers of the subsidiaries, make up
the best possible knowledge sharing situation. In the latter, I strive to
identify hindrances,mentioned by the interviewees themselves, related
to the individual subsidiaries that will make diﬃcult the realization of
an ideal knowledge sharing situation.
After having completed the description of the individual subsidiaries’
local corporate culture, their views on the appropriateness of Business
Insight against their already-existing knowledge sharing processes,
their perceived best-feasible knowledge sharing solutions, and the hin-
drances they foresee, I extract the codes that will feed the successive
analysis, which in turn will later lead to answering the second research
question.
iss Austria
The iss subsidiary, iss Austriawas a particularly interesting subsidiary
to analyze as it is one of the few subsidiaries that showed very positive
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results concerning the corporate knowledge sharing system, Business
Insight. From pure quantitative data, it is easy to note that the daily
activity on the knowledge sharing system surpasses that of most other
subsidiaries. Consequently, the following is a qualitative analysis of the
underlying factors that will reveal the particularities of why iss Austria
performs so well.
The Local Corporate Culture
The corporate culture at iss Austria was expressed as being informal
and content. The subsidiary does not regard itself as a company that
operates under the typical more formal and strict Austrian working
culture, but employees are rather portrayed as being very relaxed and
casual. This is nicely exempliﬁed by the colourful and positive arte-
facts visible throughout the oﬃces and the informal use of the Ger-
man language that is used not only to communicate with lower ranked
colleagues but also to higher positioned leaders. People are ‘per du,’
meaning on an informal and ﬁrst name basis. There is a decentralized,
non-hierarchical structure permitting all employees, from the topman-
ager to newly employed lower ranks, to mingle freely and converse
without formalities. Furthermore, the decentralized structure allows
for communication to ﬂow freely and unhindered throughout the com-
pany. The employees have been described as being serious and hard
working but also down to earth with the unrivalled ability to simulta-
neously have fun.
Historically, iss Austria has been a well functioning, independent
cleaning company. Its cultural history reveals that this success has been
attained through hard work, and the pride the employees take from the
previous accomplishments of their company is still apparent today and
fuels their will to continue working hard.
When working on a certain task, there is a structure or order that
is followed in order to complete the task in accordance with the set
norms and standards predominant at the subsidiary. These set norms
and standards may be in a written form or simply implied, depend-
ing on the degree in which formal guidelines are deemed necessary by
the management. Since the subsidiary consists mainly of Austrians, it
is likely that some norms and standards that normally are in written
form are not in a written form at iss Austria since everyone takes it
for granted because of their homogenous background.This implies that
a certain understanding of the Austrian working culture is necessary
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to be optimal in iss Austria. However, when necessary, the subsidiary
is ﬂexible enough to break out of the preset structure allowing for the
adaptation to speciﬁc circumstances.
The core values of iss Austria’s corporate culture emphasize the no-
tion that hard work, respect for others and loyalty towards the com-
pany, complemented by the ability to enjoy yourself and be friendly,
will serve the company best in the long run.
Codes for iss Austria’s corporate culture: happy, informal, non-hie-
rarchical, relaxed, hard working.
Business Insight’s Match with the Existing Knowledge Sharing Processes
Before the introduction of Business Insight there was no formalized
knowledge sharing system within iss Austria. It was generally con-
ducted through informal communication, meetings and training sem-
inars which all allowed for discussions and trading of knowledge and
ideas on a very informal basis. The primary knowledge sharing method
was simply to pick up the phone and call the relevant counterpart and
extract the appropriate information. Although simple in nature, this
venerable method of knowledge sharing allowed everyone to receive
pertinent data about speciﬁc issues quickly and eﬃciently, and con-
sequently functioned very well for a long time. When communicating
with the headquarters inDenmark, it could often take some time before
the correct person was available and able to speak over the telephone
and reach a common understanding.There would generally be a lengthy
story or explanation told before headquarters would understand the
speciﬁcs of the subsidiary’s inquiry but soon thereafter a satisfactory
outcome would emerge.
The introduction of Business Insight was welcomed despite iss Aus-
tria experiencing success with the already established and well running
knowledge sharing methods. The employees did not see Business In-
sight as a threat or substitute to their current knowledge sharingmeth-
ods, but rather as an extra possibility from which pertinent data could
be retrieved and consequently approached the new systemwith anopen
and positive mind. It was interpreted as a positive sign that iss incor-
porate a global knowledge sharing system as it would prove proﬁtable
for iss Austria as well as the iss organization as awhole. Furthermore,
since iss Austria was a growing company, the subsidiary felt that it was
due time to get a formalized knowledge sharing system since eﬀective
communication might not continue to be as simple and straight for-
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ward in the future as it was back when iss Austria was smaller and
more independent.
It was viewed very positively that Business Insight is not the exclu-
sive preserve of the topmanagement because it appreciated the author-
ity middle managers have when sharing knowledge and respected the
inﬂuence they have on the successful incorporation of such a system.
Thereto, it was felt that the depth and usefulness of the system would
increase proportionally to the increase of people who had access to the
system and used the system. In other words, the more people who use
the system, the more useful the system becomes.
The fact that Business Insight is in English interestingly enough cir-
cumvents the language barriers iss Austria previously experienced
when communication outside Austria despite not everyone within iss
Austria speaking ﬂuent English. Before Business Insight, employees
sometimes feared speaking English to, for example the headquarters
in Denmark, and consequently felt less conﬁdent in their ability to ex-
press themselves clearly. However, through the use of Business Insight,
knowledge sharing with the headquarters has increased because the
knowledge sharing becomes passive (reading from a screen) which for
some is easier to do than active knowledge sharing (calling someone on
the phone). Thus, where an employee might have hesitated in calling
Denmark or not called at all out of fear in not being able to express her-
self, she is now more prone to look it up on Business Insight with the
aid of her dictionary but without the humility of language deﬁciencies.
It is felt that the advantages of circumventing these language deﬁcien-
cies are greater than the disadvantages of time spent looking words up
in a dictionary or simply not calling.
Codes for Business Insights match with the existing knowledge shar-
ing processes: welcomed, useful, eﬃcient.
The Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
Although iss Austria, in general, is pleased with the current knowl-
edge sharing situation and the employees realize that their knowledge
sharing activities surpass many of the other subsidiaries, they do rec-
ognize that the situation is not optimal and there is room for consider-
able improvement. For iss Austria, the ideal knowledge sharing situa-
tion entails the ability to easily receive all relevant information directly
from the appropriate sourcewithout hindrances and likewise being able
to transmit the precise asked-for data from the most knowledgeable
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source directly to the inquirer without losing any of themeaning due to
technicalities or personal shortcomings. For this to occur, a high degree
of coordination among the subsidiariesmust be present. In the opinion
of iss Austria, such global coordination should stem from amanagerial
source at the corporate headquarters. Furthermore, it entails the active
involvement of all the subsidiaries, not just a few, so that communica-
tion is made possible throughout the entire iss group.
Another area that was suggested for improvement towards the at-
tainment of the above was the general layout of Business Insight. Al-
though using Business Insight becomes easier with time, it is a very
confusing system to get used to and consequently gives rise to frustra-
tion and anger during the introductory encounters. Flashing news win-
dows and other distracting pop-ups quickly become distracting, as they
constantly demand an eye tomonitor the events and add to the frustra-
tion ﬁrst time user’s experience. It is felt that a more relaxed and user
friendly layout of the systemwould promote the use of Business Insight
and act as a considerable improvement for the initial impressions.
A further step towards the ideal knowledge sharing situation would
be to create a link to an employee database of all iss employees with
access to the system. Here it would be possible to localize the exact per-
son one wishes to contact in order to extract information by reﬁning
the search to countries/cities, professions or specialties. Today, much
time is wasted searching for the exact person one feels might be able
to provide useful information about a speciﬁc topic because the art of
ﬁnding the correct person is not a straightforward task. However, by
being able to type two or three key words into a search engine (such as
Milan, manager, Gerbraldi account), the knowledge seeker can quickly
ﬁnd all relevant people, their direct contact information, precise job de-
scription and anything else deemed relevant in order to connect these
people; in this case, themanager inMilan of the Gerbraldi account.This
allows for a pinpointing of relevant personal and thereby greatly facili-
tates the information seeking process.
A ﬁnal suggestion towards the ideal knowledge sharing situation is
creating common division areas that act as virtual conference rooms for
speciﬁc divisions across all 38 subsidiaries. Within these virtual confer-
ence rooms, division speciﬁc data will be readily available allowing an
employee with an interest only in one area to obtain in-depth and pre-
cise data about that speciﬁc area. For instance, the establishment of a
marketing area where the entire iss group has access and can share
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ideas that pertain speciﬁcally to the intricacies of marketing. Within
such an area, iss marketing personnel throughout the entire world
have the possibility to extract information relevant to marketing and
pertaining to their exact needs. The information would become more
speciﬁed since it only relates to marketing issues and peripheral data,
such as ﬁnancial data, would be excluded and stored in the virtual ﬁ-
nance area, where all the ﬁnance employees from the iss group gather
and share data. Currently, the marketing department of iss Austria
contacts the other subsidiaries once every two years to get them to send
commercial products and commodities to Austria so the Austrian mar-
keting department can learn from the intuitiveness of other iss mar-
keting departments.Through the establishment and active use of a vir-
tual marketing area, this process could be greatly simpliﬁed and made
more cost eﬃcient.
Codes for the ideal knowledge sharing situation: coordination among
subsidiaries, active involvement of all iss subsidiaries, user-friendly
layout, personal data links, establishment of virtual division areas.
Hindrances to the Achievement of an Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
The complex and disturbing layout of Business Insight that hinders em-
ployees to participate actively in knowledge sharing activities as they
seek to avoid the frustration they often encounter when using the sys-
tem, the lack of a link to employee databases within iss that would
facilitate the information seeking process, and the lack of divisional vir-
tual areas for topic speciﬁc discussions are the three pivotal points that
iss Austria feels hinder the attainment of the ideal knowledge sharing
situation. Naturally, simplifying the Business Insight layout and estab-
lishing the employee database link and virtual discussion rooms are the
obvious and natural ﬁrst steps in overcoming these hindering factors.
However, there are other factors hindering the attainment of the ideal
knowledge sharing situation that are not necessarily as straightforward
as the above mentioned factors.
First, if the divisionalmanager is not the one endorsing the use of the
system, the likelihood that Business Insight serves a useful purpose de-
creases. iss Austria feels that if the order to use it comes directly from
the Danish headquarters to the end users, the eﬀect of that order will
be minimal as the employees will down-prioritize such a distant order
compared to an order stemming from their immediate boss. However,
if the divisional manager actively circulates the subsidiary prompting
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its use it is felt that the eﬀect will be much greater. Consequently, it be-
comes essential for the headquarters to focus on the divisionalmanager
when promoting the knowledge sharing system and ensure that the he
is enthused and eager about the knowledge sharing system. Therefore,
without the headquarters acting as the key promoter and enthusiast of
the system towards the divisional manager, the divisional manager will
lack the power to promote the system internally throughout his divi-
sion.
Second, it is perceived as problematic that the headquarters can and
will ﬁlter all the information given into the system. The headquarters
in Denmark does not necessarily know what the subsidiaries consider
relevant knowledge to include on Business Insight and what can be ex-
cluded. This discrepancy resides in the existence of diverging agendas;
the headquarters prioritizes knowledge that is directly correlated to ﬁ-
nancial gains, whereas iss Austria has local prioritizations to take into
account aswell. A sole focus on data pertaining to ﬁnancial results, such
as those iss headquarters would be prone to favour, deprives iss Aus-
tria of vital information that could prove useful for their alternative
needs. This diﬀerence in corporate priorities suggests that the head-
quarters is not a good judge of what should be included on Business
Insight and consequently lessens the combined value of useful infor-
mation on the system.
A ﬁnal consideration of the factors that hinder the ideal knowledge
sharing situation is that everyone within iss Austria, and almost all
other subsidiaries that use the system, are using the system in a lan-
guage other than their natural tongue. Although it was stated above
that knowledge sharing onBusiness Insight occurs in a passive opposed
to activemode, thereby decreasing language barriers, the fact that some
employees have great diﬃculty comprehending English clearly still acts
as a major hindrance towards the attainment of the ideal knowledge
sharing situation.
Codes for hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowledge shar-
ing situation: not user-friendly system, lack of useful links and virtual
areas, lack of headquarters endorsement to divisional manager, diﬀer-
ence in headquarters-subsidiary priorities, language barriers.
iss Austria Conclusion
In sum, both quantitative and qualitative data suggest that iss Aus-
tria is comparatively one of the best iss subsidiaries to diligently use
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Business Insight. Nevertheless, this subsidiary clearly has some prob-
lematic areas, which clearly is to be expected, within the realmof knowl-
edge sharing that need correcting. However, it appears as if iss Austria
tackles any enduring problems in a very calm and sensible manner al-
lowing for a logical and structured dismemberment of the problematic
issues, thereby facilitating the problem-solving phase.This trait acts as
a powerful tool when dealingwith complicated issues, such as the estab-
lishment of a global knowledge sharing system, andwill probably result
in iss Austria being one of the iss divisions with the best knowledge
sharing results in the future.
iss Italy
The Italian subsidiary of iss has retained all the characteristic of a fam-
ily controlled, relatively small business, with a strong entrepreneurship
spirit. The market in which it operates is much more fragmented than
is the case in most other countries and it has retained traditional clean-
ing as its almost exclusive sector of activities. Such an environment calls
for adaptability and innovative solutions and naturally, the subsidiary
is one of the top-users of the Business Insight system. In fact, the Ital-
ian managers keep pleading for the further development of knowledge
sharing initiatives at the corporate level, since they consider them as
their main source of inspiration for local business growth and improve-
ment.
The Local Corporate Culture
As is the rule rather than the exception all through the iss group of
businesses, the Italian subsidiary was bought in its entirety but was
at the same time allowed to retain most of its independence and free-
dom of decision and action. In essence, things continued to be run as
they always had been when GaravagliaWash became iss-Italy and con-
sequently, the cultural history of the company retained all its impor-
tance. Whereas the employees and the managers had long been proud
to be associated to the Garavaglia name, which stands for quality and
reliability in the Milan cleaning industry, they are now also proud to be
associated to the iss banner, which stands for quality and reliability in
the worldwide facility management industry. The core values of former
GaravagliaWashmatched very nicely those of iss and thereby, all risks
of a value clash were avoided.
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The subsidiary having, by its very origins and because of the evolu-
tion it has experienced, the characteristics of the Emilian-style small
enterprise, the original values are still prevailing.The top-managers, be-
ing sons of the founder, there is a special aura of respect around them
on the part of the employees.Their being brothers make their relations
much less formal than could be the case in most other situations. But
critiques and comments are welcome no matter who they stem from;
the subsidiary operates in a very open and straightforward manner, di-
rect contacts between the relatively small oﬃce staﬀ – including the
members of theGaravaglia family – being the preferred formof commu-
nication.The doors to the top-managers’ oﬃces remain physically open
even during meetings, and interruptions are frequent and expected.
The warehouse for the cleaning material necessary to the fulﬁlment of
the contracts is in the basement of the building where the oﬃces are
located, which makes it easy and convenient even for the employees at
the operational level to personally contact any of their superiors if they
want to.
The original entrepreneurial atmosphere is still very present at iss-
Italy. This is exempliﬁed by the constant eﬀorts the subsidiary makes
to widen the array of services it oﬀers its clients, but especially by the
ad hoc manner in which managerial and oﬃce tasks are accomplished:
whoever is best qualiﬁed to complete a given task spontaneously steps
forward and takes care of it, without further formalities. Entering the
iss group was also seen as an energetic entrepreneurial move, as the
Garavaglias hoped that the association would help their company meet
the demand for new services, fromnew categories of clients. In fact, en-
trepreneurial thinking has been the cornerstone of iss Italy’s success
since the middle of the 1940’s and is clearly represented in the mind-
set of the management. This mindset is incredibly apparent and conse-
quently ‘rubs’ oﬀ on the rest of the employees at iss Italy and acts as a
shared assumption of how success is achieved. Entrepreneurial think-
ing thus lies at the core value of iss Italy’s corporate culture as it man-
ifests itself in values and beliefs of the entire company.
Codes for iss Italy’s local corporate culture: entrepreneurial, open-
ness, informal, initiative, pride in the name.
Business Insight’s Match with the Existing Knowledge Sharing Processes
Because of the relatively small size of iss-Italy, internal knowledge
sharing has traditionally happened by means of personal networking.
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Employees pertaining to a certain category normally know their col-
leagues, whose advice or assistance they seek whenever they need it.
Even in more complicated cases, simply contacting somebody at a su-
perior level in the hierarchy of the company will generally be suﬃcient
to be put in contact with the holder of the sought-after knowledge. Un-
til iss takes further steps to increase the scale or scope of its activities
in Italy, this way of communicating internally will remain the rule in
the Italian subsidiary, as it is considered optimal.
iss-Italy has traditionally been inclined to look at the international
scene to gather new ideas and better its methods. Prior to its entry
in the iss group, people from the then independent company had al-
ready been sent out on missions to look at some similar companies in
Japan and around Europe, in order to pick up new business ideas and
working procedures.Therefore, it seemed only natural for themanagers
of iss-Italy to build relationships and maintain regular contacts with
other subsidiaries of the group, mainly the Swiss one – its geograph-
ical proximity makes it convenient (the trip there and back from Mi-
lan, by car, and the meeting can easily ﬁt in a normal business day) and
it was actually through a Lugano-branch of that subsidiary that Gar-
avaglia Wash was originally acquired by iss.
Although it makes their contacts with international correspondents
more frequent and easier than before, the managers of iss-Italy feel
that Business Insight is not nearly suﬃcient to fulﬁl the needs for
knowledge sharing of a company like iss. In their ownwords, they were
genuinely shocked to ﬁnd out that such a system was not in operation
three years ago, when the subsidiary was bought up. In the process
of examining the buyout proposal put forward by iss, the Garavaglia
brothers considered the company as a good basis for further develop-
ment of their business; they were hoping for constant and high-level
cooperation with the corporate level and the other subsidiaries of the
group. Their association with iss was done with the avowed goal of
learning and beneﬁting from a common pool of experience and the
transaction was viewed as the ideal way to develop new businesses on
the Italian market. Logically, they therefore welcomed the Business In-
sight initiative, but nevertheless consider that the system is already
lagging behind in light of the challenges that the evolution of the mar-
ket poses the subsidiary in Italy, and the group on a worldwide basis.
Codes for Business Insight’smatchwith the existing knowledge shar-
ing processes: welcomed but long overdue, useful yet currently under-
developed.
82
Subsidiary Speciﬁcs 4.2
Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
As is now evident, employees at iss-Italy are somewhat unpleased
about the progress that has been made in the knowledge sharing pro-
cesses through Business Insight. This dissatisfaction does not stem
from the use that is actually made of the system, but rather from the
potential beneﬁts that could be extracted from its use but are left un-
exploited. At iss-Italy, the general feeling is that the achievement of
an ideal situation for group-wide knowledge sharing would build on
an expanded version of Business Insight that would incorporate nu-
merous functionalities. A greater utilization of the system by a greater
number of subsidiaries is also considered essential to an ideal situation
regarding knowledge sharing.
The key component of such a system, still according to the sub-
sidiary’s people, is a strong central commanding body. A strong depart-
ment of knowledge sharing at the corporate level would have a better vi-
sion of the whole company and of its requirements, and would thereby
be in an optimal position to make the best possible decisions for the
group.Thus, coordination from the corporate headquarters is an essen-
tial element of an ideal knowledge sharing system. iss-Italy expects
that such an organization of the knowledge sharing processes would
boast at least two characteristics that are presently missing: interna-
tional coordination and a deeper insight into the subsidiaries’ particu-
lar environments. On one hand, an increased degree of coordination,
it is believed, would link the diverse parts of the company, eventually
helping them in securing international contracts that would beneﬁt
more than one national subsidiary. Increasing the headquarters’ level
of awareness about the peculiarities of the individual subsidiary, on the
other hand, would potentially yield positive results, in that central ad-
vice and support could swiftly be given whenever necessary, which is
not the case presently.
Codes for the ideal knowledge sharing situation at iss-Italy: active
participation from the corporate level, world-wide group coordination
from headquarters, international participation.
Hindrances to the Achievement of an Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
As mentioned earlier in this section, the management of iss-Italy is of
the opinion that the knowledge sharing system presently in function
is good but far from suﬃcient. Several factors are considered as being
hindrances that must be overcome if the group is to get nearer the ideal
knowledge sharing situation according to the subsidiary.
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Firstly, the managers of iss-Italy interpret the lack of involvement
of the corporate level of the company into the subsidiaries’ business
and environment as a lack of interest. Actual situations were described,
in which iss-Italy had to forego considerable beneﬁts because of that
perceived disinterest that stems from insuﬃcient or ineﬃcient commu-
nication between the headquarters and its subsidiaries. For instance,
iss-Italy has experienced being prevented from bidding on big con-
tracts because it did not have, on a national level, the minimum annual
turnover required from contestants. Had they been backed-up by their
headquarters, this problem would have been easily overcome. Hence, it
appears that more involvement of the central body into the divisions’
business would be deemed suitable.
Secondly, several of the subsidiaries – particularly the big ones – seem
less than enthusiastic when confronted with the idea of actually shar-
ing their knowledge with other parts of the company in an eﬀective
way. As a result, resources are ineﬀectually spent on inventing or de-
veloping similar solutions in diﬀerent parts of the group, while they
could be much more economically sourced from the organized pool of
common knowledge that a well-functioning knowledge sharing system
should be. This lack of eﬀort in promoting and participating in sharing
on the part of some subsidiaries has resulted in lost business for other
divisions. Existing or new clients would require the provision of certain
services that were new for iss-Italy, but for which expertise already
existed elsewhere in the group. However, because that expertise was
not made readily available, the transfer of knowledge never happened
and, once again, resources were wasted, or clients turned to competent
competitors. The passivity of some parts of the group in regards of the
knowledge sharing system is therefore another key obstacle that lies on
the way to the ideal situation.
Thirdly, there is confusion in the distribution of the responsibilities
between the headquarters and the subsidiaries. Nobody at iss-Italy
seems to be really sure of whether one of their responsibilities is to de-
velop new business areas and to publicize them on a group-wide basis.
The same type of confusion is also found in the tasks related to targeting
businesses that could be acquired by iss, in the development of stan-
dard forms, contracts and measures, and in initiatives to get together
with people from other subsidiaries to discuss common problems. As
long as the respective responsibilities of the headquarters and the sub-
sidiaries are not clearly identiﬁed and publicized, knowledge sharing
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cannot be achieved in an optimal way, as one never knows if he is bas-
ing his work on a correct and approved piece of knowledge.
Fourthly, the unexpected costs that the setting up of the knowledge
sharing system imposes on the small subsidiaries of the group have
already acted as a hindering factor. When the directive, according to
which the subsidiaries have to equip themselves with network capacity
and computer material of a certain technological level, arrives from the
headquarters in themiddle of the budgeting year, for example, it is rela-
tively more diﬃcult for the small divisions than for the big ones to ﬁnd
the resources necessary to undergo the upgrading of their hardware and
netware.
Finally, iss-Italy expects that there are problems related to the fact
that the subsidiaries of the group operate under a whole array of na-
tional languages.The standardization of the system by the adoption of
a common language (in the case of Business Insight, English) does not
go without creating its own series of problems, especially for the sub-
sidiaries located in countries where the teaching of foreign languages is
given a relatively low priority in the school system. Although this prob-
lem is real, the managers of iss-Italy (which, it could be argued, is one
of the subsidiaries operating in a problematic linguistic environment)
are of the belief that a knowledge sharing system could bemade so good
that the advantages related to its use wouldmake the subsidiaries work
their way around any eventual language barrier. Locally, they have des-
ignated a super-user of Business Insight among the managerial staﬀ,
who is in charge of putting his English skills to the service of the other
users who might need them. The small size of the subsidiary and the
very limited number of people working in its central managing oﬃce
(about ﬁfteen persons, including clerical employees) made such a solu-
tion possible.
Codes for the hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowl-
edge sharing situation: low commitment of the headquarters, lack of
will from some subsidiaries, confusion of responsibilities, unexpected
costs, languages.
Conclusion
As has now become evident from our analysis of the Italian subsidiary,
its environment, its origins, and its corporate culture in this section,
there are no fundamental obstacles to the establishment of an opti-
mally functioning knowledge sharing system to be found there. The
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managers and the employees of iss-Italy have long been proactive in
learning and teaching betterworkingmethods andnewprocedures, and
their entrepreneurial spirit makes them prone to pick-up new ideas, as
they consider them as unexploited opportunities to increase their rev-
enues. But yet, the eagerness and impatience expressed by the people of
the subsidiary might in fact be the problematic factor, when consider-
ing it from a group-perspective. iss-Italy is relatively small, it canmove
swiftly, and the fact that it is still verymuch family-controlled promotes
a type of working atmosphere and culture that ismuch faster paced and
passionate than what is realistic to expect from the bigger subsidiaries.
Therefore, iss-Italy will eventually be imposed a compromise that it
might well have diﬃculties to accept, in order to make it progress with
the rest of the group.
iss Denmark
TheDanish subsidiary of iss, herein called iss Denmark, was of partic-
ular interest to analyze since it is one of the poorest performers regard-
ing the regular use of the corporate knowledge sharing system, Busi-
ness Insight. Although many iss subsidiaries do not diligently utilize
Business Insight, the fact that iss Denmark is one of them strikes me
as being abnormal as it is contact-wise and geographically very close to
the corporate instigators of the knowledge sharing system. One might
expect that a subsidiary from the same country as the headquarters and
sharing so many similar traits would also share the eagerness to use
Business Insight. The following is therefore an explanation of the dis-
tinct factors that cause this peculiar outcome.
The Local Corporate Culture
The corporate culture at iss Denmark is characterized as being very
informal and relaxed. This is exempliﬁed through the artefacts and ca-
sual dress of the employees, jeans being accepted as perfectly decent
oﬃce attire and the very seldom use of neckties. Employees are on an
informal and ﬁrst name basis and include each other in the speciﬁcs, be
they problems or joys, of their private lives. The subsidiary regards it-
self as being old fashioned and less appreciative of themodern business
techniques which rely heavily on computer know-how and technical ex-
pertise. The subsidiary’s structure is portrayed as being decentralized
and non-hierarchical permitting all employees, from the top manager
to newly employed lower ranks, to mingle freely and converse without
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formalities or hesitation. The employees have been described as being
earnest and sincere and very good at doing their jobs, characteristics
that are promoted by the subsidiary’s strong cultural history.
iss Denmark is a subsidiary that considers itself good atwhat it does.
It has experienced ﬁnancial success in many previous years, which in-
stalls conﬁdence in the manner in which it conducts business. Its cul-
tural history therefore exerts a signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the subsidiary’s
overall corporate culture. The employees, especially longstanding ones,
possessmemories frompast strategies or actions that haveworkedwell,
thereby reinforcing their beliefs and values about the conduct of good
business. These beliefs and values are so deeply imbedded in iss Den-
mark’s corporate culture that they manifest themselves as deep as the
company’s core ideology. Althoughnot explicit, these values, beliefs and
assumptions act as powerful guides as to how business should be con-
ducted and unknowingly propel the employees towards a uniﬁed mode
of thinking, one not prone to accept new and radical ideas. At the core
value of iss Denmark’s corporate culture is the belief in integrity and
old-fashion values, as well as helping and supporting fellow employees
when necessary.
Codes for iss Denmark’s local corporate culture: informal, relaxed,
non-hierarchical, old fashioned, integrity, uniﬁed mode of thinking.
Business Insight’s Match with the Existing Knowledge Sharing Processes
People at iss Denmark feel that they ﬁt poorly into the corporate
knowledge sharing plans; their dissatisfaction was expressed through
the manner in which the new knowledge sharing system was intro-
duced. The subsidiary’s communication manager heard of Business In-
sight through the corporate it department, rather than through a for-
mal representative from the headquarters who, he feels, should have
come to present and launch the system. Therefore, from the outset, it
seemed like a project that was half-heartedly believed in from the head-
quarters’ side and consequently, not something iss Denmark needed
worry too much about. Furthermore, the Danish subsidiary feels that
the headquarters is trying to go through a transformation process that
asks for many changes; changes that, in the eyes of the managers of
iss Denmark, are too drastic and probably not attainable. This eﬀec-
tively discourages iss Denmark to make use of the knowledge sharing
system, as people feel it is simply one of the corporate headquarters’
many initiatives that might be a dud in half a year’s time anyway. Con-
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sequently, the subsidiary is far from impressedwith the whole Business
Insight concept and it does not have any speciﬁc expectations of it.
iss Denmark also possesses an internal knowledge sharing system
that was established and well functioning before the introduction of
Business Insight. The system, called ‘Vidensbank’ (Danish for ‘knowl-
edge bank’), functions as the medium through which procedures, mod-
els and cases are exchanged internally, within the subsidiary.This form
of knowledge sharing, complemented by networking and communicat-
ing directly with the relevant people, is the preferred one among the
employees of the subsidiary. They feel it works well, is manageable and
sensible, where asBusiness Insight ismore complicated and less precise.
Consequently, iss Denmark’s members perceive Business Insight with
great scepticism and clearly prefer and continue to use their established
and still well functioning knowledge sharing methods. If anything, it is
felt that Business Insight can supplement their established ways and
act as a library-like, look-up tool for any eventual data that cannot be
attained through their preferred knowledge sharing ways.
iss Denmark questions the headquarters’ eagerness to integrate
knowledge from the thirty-eight subsidiaries into one giant knowledge
sharing system. The general feeling at the Danish subsidiary is that
the people in, for instance France, have little input as how to help or
provide information to a situation that iss Denmark has to deal with
and, conversely, iss Denmark has little to oﬀer iss France when deal-
ing with local French issues. At iss Denmark, there is a strong belief
that the subsidiary’s people are the experts on the Danish market and
consequentlywould be downgrading the quality of the attainable data if
they acquired it from foreign subsidiaries that do not know the speciﬁcs
of the Danish market, instead of seeking that information internally,
among themselves.
Codes for Business Insight’smatchwith the existing knowledge shar-
ing processes: poorly, not taken seriously, half-hearted implementation
attempt, not welcomed, useless.
The Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
As a natural consequence of iss Denmark being content with their
current knowledge sharing capabilities and harbouring no major am-
bitions of expanding their knowledge sharing operations to other sub-
sidiaries, they feel that they are pretty close to the ideal situation as it is.
Hence, when asked to explain how iss Denmark could attain the ideal
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knowledge sharing situation, there was little to be explained and only
minor suggestions for improvement of the already established knowl-
edge bank ‘Vidensbanken’ and other internal knowledge sharing meth-
ods were made. The paramount suggestions included quicker access to
colleagues through the expanded use of cell phones and better utiliza-
tion of the knowledge bank, thereby facilitating the knowledge extrac-
tion process. For iss Denmark, the ideal knowledge-sharing situation
clearly did not include Business Insight.Therefore, in order tomake our
inquiry at this interview applicable to the coding process, it was impor-
tant to emphasize the question of how the ideal situationwould bewith
the use of Business Insight.
iss Denmark views Business Insight as a system that lessens the
value of iss knowledge, as knowledge sharing goes from their national
divisions to a process of gathering knowledge centrally and reorganiz-
ing it company-wide from the corporate level.Therefore, the whole con-
cept of a knowledge sharing situation with the use of Business Insight
being ideal appears paradoxical to them; they believe that Business In-
sight destroys the uniqueness of the data, so tomake it applicable glob-
ally, thereby depreciating the value of the knowledge that is shared.
However, when asked to look aside from this paradox (a paradox that
is relevant and will be addressed later), iss Denmark stated the follow-
ing criteria as being essential to an ideal knowledge sharing situation
involving the use of Business Insight.
First, when logging onto the system, there should be a brief daily
overview of a few (three-ﬁve) iss related subjects that have potential
interest for all of iss’ employees all over theworld.This overviewwould,
in essence, act as a corporate newspaperwhere employees could keep up
to date with current iss activities abroad and, if possible, get inspired
andmotivated from them and introduce the events or activities locally.
The overview should consist of a few brief titles, including a 5–10-word
description of the underlying article acting as a teaser to get more in-
formation. It is essential that the overview is not more extensive than
this because it is felt that the attention span for employees to bother
looking at this overview is incredibly short. If the overview is too long
and demands toomuch eﬀort from the users, it is feared that frequency
with which it should be used will decrease and daily visits to this ‘cor-
porate newspaper’ will cease.
Second, if one of the titles, and subsequent 5–10-word description,
caught an employee’s interest, there should be a link allowing the user
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to read the entire article instantaneously. This article should contain
several other links within the bulk of the text allowing the user to redi-
rect and reﬁne his interest towards the exact area that he initially found
interesting and continue his information search. Furthermore, contact
details of the employees over whom the article was concerned must be
made available in the near vicinity of the article so the user can call or
mail the person immediately, while the topic still is fresh and engaging
in the users head.
Third, incentives should be given by corporate initiators of Business
Insight, who iss Denmark feel have been completely invisible thus far,
to use the system.This is especially important during the initial phases
of growing accustomed to the system and how to optimally use it and
contribute to it. There must be pressure from top corporate managers
at the headquarters to promote the use of Business Insight and not, as
currently done, through the promotion from it people. The incentives
should be given in order to attain the appropriate level ofmarketing and
promotion of the system, a level that is currently far too low. By doing
so, it will provide the early adopters with positive experiences from us-
ing Business Insight, not only in the form of gains from the incentive,
but also from gains in knowing more about the entire iss corporation.
iss Denmark feels that through positive experiences with the system
the eagerness to use the system will increase thereby allowing for more
people to contribute knowledge into the system.The positive repercus-
sions of an incentive scheme will therefore help complete the vision of
an ideal knowledge sharing situation.
Codes for the ideal knowledge sharing situation: easy overview of
topics, links to relevant subtopics or employees, incentives.
Hindrances to the Achievement of an Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
The primary factor hindering the attainment of the ideal knowledge
sharing situation for iss Denmark is clearly the paradoxical situation
that arises when attempting to improve the current local knowledge
sharing capabilities. iss Denmark strongly believes that the quality of
data will be compromised when it has to be regurgitated by the head-
quarters and assimilated by the local subsidiaries. Therefore, according
to iss Denmark, the ground-laying notion behind Business Insight, the
notion which intent was to improve knowledge sharing, paradoxically
acts as the predominant factor hindering the attainment of the ideal
knowledge sharing. However, iss Denmark did list other factors, some
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in junction with the paradox, that hinder the attainment of the ideal
knowledge sharing situation but had the potential to be overcome.
First, in order for the data to pass through the corporate ‘screen’ at
the headquarters and be relayed to all the other subsidiaries through
Business Insight, it has to be of importance to at least some of the other
subsidiaries. iss Denmark feels that in order for this to occur, the head-
quarters has to remove certain local details of the data stemming from
one speciﬁc subsidiary so it can be applicable to all other subsidiaries.
However, by doing so, the data losses its relevance because the speciﬁcs
of the situation might have been the determining factors for the out-
come. As a result, because of the central origin of the knowledge ﬂow,
Business Insight becomes ﬂooded with useless information, oﬀering
very little relevance to any given individual throughout iss’ national
divisions.
Second, iss Denmark feels that the headquarters, through Busi-
ness Insight, short-circuits some of the hierarchical levels within the
divisions. The communication between the headquarters and the local
middle managers of the national divisions can cause uncertainty as to
whom the middle managers should report to: divisional managers or
headquarters? Through the use of Business Insight, local middle man-
agers will have more direct contact with the headquarters opposed to
solely reporting to the divisional managers. It is feared that the use
of Business Insight might therefore result in the confusion of goals as
middle managers receive information from both divisional and corpo-
rate managers. In other words, iss Denmark fears that the divisions
can be forced to surrender some of its sovereignty and, in the extreme,
result in divisions becoming centrally controlled rather than controlled
by the national division leaders. iss Denmark feels that the knowledge
sharing system, Business Insight would therefore be better severed if it
was the exclusive preserve of the top management.
Third, the priorities of the various national subsidiaries might get
overlooked as the headquarters attempt to promote what they deem as
a priority. This problem is rooted in the diﬀerence between divisional
and corporate priorities. iss Denmark feels that the headquarters have
one primary stakeholder, namely the shareholders, whereas the divi-
sions have more stakeholders in the form of customers, employees and
local surroundings. Consequently, the diﬀerent goals pursued will hin-
der eﬀective communication between the headquarters and all national
subsidiaries as they will disagree on which areas to emphasize.
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Fourth, iss Denmark is under the impression that the headquarters
are not endorsing Business Insight to the divisional managers. In order
for Business Insight to function ideally, it must be believed in from the
headquarters and the divisionalmanagers.Thus far, the sole promotion
of Business Insight the Danish divisional managers have received was
from the it department and not from the top managers at the head-
quarters. This is an important factor hindering the attainment of the
ideal knowledge sharing situation because it lessens the seriousness
with which Business Insight gets further promoted internally in the
national divisions. If the divisional managers are the ones who should
promote the system within the divisions, then the headquarters needs
to promote the system directly to them so divisional managers do not
feel ‘run over’ or circumvented.
Fifth, the ideal knowledge sharing situation must be carried out by a
system that does not suﬀer under technical restraints. When iss Den-
mark attempts to use Business Insight, they are oftenmet with frustra-
tion and anger as they encounter technical diﬃculties that hinder the
eﬃcient and quick use of the system. Currently, the access to Business
Insight is not instantaneous and requires themanagers at iss Denmark
to waste valuable time simply getting hooked up to the system. They
feel that the time spent logging on to Business Insight could be bet-
ter utilized if they instead used the time searching for the information
through their traditional andwell established knowledge sharingmeth-
ods. Therefore, the technical problems that Business Insight often ex-
periences, along with a relatively slow logon process, act as hindrances
towards the ideal knowledge sharing situation.
Sixth, although iss Denmark is one of themost sceptical subsidiaries
when it come to the knowledge sharing project Business Insight, they
do acknowledge that the system will never work unless it has the unan-
imous support and voluntary contributions from all the subsidiaries.
iss Denmark feels that it will be incredibly diﬃcult to get all the sub-
sidiaries to contribute time, eﬀort and money into the system so that
Business Insight reﬂects the entire iss group. According to iss Den-
mark, the reasoning for this is that the beneﬁts Business Insight can of-
fer the individual subsidiaries simply do not outweigh the costs needed
to be put in by the individual subsidiaries. As a result, the costs-beneﬁt
structure of Business Insight is inadequate and consequently does not
promote the subsidiaries freely giving their input to the system, thus
acting as a hindrance towards the ideal knowledge sharing situation.
The ﬁnal factor hindering the attainment of the ideal knowledge
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sharing situation according to iss Denmark is language.They acknowl-
edge that this problem is more relevant in other subsidiaries than in
the Danish unit, where the standard of English is comparatively high.
However, if theDanish Subsidiarywill be required to communicatewith
a subsidiary with extremely poor English skills, then the fact that iss
Denmark speaks almost ﬂuent English will not be enough to establish
a smooth communication ﬂow. For Business Insight to work, it will
require that every user of Business Insight throughout the world has
at least a working level knowledge of the English language, something
that many subsidiaries currently do not have.
Codes for hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowledge shar-
ing situation: Central control of Business Insight, Business Insight
is not the exclusive control of the management, diﬀerence in head-
quarters-subsidiary priorities, lack of corporate managerial endorse-
ment, technical restraints, inadequate cost-beneﬁt structure, language
barriers.
Conclusion
Although iss Denmark clearly comes across as being one of the most
sceptical subsidiaries in regards to a corporate knowledge sharing sys-
temof the divisions thatwe encountered, we nevertheless feel that they
provided some excellent suggestions towards an improved knowledge
sharing system. Ironic as it may seem, the extreme scepticism of this di-
vision actually sheds light on some relevant thoughts for improvement
not yet thought about by divisions who are pro Business Insight.
It appears as if iss Denmark is not aware, or simply does not believe
in, the added value that could stem from a global knowledge sharing
system and hence are generally satisﬁed with their current knowledge
sharingmethods. Consequently, they are less interested in contributing
to Business Insight because it is felt that beneﬁts of Business Insight
will never outweigh the costs of contributing to it. Furthermore, the
management of iss Denmark feels that the diﬀerent employees within
the division do not necessarily all share the same viewpoints and ambi-
tions.Thismight explain why themanagement of iss Denmark is scep-
tical towards a knowledge sharing system that involves lower-ranked
managers as well.
iss France
France has long been considered as somewhat of an exception in the
European landscape, and that perceived diﬀerence has always been a
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source of national pride for the French people.The French subsidiary of
iss is to the group, what France is to its neighbours: an entity that func-
tions according to its own beliefs and interests, that is often diﬃcult to
collaborate with on an equal basis, but that is simply too big and impor-
tant to be ignored altogether. Since the introduction of the system, iss
France has simply chosen to do without Business Insight, a course of
action that clearly goes against the intentions of the group’s headquar-
ters. Given the relative size of the subsidiary, this non-stated decision
(no manager has oﬃcially said that iss France was not to use Business
Insight) is an important negative signal that the corporate level and the
other subsidiaries cannot avoid listening to.
The Local Corporate Culture
Characteristic of most French organizations are the complex hierarchi-
cal relationships that are maintained between the diverse categories of
employees.These divisions between the operational, the lowermanage-
rial, and the other types of organizational members are often related to
the type of education they received and, directly linked to that factor,
to the previous positions they have occupied in the course of their pro-
fessional career. iss France is no exception to that aspect of French
national culture, and the oﬃces are laid-out in such a way that one
clearly understands what exactly is oﬀ-limits for oneself – the higher
the ﬂoor in the building, the higher the hierarchical level of the people
working there. The remarkable formality of the working atmosphere at
the subsidiary’s headquarters in Paris is underlined by a series of cul-
tural artefacts: doors are closed and locked, business suits are worn
by everybody, and no form of the French language but the polite and
distant one is used, even among colleagues at the same hierarchical
rank.
Critique and comments on one’s work are allegedly welcome, but
their exact formulation has to be well-thought out in order to avoid
hurting personal feelings, and they would be seen as rather inappro-
priate if stemming from people at a lower hierarchical position. Never-
theless, in the French professional context that is inherent to the sub-
sidiary, the corporate culture, although formal, does qualify as an open
one.This relative openness is also reﬂected in the relationships that iss
France maintains with its environment and its outside stakeholders: it
generally revealsmore information than is required by local regulations
and customs, it is open to collaborative agreements with the media and
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social groups, it sponsors sport teams, it participates in exhibitions, it
publishes a corporate magazine, etc.
Notwithstanding the above, the managerial organization of the sub-
sidiary remains very political in its functioning – somebody’s fail-
ure will often be considered as a premium opportunity by somebody
else – another trait common to many French organizations. A posi-
tive consequence of this, and of the high level of decentralization of
the responsibilities, is the intensity of internal communication that
it requires; managers want to know what is going on in the other
parts of the national organization, so that they will become aware
of, and be able to seize eventual opportunities. Means used to secure
that communication include a subsidiary-wide intranet, an upper-level
managerial newsletter, as well as regular meetings between diﬀerent
divisions.
A strong feeling of belonging to the iss group transcendsmost parts
of the subsidiary and creates a unifying group-spirit. At the source of
that French iss spirit are shared core values that promote the achieve-
ment of a sound equilibrium between proﬁtability, good working con-
ditions for employees and service to customers. It has been relatively
easy to transfer these corporate values to the independent companies
that were bought and integrated into the subsidiary, as they are typical
ofmany French organizations.Thismindset, however similar it is to the
one that can be found in other subsidiaries, seems to stop at the French
border; the divisions are proud to pertain to iss France but generally
do not care much about being part of the iss’ multinational group.
Codes for the corporate culture of iss France: hierarchical, formal,
political, nationally oriented, common way of thinking.
Business Insight’s Match with the Existing Knowledge Sharing Processes
In a logical line of thought with what was mentioned in the previous
section about the corporate culture of iss France, communications and
knowledge sharing processes are rather self-centred, on a national ba-
sis. Bi-annual conferences and seminars are organized for the man-
agers of the group, where the results of the subsidiary and of its dif-
ferent divisions, the strategies, the targets and their attainment are
communicated, decorticated and commented. This tradition of meet-
ing up and discussing issues of common interest is very representative
of the overall knowledge sharing processes at iss France, where no real
organized system dedicated to this purpose exists. Informal network-
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ing activities are preferred, giving the individual organizational mem-
ber the possibility of establishing his own personal system for sharing
knowledge, should she deem it necessary. The national intranet, con-
sidered by many as the premium source of information (but not as a
tool for interpersonal communication or as a source of evolving infor-
mation; for both these cases richer media are favoured) complements
these face-to-face meetings and conversations.
In such a context, Business Insight oﬀered a wealth of opportuni-
ties but it has nevertheless been met with such resistance that it never
really got used in the French subsidiary. This resistance, which con-
trasts sharply with the potential beneﬁts from using Business Insight,
has to do with the changes in communication habits that would be
required from organizational members; whereas people are currently
used to punctually communicating face-to-face, the use of the new sys-
tem would oblige them to convert to a virtual communication mode
that calls for a sustained and continuous dialogue.
There has long been an acceptable (but far from optimal) ﬂow of in-
formation between the divisions of the subsidiary, but not between
the subsidiary and its international partners within the iss group.
Cross-subsidiary communication does happen, but it is generally lim-
ited to certain types of managers and conﬁned to the exchange of tech-
nical information, or to the comparison of the results of a handful of
pilot-projects (e. g., the results of the projects to study the providing
of services to the nuclear industry in France and Sweden). Organiza-
tional members are given no incentives to communicate with people
from other subsidiaries, and a feeling of self-suﬃciency ensures that
the idea of doing so only rarely arises. Even the communication man-
ager has practically no contacts with people from other subsidiaries,
and only occasional ones with the company’s headquarters, almost al-
ways initiated by the latter.
The introduction of Business Insight certainly has the potential
to make the internal communications more eﬃcient than they are
presently, but it is at best doubtful that it is suﬃcient to initiate the
sought-after cross-subsidiary exchange. Consequently, the existing
knowledge sharing processes of iss France would probably beneﬁt
from the increased use of Business Insight, but their very limited inter-
national character would not be revolutionized.
Codes for Business Insight’smatchwith the existing knowledge shar-
ing processes: no real implementation attempt, useless, redundant.
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Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
Themanagers of iss France know that the activities of their subsidiary
represent a very large share of the overall worldwide activities of the
whole group; they are well aware of the power that situation endows
themwith and they seem to be willing to use it. Consequently, a certain
‘my way or the highway’ spirit perverts the vision of the subsidiary’s
management, and the ideal knowledge sharing process, according to
them, would strangely resemble the one that is already in place at iss
France.
Due to the lack of communication between iss France and other sub-
sidiaries, a group-wide knowledge sharing system is seen as yet another
way for the headquarters to push standards and universal solutions
onto the subsidiaries. Such an attitude deﬁnitely goes against the ideal
solution proposed by iss France, in which any proposal would have to
be negotiated and developed in collaboration with the individual divi-
sions.
The avowed feeling of national self-suﬃciency that permeates the
decisions and activities of the subsidiary results into a preference to
share knowledge locally. To realize such a situation, the French would
require from an ideal knowledge sharing situation the possibility to cre-
ate sub-groups based on linguistic or geographical divisions, rather than
on areas of business. A short and clear list of topics and details neces-
sary to contact the relevant people should be made available within the
system, in such a way that somebody who would ﬁnd an issue of inter-
est in Business Insight would be able to follow up on it choosing the
medium he ﬁnds most appropriate – in the case of the French people,
probably the phone rather than the e-mail.
Another key component of such a situation, still according to the
subsidiary’s employees, would be a strong central coordinating body.
As we will see later (particularly under the analysis of iss-Italy), the
deﬁnition of the responsibilities of such a department of knowledge
sharing at the corporate level vary greatly depending on the priorities
of the subsidiary. iss France believes that making a precise individual
responsible for the company-wide knowledge sharing system is of ut-
most importance to keep an eﬃcient ﬂow of communication with the
headquarters. Without such a coordinating body, nobody will be able to
keep track of anything, thereby decreasing the eﬃciency of the system.
Moreover, the designation by top-management of an individual or a de-
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partment responsible for knowledge sharing would be a proof that the
highest hierarchical ranks of the group are actively involved, providing
a stronger incentive for the managers of such a hierarchical subsidiary
as the French one to promote the implementation of Business Insight
in their own activities.
Codes for the ideal knowledge sharing situation: decentralization,
ease of use, convenient retrieval of information, incentives.
Hindrances to the Achievement of an ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
Negative previous experience in communicating with the headquarters
is the ﬁrst problem that came up when the communication manager of
iss France had to think about factors hindering the establishment of
an ideal knowledge sharing situation. People in the subsidiary regularly
have the impression that they are, at times, put under undue pressure
by their superiors from the headquarters, whomore often than not, ask
for things to be done within a laps of time that appears unrealistic to
the French managers.
Whether this impression stems from a real problem or from a dif-
ference in communication techniques is unknown, but it exempliﬁes
very nicely another problematic factor mentioned by iss France: the
perceived lack of sensibility, on the headquarters’ side, to local require-
ments and particularities of the subsidiaries. Naturally, the scepticism
that characterizes the way in which iss France considers worldwide
standards is directly related to the importance that localization is given,
ahead of globalization.
The use of a common language (in the case of Business Insight, En-
glish) is also seen as a hindrance that comes in the way of eﬃcient
group-wide knowledge sharing, especially for countries like France,
where the school system puts little weight on the teaching of foreign
languages. Organizational members, it is believed, will be more reluc-
tant to spend time deciphering information in a language that they
do not master, and will consequently not use the system optimally.
Insuﬃcient linguistic abilities will also have an important impact on
the French subsidiaries ability and eagerness to add information to the
system; not only will organizational members have to be convinced of
the advantages of spending their time to contribute information and
make it available to others in the group, but they will have to do so in
a language that they often do not know well enough to be at ease with.
Overall, iss France has a positive impression about the idea to imple-
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ment the system, but remains dubious that all obstacles can be removed
tomake it eﬃcient.This negative perception is compounded by the lack
of formal visible endorsement of Business Insight by the highest rank-
ing levels of corporate management, which acts as a disincentive on
subsidiaries’ managers to implement it locally.
Codes for the hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowledge
sharing situation: lack of decentralization, negative experience in com-
municating with the headquarters, scepticism towards worldwide stan-
dards, language barrier, lack of incentives to local implementation such
as formal managerial approval.
Conclusion
Integrated in an environment where everything from the school sys-
tem to the political apparatus promotes hierarchical divisions and for-
mal professional relationships, iss France is an entity with traits that
are far from the traditional Scandinavian model that can be observed
at the group’s corporate level. Moreover, the considerable relative size
of the subsidiary makes it a very inﬂuential actor in a group-wide per-
spective. These characteristics have resulted in the development of a
very strong and self-centred corporate culture at the subsidiary level,
blinding the divisions of iss France to the international aspects of their
belonging to the iss family. The nationalistic character of this group
feeling reaches so far that it precludes the establishment of eﬃcient
and enriching relationships with other parts of the group. This type of
consequence is exempliﬁed by the description that is given of the ideal
knowledge sharing system that would ﬁrst and foremost have to allow
for smaller sub-groups to form and act independently from the rest of
the company, thereby eﬀectively precluding the group to reap maximal
beneﬁts from such a system.
As if the self-centrism and the resulting lack of enthusiasm of iss
France towards international knowledge sharing were not enough,
there are also the problems related to language. The level of English
knowledge ofmost Frenchorganizationalmembers (including thehigh-
est managerial levels) is admittedly too low to allow for an optimal use
of a system such as Business Insight, and even more so to allow for
eﬃcient contributions to the system.
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in chapter 4, the emphasis was on highlighting the main factors inﬂu-
encing the individual subsidiaries which, in turn, delivered the codes
that best describe their respective managerial staﬀ’s line of thoughts
regarding knowledge sharing and related topics. With these two ele-
ments in place, I now proceed to analyze the relations (similarities or
contrasts, in standpoints and operating factors) between the diﬀerent
subsidiaries. This will lead, in the conclusion to this chapter, to a sum-
mary of the elements pertinent to the description and analysis. I will
then utilize these elements as a basis on which to develop a relevant
answer to the second research question: What are the problem areas of
knowledge sharing within iss? Before doing so, however, I dedicate a
section to discussing the speciﬁc validity of the data that was exposed
in Chapter 4, and that now forms the basis of the upcoming analysis.
5.1 Speciﬁc Validity of the Data
Before proceeding with the actual analysis and interpretation of the ob-
tained data, I ﬁnd it important to speciﬁcally assess the reliability of the
data and justify its validity.The speciﬁc circumstances that were charac-
teristic of the empirical research and ﬁeldwork unavoidably gave rise to
concerns regarding the validity of the data collected during the inter-
views. In the chapter on procedural considerations, I already exposed
and explained the concerns about the general validity of the data, in
relation to the chosen methodology and to the environment I had to
work in (see section Note on the General Validity of the Empirical Data,
page 35). There nevertheless remains the fact that the degree to which
these concerns should aﬀect the analysis and interpretation of the data
varies from one interview to the next.
As mentioned earlier, this research project is the result of coopera-
tion between me – the author of the present book – and the corporate
partner, iss. Given the vested interest that the companyhas in the anal-
ysis being as complete and representative of the reality as possible, I can
logically and reasonably assume that the data gathered during the in-
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terviews with the headquarters’ staﬀ is reliable. Disclosing incomplete,
inaccurate or wrongful information would have biased the very foun-
dations on which this project is based, eﬀectively rendering the present
study useless to the company. It is therefore not in the interest of the
corporate level of the company to do so.
At iss France, the communication manager who was interviewed
seemed to have some preoccupations about this study; the fact that the
appointment with her had been arranged through my contacts at the
headquarters and the corporate-wide character of the project clearly
resulted in her holding back during the ﬁrst phase of the discussion.
Considering the general content of the data that was harvested during
the interview, however, it is diﬃcult to imagine that this initial attitude
endedhaving any signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the quality or reliability of the
information that was disclosed. Far from painting rosy pictures of the
corporate knowledge sharing situation at the French subsidiary (which
would have been a hint that the truth might have been distorted), the
interviewee made no attempts to hide the lack of eﬀorts devoted to
the topic, nor the relative unimportance with which it is considered by
most local organizational members. In the days immediately following
this interview, a newly issued corporate statistical report concerning
the use of Business Insight by the diﬀerent national subsidiaries con-
ﬁrmed the accuracy of the situation that had been depicted to us, thus
reducing any doubt about the reliability of the data obtained from this
source.
The managers of iss Denmark (and in particular its communication
manager), just like those ofmost big Danish companies, are used to col-
laborate with researchers on projects such as this one. They therefore
develop an ability to deal with the typical investigative questions such
as the ones asked throughout the current research, and can give an im-
age of their organization that is not exactly realistic. With this deﬁcit in
mind, the case of iss Denmark is however similar to the French one on
at least one point: here, as in France, no attempt was made to make the
reality more positive than it is, and it was clearly told that Business In-
sight provoked no particular enthusiasm in the Danish subsidiary. The
implementation eﬀorts are anything but sincere and eﬀective, and the
managers of the organization will go to great lengths to avoid incorpo-
rating it in the course of their daily routines. Due to the geographical
proximity of the headquarters of the group, special eﬀortswere put into
convincing me of the existence of a distinct, subsidiary-level corporate
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culture. This had already been mentioned in the course of an earlier in-
terviewwithheadquarters personnel andwas later reconﬁrmed, leaving
little doubt that it in fact was the case. Taking into account the content
of the interview with the Danish subsidiary and the fact that some of
it was directly backed-up by a third party, it is appropriate to rely on
the information that was put forward to build the data set about that
subsidiary.
The more positive situation of knowledge sharing that was exposed
to us by the managers of iss Italy prevents me from applying the same
logical reasoning to sustain the validity of the data. Not satisﬁed with
merely welcoming Business Insight and incorporating it in its regu-
lar processes, the Italian subsidiary clearly called for more and better
group-wide knowledge sharing activities. According to them, there was
practically no limit to what they could potentially accomplish with the
system and the only problems they could identify was that it had been
underway for too long and that it still was relatively primitive.The inter-
view was simultaneously conducted with the totality of the subsidiary’s
managerial staﬀ enjoying access to Business Insight, making it virtually
impossible to get an outside second opinion that would have conﬁrmed
or inﬁrmed the data gathered.The fact that I was sent by headquarters
gaveme credibility in their eyes and they seized the visit as an opportu-
nity tomake some comments that theywould not havemade otherwise.
Although the Italian managers could have embellished their operative
reality, I am conﬁdent that their depiction was true and consequently,
that the data is reliable. Everything that relates to the subsidiary, to its
history or its mode of functioning indeed indicates that iss Italy really
is an organization that has a strong tradition for searching ideas and
borrowing techniques outside its boundaries and hence, it also makes
sense for them to do so through the introduction and active use of Busi-
ness Insight. Given the entrepreneurial corporate culture of this orga-
nization, the data would remain valid for analysis even though some
points had been exaggerated during the interview.
The reliability of the interviewdata relating to iss Austria is themost
diﬃcult one to assess. The mere nature of the revelations made by the
managers of the French and Danish subsidiaries gives me good reasons
to believe them, and they are backed up by information obtained from
headquarters. In the case of iss Italy, the traditions and history of the
organization are there to conﬁrm the words of the managers. The Aus-
trian subsidiary, however, cleanly gave the impression that they had
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welcomed Business Insight but that they could also have done with-
out it. Neither strong opposition, nor especially positive remarks came
from the interview with them, and I am therefore left with statistics
alone to measure the degree of correctness of the information. Num-
bers show that iss Austria is constantly in the top-tier among the sub-
sidiaries using Business Insight; I consider that as a conﬁrmation that
the system is used as was explained during the interview and thus, I
ﬁnd the data to reach a degree of reliability that is high enough to work
with.
5.2 Analysis and Interpretation: Coded Areas Across
Subsidiaries
With the use of the codiﬁed data obtained through the interviews, we
can now clearly see the common trends and diﬀerences pertaining to
the four areas that we described in each subsidiary. From this, we will
be able to spot patterns, or lack of patterns, which suggest that some
things are more recurrent than others. These emerging trends and pat-
terns will then be projected against the ﬁndings from chapter three in
order to see how they match up with the arguments and theories that
were proposed earlier.
We know from the outset that the Italian and Austrian subsidiaries
are currently diligent knowledge sharers, whereas Denmark and France
rank much lower on the frequency and intensity with which they share
knowledgewith other subsidiaries. In the following analysis, I therefore
expect to ﬁnd similar patterns and trends emerging from the Italian
and Austrian subsidiaries, suggesting that these traits work in accor-
dance with the attempts of sharing knowledge globally. Conversely, I
will be looking for similar traits in the other two subsidiaries, so to
identify the traits that possibly hinder eﬀective knowledge sharing. It is
very important to note here that because a subsidiary is not a frequent
user of Business Insight does not necessarily mean that the company
is poor at sharing knowledge internally, within its national structures.
This is an essential distinction to make because I will, in the following,
solely be looking for factors that relate to knowledge sharing across
subsidiaries, through the use of Business Insight, and not for factors
relating to internal knowledge sharing. Table 5.1 illustrates the similar-
ities that have been identiﬁed across subsidiaries, while table 5.2 evi-
dences the potentially interesting diﬀerences that have been observed.
The tables must exclusively be read horizontally; the combinations of
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table 5.1 Similarities between coded areas
Austria France Denmark Italy
The local corporate culture
Informala
Non-hierarchicalb
Relaxedc
Hard-workingd
Happy
Hierarchical
Formal
Political
Nationally
oriented
Common way
of thinkingf
Integritye
Informala
Relaxedc
Non-hierarchicalb
Old fashioned
Uniﬁed mode
of thinkingf
Entrepreneuriald
Opennesse
Informala
Initiative
Pride in the name
Business Insights match with the existing knowledge sharing processes
Welcomedg
Usefulh
Eﬃcient
No real
implementation
attempti
Uselessj
Redundant
Poorly
Not taken
seriously
Half-hearted
implementation
attempti
Not welcomed
Uselessj
Welcomed but long
overdueg
Useful yet
currently
underdevelopedh
Ideal knowledge sharing situation
Coordination
among
subsidiariesk
Active involvement
of all subsidiariesl
User friendly
layoutm
Personal data-links
Establishment of
virtual division
areasn
Decentralization
Ease of usem
Convenient
retrieval of
informationn
Incentiveso
Easy overview of
topicsm
Links to relevant
subtopics or
employeesn
Incentiveso
Active partici-
pation from hq
Worldwide group
coordination from
the hqk
International
participationl
Continued on the following page
codes highlighted will be subject to further analysis in the present
section.
The analysis of the combinations of codes identiﬁed in tables 5.1 and
5.2 will allow for identiﬁcation of problematic factors relating to knowl-
edge sharing across subsidiaries in iss. My task will be in explaining
these factors and their speciﬁc occurrences by relating back to the pro-
posed theories of the theoretical ﬁndings and interpreting this data
with the empirical ﬁndings. The performance of such an analysis will
lead directly to the core of the second research question and to its an-
swer.
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table 5.1 Continued from the previous page
Hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowledge sharing situation
Not user-friendlyp
Lack of useful links
and virtual areas
Lack of hq
endorsement to
divisional
managersq
Diﬀerence in
hq/subsidiary
prioritiesr
Language barriers
Lack of
decentralizationu
Negative
experience in
communicating
with hq
Scepticism towards
worldwide
standardst
Languages
Lack of incentives
to local
implementation
such as formal
managerial
approvalq
Central control of
biu
bi is not the
exclusive control of
the management
Diﬀerence in
headquarters-
subsidiary
prioritiesr
Lack of corporate
managerial
endorsementq
Technical
restraintsp
Inadequate
cost-beneﬁt
structuret
Languages
Low commitment
of the hqq
Lack of will from
some subsidiaries
Confusion of
responsibilities
Unexpected costs
Languages
note Codes that match are identiﬁed by the same superscripted letters
TheLocal Corporate Culture
The subsidiaries in Austria, Italy and Denmark all have corporate cul-
tures identiﬁed as informal whereas France’s is characterized as being
formal. As was established earlier, Schein (1999) proposes that an infor-
mal corporate culture, opposed to a strictly formal corporate culture,
increases the likelihood of knowledge sharing, as employees are more
prone to talk freely to their colleagues and superiors with whom they
have daily contact. Although it is diﬃcult to disagreewith Schein’s view-
point in theory, I question its applicability to the iss situation because
the level of formality observed within a subsidiary does not appear to
hinder nor facilitate knowledge sharing with other units. The Austrian,
Italian andDanish subsidiaries possess informal corporate cultures, yet
only the Italian and Austrian subsidiaries are regarded as diligent ex-
ternal knowledge sharers. The Danish subsidiary is considered poor at
external knowledge sharing despite its informal corporate culture, and
conversely, the French subsidiary is also poor at external knowledge
sharing despite its formal corporate culture. Hence, the level of formal-
ity has had no inﬂuence on the extent to which knowledge sharing oc-
curs within these subsidiaries. I am furthermore led to believe that the
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table 5.2 Diﬀerences between coded areas
Austria France Denmark Italy
The local corporate culture
Informala
Non-hierarchicalb
Relaxed
Hard-working
Happy
Hierarchicalb
Formala
Political
Nationally
oriented
Common way of
thinkingc
Integrity
Informala
Relaxed
Non-hierarchicalb
Old fashioned
Uniﬁed mode of
thinkingc
Entrepreneurialc
Openness
Informala
Initiative
Pride in the name
Business Insights match with the existing knowledge sharing processes
Welcomedd
Usefule
Eﬃcientf
No real
implementation
attempt
Uselesse
Redundantf
Poorly
Not taken
seriously
Half-hearted
implementation
attempt
Not welcomedd
Uselesse
Welcomed but long
overdued
Useful yet
currently
underdevelopede
Ideal knowledge sharing situation
Coordination
among subsidiaries
Active involvement
of all subsidiaries
User friendly
layout
Personal data-links
Establishment of
virtual division
Decentralizationg
Ease of use
Convenient
retrieval of
information
Incentives
Easy overview of
topics
Links to relevant
subtopics or
employees
Incentives
Active
participation from
hqg
Worldwide group
coordination from
the hqg
International
participation
Continued on the following page
level of formality is unimportant with regards to external knowledge
sharing, as formality was never raised as an issue hindering knowledge
sharing in the survey data.This suggests that the formality which a cor-
porate culture is labelled has little or no inﬂuence on the company’s
ability to share knowledge externally and implies (as is also expected)
that many other factors within a company’s corporate culture inﬂuence
a company’s ability to share knowledge.
The Austrian and Danish subsidiaries are both characterized as be-
ing relaxed and non-hierarchical where as the French is character-
ized as being hierarchical. Marschan (1996) has suggested that the
less-hierarchical subsidiaries are generally highly diﬀerentiated and
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table 5.2 Continued from the previous page
Hindrances to the achievement of an ideal knowledge sharing situation
Not user-friendly
Lack of useful links
and virtual areas
Lack of hq
endorsement to
divisional
managers
Diﬀerence in
hq/subsidiary
priorities
Language barrier
Lack of
decentralizationh
Negative
experience in
communicating
with hq
Scepticism towards
worldwide
standards
Language
Lack of incentives
to local
implementation
such as formal
managerial
approval
Central control of
bi
bi is not the
exclusive control of
the management
Diﬀerence in
headquar-
ters-subsidiary
priorities
Lack of corporate
managerial
endorsement
Technical
restraints
Inadequate
cost-beneﬁt
structure
Language
Low commitment
of the hq
Lack of will from
some subsidiaries
Confusion of
responsibilitiesh
Unexpected costs
Language
note Codes that contrast are identiﬁed by the same superscripted letters.
functionally interdependent which results in complex ﬂows of infor-
mation. She supports this claim by stating that less-hierarchical sub-
sidiaries are coordinated and controlled particularly through informal
mechanisms, such as interlocking boards of directors and personal rela-
tionships. According to her, this results in complex ﬂows of information
that impede a less-hierarchical subsidiary’s ability to share knowledge
externally. This theory certainly appears convincing when projecting it
onto the Danish subsidiary, which is non-hierarchical and simultane-
ously poor at sharing knowledge externally. However, the theory fades
in credibility when taking it further and looking at the Austrian and
French subsidiaries. The fact that the Austrian subsidiary is a relatively
non-hierarchical organization and the French subsidiary is much more
hierarchical in structure would, according to her, suggest that the for-
mer experience diﬃculty sharing knowledge externally while the lat-
ter’s sharing abilities is improved. Our empirical data, concerning these
two subsidiaries, however contradicts this drastically with France be-
ing one of the absolute poorest knowledge sharers and Austria sharing
knowledge diligently external to their group.Thus, no patterns emerge
from the eﬀect that a hierarchical structure has on a company’s ability
to share knowledge externally and suggests, as was the case above, that
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other factors are predominant when inﬂuencing a company’s ability to
share knowledge.
The French subsidiary is very nationally oriented and the employees
all share a common way of thinking, a trait also present in the Danish
subsidiarywhere the employees have beendescribed as operating under
a uniﬁedmode of thinking.This conformity in the thinking process was
not present in the Austrian subsidiary and especially not in the Italian
subsidiary where the employees were depicted as being entrepreneurial
and open to new ideas. Alvesson and Berg (1992) stressed the impor-
tance of subsidiaries avoiding a shared way of thinking, as it would in-
evitably lead to diﬃculty in taking foreign information into account, a
viewpoint also put forward by some survey respondents who have iden-
tiﬁed the existence of these commonways of thinking as a problem that
demands a cultural change that will promote cross-corporate cultural
sharing initiatives. Furthermore, it would complicate the understand-
ing of information stemming from that subsidiary as it entails a certain
understanding of the sending subsidiary’s way of thinking.Therefore, if
we allow Alvesson and Berg’s theory to naturally evolve, we realize that
a uniﬁed mode of thinking, or a predetermined way of doing things,
does not promote knowledge sharing because one does not feel the ne-
cessity to retrieve information, nor share information, because of the
preconceived notion that everyone already knows what he/she should
be doing and that the established way of doing things is the best way; a
mode of thinking spotted at iss Denmark.The further implications of
this is that other subsidiaries will have diﬃculty understanding infor-
mation that stems from a subsidiary with this mindset because their
predetermined ways have inadvertently become so tacit that they are
no longer easily understandable for other subsidiaries operating under
a diﬀerent corporate culture. Suchwas the case for iss Francewhere the
French employees actions and words within the subsidiary many times
seemed puzzling to outsiders such as the headquarters. Conversely, em-
ployees with diverging thinking patterns and operating with a mindset
that there are other ways of doing things, appear to be traits that en-
hance the likeliness that employees share knowledge with other sub-
sidiaries; a presumption certainly supported by the data obtained from
the Italian employees that are very eager to share knowledge interna-
tionally. Furthermore, other subsidiaries will have an easier time shar-
ing knowledge with such a subsidiary because the shared data is not
embedded in a tacit understanding of a speciﬁc corporate culture.
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Epilogue
The subsidiaries of the iss group that have been interviewed have dis-
tinct and sometimes contrasting corporate cultures. Some traits do
however repeat themselves in diﬀerent subsidiaries and thus provide
fodder for afterthought as to what characteristics of the diﬀerent cor-
porate cultures facilitate knowledge sharing. Of the above mentioned
traits, it appears as if being nationally orientated and having a com-
mon or uniﬁed mindset are characteristics of corporate culture that
do not support a global knowledge sharing initiative and deter em-
ployees from using such a system. Although it would be tempting to
take this a step further and bundle the four subsidiaries into categories
of similar corporate cultures, it would be incorrect because each sub-
sidiary possesses particular qualities, not shared by others, that make
their individual corporate culture unique. Consequently, the attempt to
group, for example, the Austrian and Italian subsidiary’s corporate cul-
ture together and conclude that their corporate cultures are similar and
therefore more likely to share knowledge is mooted and no attempts at
that will be made. What however can be concluded is that, with the
exception of being nationally orientated and the employees sharing a
uniﬁed mindset, whether a subsidiaries corporate culture is hierarchi-
cal or non-hierarchical, formal or informal plays no signiﬁcant role on
these units’ ability to share knowledge externally.
Appropriateness of Business Insight
The patterns andmannerisms emerging from how Business Insight ﬁts
in with the already existing knowledge sharing processes reveal the in-
tricacies of howBusiness Insightwas received and incorporated into the
organization. In accordance with this, the match between the manner-
isms and how well Business Insight ﬁts in with the existing knowledge
sharing processes will expose which traits and characteristics go well
with the introduction of Business Insight.
The Austrian and Italian subsidiaries both welcomed the arrival of
the corporate knowledge sharing system, although the Italian sub-
sidiary did consider it to be long overdue. Nevertheless, the fact that the
employeeswithin these organizations regarded Business Insight as tool
that could improve the quality of their work inﬂuenced them in such
a manner that they welcomed Business Insight and were interested in
the beneﬁts the system could provide. As suggested earlier by Scholes
(1999) well intended strategies are of little value to the organization as
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a whole unless all relevant employees of the unit stand behind the new
idea and welcome the new strategy and are open to the new changes
that it encompasses.This welcoming approach clearly facilitates the in-
troduction of any new system and suggests that one of the reasons the
Austrian and Italian subsidiaries are diligent users of Business Insight is
because of this open andwelcomingmindset towards a new system.The
Danish and French subsidiaries have, conversely, not welcomed Busi-
ness Insight; the Danish subsidiary not feeling an internal demand for
such a system and the French subsidiary barely knowing such a system
existed. Since Denmark and France are the two subsidiaries that do not
use Business Insight diligently I am further led to believe that welcom-
ing Business Insight is a prerequisite for the successful implementation
of the system. Notwithstanding this, such an outcome could equally be
argued reversely ala the ‘chicken-or-egg’ conundrum. As such, it is plau-
sible that the Danish and French subsidiaries are non-welcoming to the
knowledge sharing systembecause they disagreewith certain parts of it
and therefore do not wish it implemented.Thus, what can be concluded
with certainty is only that a non-welcoming attitude, wherever it may
stem from, is counterproductive to the successful implementation of a
knowledge sharing initiative.
Another common characteristic of the Italian and Austrian sub-
sidiaries, which complements the above point, is that they considered
Business Insight as a useful addition to their current knowledge shar-
ing processes. According to Boyd, Larréché, et al. (1996), successful im-
plementation of a given strategy, in this case implementing Business
Insight, greatly depends on the apparent usefulness that the new sys-
tem is perceived with. If the introduced strategy appears faulty and
lacking in competencies, it receives a poor reputation from the begin-
ning, which will consequently negatively aﬀect the eagerness to use the
system. Contrariwise, if the employees are under the impression that
the functional competencies demanded by the strategy are in order and
the appropriate mechanisms for coordinating eﬀorts have been estab-
lished, then the performance and diligence in which the new system
is approached will increase. Such was the case for the Italian and the
Austrian subsidiary; they both regarded Business Insight as a useful
complement opposed to a substitute or a threat, thereby, I suspect,
installing a sense of calmness and acceptance towards Business In-
sight, making the usermore keen to experiment and test the abilities of
the system. Conversely, the Danish and French subsidiaries were much
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more rigid in their acceptance of the new system as they regarded Busi-
ness Insight as ineﬀectual and something that could add no new value,
an opinion that is also found many times in the survey data. This is
clearly reﬂected in the eagerness with which the latter two subsidiaries
use Business Insight and it seems as if they are hesitant to use the sys-
tem because they fear letting go of their established knowledge sharing
processes.This fear is not unjustiﬁed as time spent on Business Insight
will mean less time being available for their current and, as of yet, pre-
ferred knowledge sharing ways. So, in an economic sense, it is a trade
oﬀ and if the Danish and French subsidiaries regard Business Insight
as being inferior to the established ways, then it can be argued that
Business Insight is an inferior substitute to their preferred knowledge
sharing ways opposed to a complement. Hence, the level of usefulness
a system such as Business Insight is perceived to be harbouring greatly
inﬂuences the eagerness in which the system gets used.
A ﬁnal area where the emerging patterns of how Business Insight ﬁts
inwith the already established knowledge sharing processes is theman-
ner in which Business Insight was implemented with. The Danish and
French subsidiaries have made no real implementation eﬀorts to inte-
grate Business Insight into their subsidiaries. This can be argued to be
a natural consequence of the above two points (the system not being
welcomed and it being regarded as an ineﬀectual substitute rather than
a useful complement) but nevertheless the implementation eﬀort is an
area that can be individually tackled. Almost all authors on implemen-
tation theories make a special point of stressing the importance that a
sincere implementation eﬀort has on the outcome of a ﬁrm’s ability to
implement a strategy eﬀectively (e. g. Boyd, Larréché, et al. 1996; Weitz
and Wensley 1984; Scholes 1999; Carroll, Dromgoole, et al. 2000). They
state that a newly introduced strategy is sure to experience implemen-
tation diﬃculties, if it is done without the combined ‘push’ of all the
employees in a positive direction that facilitates the implementation
process. Exactly this was also voiced by many of the answers contained
in the survey data, similarly expressing aneed for a sincere implementa-
tion eﬀort. From the interview data, we see that the Danish and French
subsidiaries have treated the implementation eﬀorts in a half-hearted
manner, which is not surprising since it is diﬃcult to full-heartily im-
plement a system that one has diﬃculty seeing bearing fruit down the
road.The ultimate consequence of this is that Business Insight is a sys-
tem used sparsely as the implementation eﬀort by the subsidiaries em-
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ployees is anything but genuine. The Austrian and Italian subsidiaries
have conversely taken the implementation process of Business Insight
as a very serious procedurewhich is undoubtedly one of the reasonswhy
these subsidiaries are experiencing success with the current knowledge
sharing system.
Epilogue
Thematch between themannerismsBusiness Insightwas acceptedwith
and how well it ﬁts in with the already existing knowledge sharing pro-
cesses throughout the four subsidiaries tells us a great deal about the
underlying notions the employees have pertaining to the knowledge
sharing system. For this analyzed area, there was a clear distinction
between the mannerisms that the ‘good’ (Italian and Austrian) knowl-
edge sharing subsidiaries revealed and the ones the ‘bad’ (Danish and
French) knowledge sharing subsidiaries revealed (between 1–6 average
daily hits per user for the former subsidiaries and 0–1 average daily hits
per user for the latter subsidiaries).
The ability to welcome the new knowledge sharing system is per-
ceived by us as having a profound impact on how well it will ﬁt in with
the existing procedures and eventually into the organization. For Italy
and Austria, it was apparent that welcoming the system played an in-
ﬂuential role in the successful integration of Business Insight into the
existing practices. Conversely, France andDenmark sawno real purpose
with Business Insight and consequently felt less compelled to welcome
such a system and, as a result, use it sparingly.
Thedegree towhich the subsidiarieswelcomeBusiness Insight is very
dependent on how useful they feel the system will eventually be. The
French and Danish subsidiaries feel that the system oﬀers little to their
organizations and might actually compromise their preferred and es-
tablished knowledge sharing abilities as focus gets taken away from
them in order to deal with Business Insight. On the contrary, the Italian
and Austrian subsidiaries regard Business Insight as being very useful
and consequently approach the new systemwith great anticipation and
openness.Therefore, the extent to which the subsidiaries feel that Busi-
ness Insight will be fruitful plays a potent role in how well the system
ﬁts in with the established knowledge sharing ways.
The welcoming ability and perceived usefulness of the system have
strong repercussions on the ﬁnal characteristic of how Business Insight
ﬁts in with the existing knowledge sharing processes: the implementa-
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tion eﬀort.Thus, in order for the implementation eﬀorts to be genuine,
the subsidiary must view Business Insight as a positive introduction
and welcome it, as was the case with iss Italy and iss Austria.This will
increase the fundamental eagerness to use the system and expedite im-
plementation as well as provide lubrication for any upcoming glitches
that occur as a result of problematic start-up technicalities.
The Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation
The third area of research that is covered in the process of gathering the
data for the empirical part of our work was termed ‘The ideal knowl-
edge sharing situation.’ The interviews that were completed with the
managerial representatives of the subsidiaries selected for participa-
tion were particularly useful in getting this type of information. The
direct and indirect questioning on the issue, because it was directed
at some organizational members who should be using Business Insight
on a regular basis and even promote its increased use among their col-
leagues and subordinates at the subsidiary level, helped shed light on
diﬀerent points that are considered as being essential components of
an ideal knowledge sharing situation and related procedures.
A large share of the factors that were mentioned by the interviewees
regarding this area can be considered as features, functionalities or par-
ticularities of a knowledge sharing system. Some of these factors were
desired by the users but missing from the existing knowledge sharing
process put in place by iss. The features mentioned by each individual
manager are representative of his personal experience with this kind of
system, and of the speciﬁc areas he is particularly sensitive to. No sug-
gestion wasmade in order to verify that a particular feature was indeed
desired by a majority among the managerial staﬀ but some of them do
appear in more than one description.
The clarity and straightforwardness of the user interface of a net-
work-based knowledge sharing system like Business Insight was one
of these recurring factors from the interview and survey data. It was
expressed as ‘a user-friendly layout’ by the Austrian subsidiary, as a
system allowing for an ‘increased ease of use’ in France, and as an in-
terface presenting an ‘easy overview of topics’ by the Danishmanagers.
The people of iss Italy, although they did not mention this factor ex-
pressly, did not reject the idea altogether neither; they simply consid-
ered it as less than essential, since an ideal, high-quality knowledge
sharing systemwould be so good that a user-friendly layout would only
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become a secondary preoccupation. Such a line of thought ﬁts perfectly
with the entrepreneurial spirit that characterizes the Italian subsidiary.
The local managers (whom, in the hierarchy of iss as a whole, play the
role of middle managers) certainly act as the entrepreneur type of mid-
dle managers, as described by Janczak (1999). Entrepreneurs welcome
any change that will make their research for existing knowledge easier,
preferring such characteristics as eﬃciency to user-friendliness, which
they perceive as fringe beneﬁts. It therefore makes sense for the Italian
subsidiary managers to put relatively less weight on user-friendliness
than the managers of the other subsidiaries. Nevertheless, ﬁnding
somewhat converging opinions on this point across very diﬀerent sub-
sidiaries, corporate and national cultures should not come as a surprise.
Hence, it is reasonable to deduce that the user-friendlier the layout
of a system is, the more enticing it is to use it regularly, and the opin-
ions expressed by the diﬀerent national subsidiaries support the gen-
eral theory conveyed in the literature, that user-friendliness facilitates
the introduction and acceptance of a new system (Kautz and Vendelø
2001; Orubeondo 2000; Tan 2000). In further accordance with the sub-
sidiaries statements, Orubeondo (2000) suggests that in order for the
system to be truly user-friendly to its target group, the developers of
Business Insight will have to keep it in the relatively simple end of the
spectrum.
Similarly, there was a high degree of consensus around the idea that
the system should be constructed in such a way that allows for fast and
convenient retrieval of linked information, be it about persons in the
iss organization or about related topics. This was expressed in diverse
but similar ways by the subsidiaries: as a desire to have a direct link be-
tween the name of an employee mentioned in a text or an article and
the contact informationof that person; an eﬃcient search-and-ﬁnd tool
incorporated in the system; or a list of hyperlinks allowing for instant
access to related topics, in the margin of the page that is displayed.This
was also supported by the survey data, where several respondents have
mentioned the importance of increasing the convenience of informa-
tion retrieval and of making available an eﬃcient search engine. These
stated needs and wishes for well-functioning retrieval systems under-
line the importance ofmaking the information contained in the system
available to the users in a form that is clear to them, and at the time that
suits them best, a view that, as we mentioned earlier, is also upheld by
Gross (2001).
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The components of an ideal knowledge sharing system that are de-
scribed above have been mentioned by a series of interviewees em-
ployed in subsidiaries with very diverse corporate cultures. Therefore,
they appear to be accepted unanimously and do not have any signiﬁ-
cant potential for creating organizational problems stemming from di-
verging values and preferences. Other factors, however, have only been
mentioned by people from some of the subsidiaries that have been in-
terviewed. iss Austria and iss Italy appeared to agree on a series of
points that were often directly or indirectly rejected by iss Denmark
and iss France. True to their long-established practice for seeking new
ideas and sharing knowledge on an international basis, the managers
of the Italian subsidiary could not imagine a system like Business In-
sight working optimally without a much higher degree of international
participation and coordination than is the case presently. They clearly
call for a central, corporate coordinating body that would not only ad-
ministrate the system and feed it with data, but also ensure the active
participation of most or all subsidiaries of the group, for the beneﬁt of
all the parts of iss’s worldwide organization. The Austrian managers,
although they were not as precise as the Italian ones in their wishes,
also sought a better and more eﬀective form of coordination, and an
increased level of international participation of the subsidiaries in the
system. They however remained vaguer than the Italians on the man-
agerial level at which such a coordinating and internationalizing power
should be set-up,mentioning the corporate headquarters as ‘an option.’
iss is far from the ﬁrst multinational group to suﬀer from the rela-
tively high degree of decentralization of its operationalmanagement, in
the process of trying to improve group-wide knowledge sharing. Cerny
(1996) and Stevens (2000) argue that companies operating in very dif-
ferent sectors of activities risk being impeded equally much by their
relatively decentralized structures in their attempts to introduce new
processes of knowledge sharing. Since iss Italy and iss Austria are gen-
erally better than iss France and iss Denmark at sharing knowledge
externally, and since they are the two subsidiaries calling for a higher
degree of centralization of the system, I tend to agree with the views of
Stevens and Cerny. There appear to be facts internal to the iss group
that support the superiority of the centralist model, over the decentral-
ized structure of knowledge sharing.
Historically less inclined towards sharing knowledge internation-
ally because of their previously existing, nationally-based knowledge
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sharing, internal communication, or intranet systems, the French and
the Danish subsidiaries were unanimous on a very important point:
the corporate management of iss should give more incentives to the
subsidiaries of the group in order to make them engage more actively
in knowledge sharing activities across the boundaries of subsidiaries.
Types of incentives that were mentioned would take the form of re-
wards, ﬁnancial or else, based on a royalties system; each time a piece
of knowledge would be accessed in the system, the subsidiary or the
division from which it had originated would receive credit. While that
kind of suggestion indicates that even subsidiaries that are relatively
self-suﬃcient with regards to knowledge sharing understand the bene-
ﬁts of company-wide participation to the system, it also suggests that
they consider their own eventual participation as a net cost for which
they feel they should be rightfully compensated. This kind of attitude
is supported by the fact that these subsidiaries have already existed
and evolved in that autarchic mode for a certain time and therefore,
they consider that their contribution to the system would be relatively
higher than their use. Therefore, when looking at the situation from
these subsidiaries’ point of view, the costs / beneﬁts analysis of a knowl-
edge sharing system should be conducted at their own level, rather than
on a group-wide basis.
The literary work of Ellis (2001) and Stevens (2000) suggests that
incentives schemes may not be the best way of getting organizational
members to use the knowledge sharing system on a long-term basis,
and that alternative solutions should be preferred to them. I agree with
these authors as far as the success of the system should not only de-
pend on the users getting rewarded for using it, but it seems that the
development of an incentive scheme could be a valuable part of a pro-
motional package aiming at popularizing the system. In other words,
incentives appear useful in convincing the users of the sceptical knowl-
edge sharing subsidiaries, such as iss Denmark and iss France, to give
the system a fair chance, but the system must in turn be good enough
for the users to be willing to stick to it even after the original incentives
scheme has been rolled-back.
Epilogue
The analysis of the factors that were mentioned by more than one sub-
sidiary as being integral parts of an ideal knowledge sharing system is
an interesting and revealing process in that it allows us to observe a
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series of underlying characteristics that are common to the diﬀerent
corporate cultures of the subsidiaries. Certain changes in some of the
features of a knowledge sharing system undeniably result in a positive
evolution of this system.Making the layout of the interface of the com-
puter-based part of the systemmore user-friendly, for example, is very
unlikely to be rejected by anybody as a change for the better.
Some traits of the system, its processes, and its operation and ad-
ministration, however, do not yield the same kind of unanimity among
the subsidiaries. In the empirical data gathered through the interviews,
this is best exempliﬁed by the wishes expressed by the subsidiaries re-
garding which managerial level to place which type of responsibilities
for the functioning of Business Insight. While the people of iss France
clearly stated that their acceptance and use of the system would greatly
be increased if it were to be decentralized to a higher extent, the com-
ments of the managers of iss Italy were going in a completely oppo-
site direction and tend to be better supported by diﬀerent authors (e. g.
Cerny 1996; Stevens 2000). For them, the only eﬃcient administrative
and coordinative body for such a system would have to be at the corpo-
rate headquarters level, the only echelon that has a strategic overview;
diverging goals and plans in using Business Insight are at the source
of such diverging opinions. The entrepreneurial iss Italy aspires at ex-
panding andmakingmore eﬃcient its existing international operations
of knowledge sharing, which clearly is favoured by a group-wide sys-
tem; meanwhile, political and nationally-minded iss France considers
it would be better oﬀ if it could simply make Business Insight ﬁt in its
normal pattern of knowledge sharing activities, a vision that requires
a high level of local adaptation to the precise circumstances of the sub-
sidiary.
The same type of contrast appears when considering the types of
knowledge sharing sub-groups (an example of such a sub-group would
be a common divisional area as suggested by iss Austria in the sec-
tion The Ideal Knowledge Sharing Situation for iss Austria, page 76)
that were asked for by the French and the Austrian subsidiaries. iss
France, true to its local strategy of self-suﬃciency in matters of knowl-
edge and procedure development, proposed functionalities that would
allow for the creation of regional or linguistic sub-groups within the
Business Insight framework.The avowed goal, here, is to lay the ground
for using the system in the sameway as the Frenchnational intranet has
been used thus far or, at most, to extend it to other subsidiaries or di-
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visions of iss located in French speaking areas, which would bring no
new costs of sharing for iss France. Although authors such as Klet-
ter (2001) present the formation of knowledge sharing communities
within a wider knowledge sharing system as an essential step in the
achievement of eﬃcient knowledge sharing, it is important to distin-
guish between two types of communities. While Klettermakes a strong
case for groups formed across organizational boundaries, along func-
tional parameters, the type of community required by iss France is
primarily built on linguistic and regional priorities, thereby making it
much less valuable in promoting a more eﬃcient knowledge sharing
system. iss Austria, however, covets the formation of sub-groups that
would be based on the business area of the members, rather than on
their geographical location. Such groups, according to Kletter, would
assemble people with common professional interests across the bound-
aries of subsidiaries, thereby making the sharing process better tar-
geted and more relevant to the individual organizational member.
As is apparent from the analysis that has been conducted in the
present section, some factors are universally expected to appear in an
ideal knowledge sharing system, independently of the type of corporate
culture that characterizes the operations of the individual subsidiary. A
user friendly layout of the interface, eﬃcient and simple searching tools
integrated in the system, and better links between the diﬀerent topics
were universally recognized as suitable. Diﬀerences in opinions about
underlying factors aﬀecting the administration and general function-
ing of the system, however, evidence areas in which the subsidiaries’ in-
dependent corporate culture and their corresponding goals in sharing
knowledgemay lead to conﬂicting interests. This is the case for the sys-
tem’s eventual functionalities allowing for the formation of sub-groups,
and for the managerial level from which the system should ideally be
given its cohesion and where a collaborative atmosphere should be in-
stigated.
Hindrances to the Achievement of an Ideal
Knowledge Sharing Situation
The aim of the preceding research theme (The Ideal Knowledge Shar-
ing Situation) was to uncover the features, factors and characteristics
that, according to the subsidiaries, made a knowledge sharing system
including Business Insight as good as it could be. In this fourth part of
the analysis, I seek to identify the obstacles that these same subsidiaries
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expect will bar the way to an ideal knowledge sharing situation at iss.
Common for these obstacles is their inherence to the structure of the
organization as it is presently. Therefore, several of them made recur-
rent appearances across the comments of diﬀerent managers.
Points that were made when the managers were asked about the fac-
tors that were essential to the attainment of an ideal knowledge shar-
ing situation naturally appear as counter-arguments in this section.
The Austrian and Danish subsidiaries, for example, both mentioned
the user-friendliness and the convenience of use as important features
of a good knowledge sharing system, an opinion that is supported by
Orubeondo (2000) and Kautz and Vendelø (2001). In this section, these
same subsidiaries naturallymention the relatively lowuser-friendliness
of Business Insight as one of the existing hindrances to the achievement
of the ideal knowledge sharing situation.
Similarly, the two subsidiaries assess that the often diverging priori-
ties of the corporate management and of the managers of the diﬀerent
subsidiaries are likely to cause problems. This indeed risks becoming a
source of considerable dissatisfaction, as the divergence between sets
of priorities are not only to be found on the corporate / subsidiary axis,
but also among the subsidiaries. The views of Hill and Storck (2000)
underline the critical importance of involving all relevant parties when
setting goals, in order to ensure the existence of common interests and
thereby increase commitment and compliance from all parties. Such a
coordination of goals does not happen at iss; an example of diverg-
ing priorities between the corporate headquarters and the bigger sub-
sidiaries of the group (such as iss France or iss Denmark) is the mea-
surement of ﬁnancial results.While an increased level of cross-national
knowledge sharing would likely lead to a better result for the company
as a whole, it is thinkable that relatively large subsidiaries would be left
with a net cost from participating in the system, thereby lowering their
individual performance. Among the subsidiaries, the ones that favour
national communication and are reluctant to collaborate internation-
ally, such as the French subsidiary, clearly do not have the same priori-
ties in sharing knowledge as iss Italy, for example, the entrepreneurial
subsidiary that has always gone out of its way to beneﬁt from outside
inﬂuences.
The conﬂicting opinions about the appropriate or the suitable degree
of decentralization of the administrative functions of Business Insight
are interesting, as they do not yield a nice consensus among the sub-
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sidiaries. iss France, true to the wishes it has expressed in an earlier
section, exposes the lack of decentralization of the operation of the
system as one of the main obstacles preventing the attainment of an
ideal knowledge sharing policy in the multinational organization. Con-
versely, and in accordance with the arguments put forward by Cerny
(1996), iss Italy decries the high risk for confusion of responsibilities
among the diverse levels of corporate and subsidiarymanagement, and
maintains it is an important hindrance. The preferred solution of the
Italian subsidiary to that potentially explosive situation is an increased
degree of coordination that would stem from a strong, central admin-
istration of the system that can exclusively be based at the corporate
headquarters’ level.
Danish representatives shared the French view and regarded the gen-
eral lack of decentralization of the administration of Business Insight
as a central obstacle impeding the establishment of a better knowledge
sharing situation in the company. This comes as no surprise, given the
previously stated goal that these two subsidiaries have to implement
Business Insight only if they are forced or overly rewarded to do so,
and to make it ﬁt their already-existing processes.This attitude is how-
ever counter-productive to the successful implementation of a knowl-
edge sharing system, as argued byCerny (1996) and Stevens (2000).This
sort of short-sighted view of knowledge sharing, apparent in the Dan-
ish and French subsidiaries, concentrates more on the immediate gains
provided by incentive schemes than on the real long-term beneﬁts of
the strategy. This eﬀectively deteriorates the whole knowledge sharing
strategy as employees temporarily act in accordance with the initiative
but for the wrong reasons. It is therefore important for eventual incen-
tives to be used exclusively as enticing means in the introductory phase
of a knowledge sharing system, and not as permanent rewards that be-
come the employees’ only motivations for using the system.
In spite of the subsidiaries being characterized by very diﬀerent types
of corporate cultures, they did agree on some points that were viewed
as obstacles. Common for all the subsidiary managers, is the perceived
lack of engagement of corporate management in the knowledge shar-
ing project, a factor that has previously been found to be essential to
the creation of larger competitive advantages through more eﬃcient
knowledge sharing (Zack 1999). Most intended users of Business In-
sight have been brieﬂy introduced to it by some middle-level managers
of their own subsidiary, to whom the corporate headquarters had not
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made particular eﬀorts to promote the system. The results are pre-
dictable: in the subsidiaries where the corporate culture encouraged
sharing and communicating internationally (i. e., Austria and Italy), the
middlemanagers were somewhat enthused by the system and didmake
a serious eﬀort in initiating their colleagues and subordinates; mean-
while, in subsidiaries where the culture lead more towards national
self-suﬃciency (i. e., Denmark and France), the communication ﬂow
was blocked by the middle managers and extreme lows in the level of
awareness about Business Insight were reached – at iss France, practi-
cally nobody uses it.The empirical work of Janczak (1999) shows the im-
portant role played bymiddlemanagers in the dispersion of knowledge
inmultinational organizations and the impact they have on the success-
ful implementation of systems. It is therefore important to emphasize
the pivotal role middle managers of a multinational organization play
in the process of implementing a new corporate-wide knowledge shar-
ing system and their worth should not be undervalued as ﬁnding the
right mix of middle managers to promote the system greatly inﬂuences
the overall success.
Throughout all the subsidiaries, there reigns a feeling that the entire
Business Insight and knowledge sharing initiative, is not much more
than a fad that will eventually subside in importance. The fact that
the project was never formally launched, presented and promoted to
the individual subsidiaries by headquarters staﬀ was mentioned every-
where as a sign that the highest levels of management did not attach
importance to it. This phenomenon was especially important in coun-
tries where the national cultures have inﬂuenced the corporate cultures
in such a way that the acts and endorsements of the company’s lead-
ers take a special signiﬁcation. Subsidiaries located in traditionally high
power distance societies such as Italy and France (Hofstede 1997) were
deeply aﬀected andwere leftwithout the push-for-implementation that
a concrete vouching from high managerial level would have been per-
ceived as.The relatively high power distance of the environments these
subsidiaries are embedded in helps explain why they have felt the lack
of managerial endorsement more profoundly than the others.
All interviewed subsidiaries agreed on language as being one pivotal
obstacle to any international knowledge sharing initiative at iss. iss
Austria and iss Italy both acknowledged that the use of the English
language harbours some problems, but are very optimistic and believe
that the advantages of the system will outweigh the language barriers.
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The fact that Business Insight functioned in awritten formwas seen as a
potential way of circumventing language problems; writing and reading
in English leave more freedom and are less stressing than speaking and
listening to an interlocutor on the phone, for instance.
The much bigger French subsidiary, however, considered the lan-
guage issue as the single biggest problem in the international knowl-
edge sharing system.TheEnglish knowledge of the average user of Busi-
ness Insight in France being very rudimental, no miracle cure has yet
been developed and it is unlikely to happen in a foreseeable future.This
causes problems because the intended users of the knowledge system
cannot understand it without employing a frustratingly long time to
decipher it with a dictionary, making the development of a new solu-
tion from the groundmore appealing. It is also an inconvenience for the
feeding of knowledge into the system, since very few people have both
the technical and the language skills required to redact an intelligible
piece of knowledge that could beneﬁt others throughout iss.
For iss Denmark, the language issue lies more with the other sub-
sidiaries than with itself. Given the high level of English of the bigger
part of itsmanagerial staﬀ, theDanish organization has no doubt about
its capacities to contribute signiﬁcantly to the system, and to extract
whatever beneﬁt it can from it. It nevertheless fears that eventual fur-
ther communication between the source and the recipient of a piece of
information, that would be required to clarify details or to obtain com-
plementary data, will be hindered by language problems.
The survey respondents also denounced the language factor as a sig-
niﬁcant hindrance to their eﬃcient and regular use of Business Insight.
Some of them went as far as suggesting that the system should be
run in their local language, completely disregarding the fact that this
would likely become an even bigger hindrance to other subsidiaries. Al-
though this is a clear setback to a global knowledge sharing system, it
exempliﬁes how reluctant some employees are at using a system that is
not available in their native language. Nevertheless, having a common
working language in which all users can operate is an obvious prereq-
uisite for a common, global knowledge sharing system and hence, iss
must eventually address the problems stemming from inadequate En-
glish skills in the intended users of the system.
Finally, the hierarchical levels to which Business Insight should be
accessible leaves iss Austria and iss Denmark entrenched in directly
opposed opinions. The former complains that Business Insight is still
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too elitist and should be opened to considerably more organizational
members than is the case presently, thereby allowing for more inputs
into the system and improving the overall knowledge sharing strategy.
However, the latter sees it as an inconvenience that the system is not
the exclusive terrain of corporate and subsidiary top managerial lev-
els as they feel that too much employee inﬂuence will warp the neat-
ness and simplicity that is imperative for the use of the system.The re-
spective standpoints of the two subsidiaries are a logical consequence
of their implementation eﬀort. Having integrated the system only to
a limited extent in its daily routines, iss Denmark still perceives it as
something disruptive to its regular activities. Meanwhile, iss Austria
has successfully integrated the system into its working methods and is
therefore ready to expand it and use it more extensively. Consequently,
the readiness to open the system to more hierarchical layers seems to
be positively related to the reached level of implementation.
Epilogue
Factors hindering the establishment of an optimal knowledge shar-
ing situation across the multinational operations of iss are varied.
Some of these factors are unanimously agreed upon, which indicates
real perceived problematic issues that the organization should not ig-
nore or discard altogether. Among those are problems related to the
use of a standard language that is not native to most subsidiaries, and
the apparent lack of endorsement of, and commitment to, the whole
strategy and system by top-managerial levels. Although these factors
are universally viewed as hindrances, their eﬀects vary between sub-
sidiaries, depending on the corporate culture that characterizes the
individual national organization. On one hand, we have seen that shar-
ing-enthusiastic iss Italy and iss Austria have made eﬀorts to solve
the language problem and do not see it as being particularly decisive.
On the other hand, self-suﬃcient iss France, for example, maintains
that the exclusive use of English in Business Insight is so problematic
that it does not believe that it can be implemented and used to any
signiﬁcant extent.
Other factors, such as the managerial level to which the responsibil-
ity for the administration and operation of the system should be placed,
cause more dramatic variations in the opinions expressed. While iss
Italy clearly considers the lack of a strong central directive body as ama-
jor hindrance in the achievement of an eﬃcient knowledge sharing set
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of procedures, iss France states the opposite and sees the lack of decen-
tralization as the unsolvable problem. And while iss Denmark requires
Business Insight to be the exclusive instrument of top-managers, iss
Austria sees such a limitation as the boundary that hinders the system
in becoming all it could be. Once again, the explanation to such diverg-
ing ideas is to be found in the diﬀerences in the subsidiaries’ intentions
and goals with respect to the system.
5.3 Analysis and Interpretation: Subsidiaries Across
Coded Areas
In the previous section, I have carried out an analysis of the diverse
codes that appear within the same areas, across distinct national sub-
sidiaries. In that context, I was interested in identifying both similari-
ties and diﬀerences in the codes pertaining to the subsidiaries. On one
hand and as was earlier explained, language, for example, was found
to be a code that was relevant to all four studied national subsidiaries,
within the codiﬁcation area of Factors hindering the ideal knowledge
sharing situation. On the other hand, formal/informal was one of the
noteworthy dichotomies that appeared in the codiﬁcation area of Cor-
porate culture. I have labelled that analytical process horizontal analy-
sis, as the aim with it was to identify relevant and signiﬁcant opinions,
standpoints and views among the managers of diﬀerent subsidiaries,
across horizontal sections of the table of codes (see tables 5.1 and 5.2).
I now engage on the second part of the analytical work; I will iden-
tify particularly interesting series of interrelated codes across the cod-
iﬁcation areas of the tables, within the individual subsidiaries, and see
if similar series repeat themselves in diﬀerent subsidiaries. Since the
analytical process will primarily move vertically in the table of codes,
across the codiﬁcation areas of a single national subsidiary, I call it ver-
tical analysis. The diﬀerent codes of the national subsidiaries having
been exposed and extensively explained in the description of the sub-
sidiaries and in the ﬁrst part of the analysis, I will omit their deﬁnition
here. Rather, I concentrate on their interrelationships.
Some of the codes identiﬁed for the area Corporate culture of iss
France reveal that the subsidiary’s main mode of functioning is much
more ‘nationally oriented’ than open to the rest of the group, and that
it favours a ‘common way of thinking’ over individual innovation. Both
these codes are interesting for the analysis, as they are linked to other
codes, pertaining to other codiﬁcation areas of iss France.
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Since the French subsidiary of the company is resolutely self-centred
for the bulk of its operations and its knowledge sharing activities, it
can cause no great surprise to ﬁnd, under the codiﬁcation area of the
Business Insightsmatchwith the existing knowledge sharing processes,
codes indicating that ‘no real eﬀort to implement the new system’ has
been done in France. The same holds true for the ‘useless’ character
that Business Insight is perceived to have by iss France. Similarly, the
nationalistic orientation of most activities of iss France explains very
nicely what the managers of the subsidiary have depicted as one of the
main hindrances to the ideal knowledge sharing situation, the ‘lack of
decentralization’ of the corporate knowledge sharing system, Business
Insight. iss France being accustomed to hold the reigns of its own des-
tiny and to have almost absolute control over the tools and processes it
is using, the relatively high degree of corporate-level steering of Busi-
ness Insight causes a cultural clash that sheds light on new problematic
issues.
Although iss Denmark was not seen as being as resolutely self-cent-
red and closed to its environment as iss France, the code ‘uniﬁed way
of thinking’ appears in its Local corporate culture codiﬁcation area. As
was explained in the horizontal analysis, such an organizational men-
tality can do nothing but promote and favour the search of local (na-
tional) solutions to the detriment of cross-subsidiary communication.
In that way, it relates closely to what has been found to be characteristic
of the French organization, ‘common way of thinking’ and ‘nationally
oriented.’
As was the case for iss France, that cultural characteristic of iss
Denmark is complemented by an avowed ‘half-hearted implementation
eﬀort’ of Business Insight in the codiﬁcation area of the Business In-
sights match with the existing knowledge sharing processes, as well as
by a similar belief that the system is ‘useless.’ To make the standpoints
of the two subsidiaries even more similar, the list of codes of the Dan-
ish organization also boasts the ‘central control of Business Insight’ as
one of the main hindrances to the achievement of the ideal knowledge
sharing situation.
As is evidenced by ﬁgures 5.1–5.3, which represent the continuums
formed by the codiﬁcation areas, there are series of codes that pertain
to diﬀerent areas but remain linked together. The nationalism of iss
France and its promotion of a common way of thinking yields poor re-
sults when attempting to implement Business Insight, and even dis-
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figure 5.1 Continuum of codes 1
Country Corporate
culture
bis match with
the existing ks
processes
Ideal ks
situation
Factors
hindering the
ideal ks
situation
Denmark • Uniﬁed mode
of thinking
• Halfhearted
implementation
attempt
• Useless
• Central control
of bi
France • Nationally
oriented
• Common way
of thinking
• No real
implementation
attempt
• Useless
• Lack of
decentralization
credit the usefulness of the system; and it makes the subsidiary con-
sider the decentralization of the system as one of the central points to
be resolved before the ideal knowledge sharing situation can exist. A
very similar pattern is found across the codiﬁcation areas of iss Den-
mark, suggesting that the two distinct national subsidiaries can have
common cultural traits that lead them to share preoccupations and to
perceive some of the same obstacles to trans-border knowledge sharing.
The code ‘useless,’ present in the area of the Business Insights match
with the existing knowledge sharing processes for both the French and
the Danish subsidiary can also be associated with the code ‘incentives,’
which appears in the area of the Ideal knowledge sharing situation for
both organizations as well. This combination could be coincidental, but
it could also indicate the existence of a deeper-rooted problem, charac-
teristic of the bigger national subsidiaries of the group. ‘Useless’ can in
this case be interpreted as a sign that the subsidiaries consider the costs
related to the implementation and utilization of Business Insight as be-
ing disproportionately high, a reasoning that naturally leads them to re-
quire some sort of ‘incentives’ to use the system. In such a situation, the
‘incentives’ eﬀectively play the role of a compensatory measure, oﬀset-
ting the perceived and expected negative ﬁnancial consequences linked
to the use of Business Insight. Considering the issue in this light is, how-
ever, a double-edged sword for the company as a whole. On one hand, it
leaves hope that the subsidiaries do not really mean that the system is
useless, which is a good thing if the corporate ambition is to ultimately
implement a standard solution. On the other hand, compensating the
rebellious subsidiaries (giving them ‘incentives’) to win their approval
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figure 5.2 Continuum of codes 2
Country Corporate
culture
bis match with
the existing ks
processes
Ideal ks
situation
Factors
hindering the
ideal ks
situation
Denmark • Useless • Incentives
France • Useless • Incentives
and force the system on them can lead to diﬀerent forms of abuse. All
of a sudden, the company might ﬁnd out that many more subsidiaries
than expected believe that the knowledge sharing system is ‘useless,’ re-
sulting in a total level of unnecessary compensatory expenditures that
can make an economically sound change of system less attractive.
iss France and iss Denmark, the two subsidiaries with a negative
opinion about group-wide knowledge sharing, present some common-
alities in their respective code patterns.This is also the case for the tan-
dem formed by iss Italy and iss Austria, which are both doing well in
knowledge sharing activities. Within the area of the Corporate culture
of the Austrian subsidiary, I identiﬁed the code ‘hard-working,’ a char-
acteristic that was found to be similar to the Italians’ ‘entrepreneurial’
code. The diﬀerent wording is a reﬂection of the particularities of the
individual subsidiary, but both codes express a common reality; smaller
organizations (these two subsidiaries are relatively much smaller than
the two other analyzed entities) leavemore room to newways of think-
ing, which encourages innovating employees to search and look for in-
spiration anywhere they can.
The predominance of such a spirit in the Austrian and Italian or-
ganizations therefore paves the way to two codes that were identiﬁed
in their respective codiﬁcation areas of Business Insights match with
the existing knowledge sharing processes: ‘welcome’ and ‘useful.’ While
both subsidiaries thereby state their initial and general appreciation of
Business Insight, the complementary remarks contained in the Italian
codes (‘welcome but long overdue’ and ‘useful yet currently underde-
veloped’) contribute to underline the aforementioned correlation be-
tween the size of an organization and the room it leaves for the in-
novative thinking of its members. iss Italy is the smallest of the four
subsidiaries and it clearly is themost eager knowledge-sharer and tech-
nique-developer.
A hard-working or entrepreneurial spirit thus leads to a more posi-
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tive view of the corporate knowledge sharing system, but the series of
linked codes do not stop there. The eagerness of these two subsidiaries
to develop their respective network for sharing more knowledge more
eﬃciently is also reﬂected in the Ideal knowledge sharing situation
that they describe. In this codiﬁcation area, their wishes and hopes
sometimes go directly against what had been mentioned by the French
and Danish subsidiaries. For example, iss Austria and iss Italy would
positively look upon a higher degree of corporate coordination for the
cross-subsidiary knowledge sharing activities, as is illustrated by the
codes ‘coordination among subsidiaries’ and ‘worldwide group coor-
dination from the headquarters.’ Conversely, iss Denmark and iss
France would feel that their freedom was violated by such a strategy.
But the small subsidiaries do not only want more group-wide coordina-
tion of the knowledge sharing activities, they also agree on the need for
all national subsidiaries of the company to be involved in the project,
for the system to be optimally eﬀective and beneﬁcial. This is revealed
by the ‘active involvement of all subsidiaries’ that is called for by iss
Austria and by the ‘international participation’ required by iss Italy, in
the codiﬁcation area of Ideal knowledge sharing situation.
The Austrian and Italian organizations are wishful but remain real-
istic, in that they know their positions on the topic of cross-subsidiary
knowledge sharing collides with the views of other subsidiaries. Their
managers consider that a possible solution to the dilemma of choosing
which group of subsidiaries to satisfy resides in a higher degree of in-
volvement of the top-managerial level of the company. It is therefore
not without reason that both subsidiaries see the apparently low pri-
ority given to the knowledge sharing project by corporate management
as a substantial problem, and mention it as one of the Hindrances to
the achievement of the ideal knowledge sharing situation. The Austri-
ans express that as a ‘lack of headquarters endorsement to divisional
managers,’ while the Italians more boldly label it as a ‘low commitment
of the headquarters,’
The analysis conducted in this section allows us to evidence diﬀer-
ent series of coded patterns that appear to repeat themselves in dif-
ferent subsidiaries of the same type – positive or negative towards
cross-border knowledge sharing. In the case of iss Denmark and iss
France, we have seen that nationalistic views of their business lead
them to hold a generally negative opinion of Business Insight, which
in turn makes them ask for a decentralization of the system. Such a
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figure 5.3 Continuum of codes 3
Country Corporate
culture
bis match with
the existing ks
processes
Ideal ks
situation
Factors
hindering the
ideal ks
situation
Austria • Hard-working • Welcomed
• Useful
• Coordination
among
subsidiaries
• Active
involvement of
all subsidiaries
• Lack of hq
endorsement to
divisional
managers
Italy • Entrepreneurial • Welcomed but
long overdue
• Useful yet
currently
underdeve-
loped
• Worldwide
group
coordination
from the hq
• International
participation
• Low
commitment of
the hq
decentralization to the beneﬁt of subsidiaries that are sceptical about
international knowledge sharing would eﬀectively defeat the very pur-
pose of the system, allowing the national organizations to entrench
themselves in the same isolated positions they have held thus far. We
have also identiﬁed the existence of a link between the stated opinion
that Business Insight was useless and the requirement that incentives
be given by the corporate level to the subsidiaries, to make them adopt
the system. These kinds of incentives would however be likely to have
perverted eﬀects of which the company must be conscious.
iss Austria and iss Italy also show a common pattern of codes that
goes through all of their respective codiﬁcation areas.The corporate cul-
tures of both organizations encourage innovative thinking and strongly
favour knowledge sharing.This results in a positive attitude towards the
introduction and use of Business Insight, and makes the subsidiaries
call for evenmore group-wide coordination andparticipation to the sys-
tem. This, the Austrian and Italian subsidiaries agree, would however
require a higher degree of top-managerial involvement than is the case
at the moment.
5.4 rq2: Problems of Knowledge Sharing Within iss
The preceding has provided insight into emerging trends and patterns
that the interviewed subsidiaries have revealed pertaining to the four
respective areas. The areas have been analyzed individually, yet simul-
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taneously across all four subsidiaries thereby allowing for an easier
overview of the reoccurring and the contradicting elements. Thereto,
the subsidiaries have been analyzed individually across all four areas so
to link and relate the relationships between the four areas within the
subsidiaries.
In accordance with the analyzed and interpreted data, we now have
a comfortable understanding of the problems iss as a group suﬀers
under and therefore proceed to answer research question number two:
What are the problems of knowledge sharing within iss?
The problems of ks within iss can be separated between factors per-
taining to the resolve and motivation of the employees, which I term
‘Will problems’ and factors pertaining to the proﬁciency and compe-
tence the employees possess with regards to being able to share knowl-
edge, termed ‘Capability problems.’ As explained in the earlier theoret-
ical framework, both must be present for eﬀective knowledge sharing
to occur.
‘Will’ Problems of Knowledge Sharing at iss
The ﬁrst ‘will’ problem is the non-genuine implementation eﬀort of
Business Insight by some of the subsidiaries. This poor implementa-
tion eﬀort is sparked oﬀ by the system being regarded as useless and
even threatening to the established knowledge sharing ways and con-
sequently the employees down prioritize the attention that should be
devoted to a new and encompassing system such as Business Insight
and are unmotivated to use the system.
The Second ‘will’ problem is the non-user friendly layout of Business
Insight. All subsidiaries agreed that Business Insight could be made
more useful and serviceable with a few relatively minor adjustments to
the system that would make the retrieval of data more convenient and
accessible and avoid unnecessary technical restraints.The lack of direct
links, virtual rooms, overview topics, etc., render Business Insight rigid,
complicated to use and sometimes evenuseless.This diminishes thewill
intended users of the systemharbourwith regards to using Business In-
sight.
The third ‘will’ problem is the lack of headquarters endorsement and
incitement given to the divisional managers. Up until now, the intro-
duction of Business Insight has mainly been ad-hoc and in a ‘do it your-
self ’ manner, which has resulted in some subsidiaries barely knowing
the system existed. This lack of incentives to the local managers de-
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ters some subsidiaries from giving Business Insight a proper start and
provides no motivation to detach the employees from their established
knowledge sharing ways. Furthermore, the iss headquarters inadver-
tently gives the employees the impression that this knowledge sharing
system is nothing special or radical; the employees sensing the head-
quarters lack of enthusiasm with the system and projecting that onto
their eagerness to use the system.
The fourth ‘will’ problem concerns the cost-beneﬁt structure. Many
subsidiaries feel that the return they receive from using Business In-
sight does not outweigh the expenses they must allocate to use the sys-
tem.They go on to express that this is not just in the short-termbut also
in the long term when these expenses, in the form of time and money,
should be expected to decrease as a result of the system being easier to
use as the employees slide along the learning curve. The distorted per-
ception of the cost/beneﬁt structure of using Business Insight therefore
lessens some employees’ will to use the system.
‘Capability’ Problems of Knowledge Sharing at iss
The ﬁrst ‘capability’ problem that iss suﬀers under is that some sub-
sidiaries are too nationally orientated and have a common or uniﬁed
mindset that inadvertently closes oﬀ to new ideas. These characteris-
tics do not support a global knowledge sharing initiative and prevents
employees from expanding their horizons and taking in new ideas and
information from foreign sources.
The second ‘capability’ problem concerns itself with the language fac-
tor. It has been opted to operate Business Insight in English; a logical
choice considering that English is the language in which most iss em-
ployees have a working level ability. Nevertheless, it is still a foreign
tongue for the clear majority of iss workers and consequently gives
rise to language barriers, misunderstandings and frustration as well as
obstructing some iss employees from using the system altogether as
they cannot work in English.
The third ‘capability’ problem is the extent to which Business Insight
should be decentralized. The fact that Business Insight is mainly cen-
trally run is perceived as problematic formany subsidiaries as the diﬀer-
ence between the subsidiaries’ and the headquarters’ stakeholders and
priorities lead to an inevitable clash. It is felt that the headquarters does
simply not possess the adequate screening abilities to be able to decide
what data is relevant and pertinent to include on the Business Insight
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table 5.3 iss’s Knowledge Sharing Problems
‘Will’ Problems ‘Capability’ Problems
• Non-genuine implementation eﬀort
• Non-user friendly layout
• Lack of hq Endorsement
• Poor cost-beneﬁt structure
• Nationally orientated and common or uni-
ﬁed mindset that closes out new ideas
• Language
• Decentralization of bi
knowledge sharing system. However, several of the interviewed sub-
sidiaries simultaneously voiced opposing arguments stating that Busi-
ness Insight should be more centrally run as that would increase coor-
dination among the subsidiaries and thereby make knowledge sharing
simpler; a statement certainly supported by our theoretical ﬁndings.
This would also increase the likelihood that more iss subsidiaries par-
ticipate actively in the knowledge sharing process as the subsidiaries
are denied the opportunity to act as autonomous and independent sub-
sidiaries. Hence, the issue of decentralization and the inevitable para-
dox it harbours regarding the organizations ability to share knowledge
is a serious problem iss must overcome.
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After meticulous analysis of several iss subsidiaries and the head-
quarters, exploitation of numerous theoretical models and theories
on corporate culture and knowledge sharing, and successful comple-
tion of extensive interviews and knowledge sharing seminars through-
out Europe, I now feel conﬁdent to progress onto the ultimate goal
of this book: namely expressing to the reader the factors that I deem
crucial to consider and act upon so iss may eventually possess an
all-encompassing and well-functioning global knowledge sharing sys-
tem.
Standing at the threshold of being able to tackle the issues of the
problem identiﬁcation, I aﬃrm that a great deal has been learned about
the intricacies of global knowledge sharing, and the perplexity and elab-
orateness that such a comprehensive endeavour entails. It nowbecomes
the combined forces of the answer to Research Question One, which
provided a theoretical approach towards optimal knowledge sharing
across corporate cultures, and the answer to Research Question Two,
which identiﬁed the problem areas of knowledge sharing within iss,
thatwill guide the answering of the question containedwithin the prob-
lem identiﬁcation: how can iss optimize their knowledge sharing activ-
ities across corporate cultures?
Naturally, the recommendations will be deeply rooted in the ‘Will’
and ‘Capability’ problems revealed in the conclusion of the previous
chapter since these are crucial elements the iss group must overcome.
In accordancewithmyprevious arguments that thewillmust be present
before getting capable, I, in the following, begin by addressing the prob-
lems that are ‘Will’ related (6.1–6.5) and then progress to the ‘capability’
related problems (6.6–6.9).
6.1 Conduct Genuine Global Implementation
The poor implementation eﬀort by some of the subsidiaries is a direct
result of their respective corporate cultures leading them to regard the
system as being useless and threatening to the established knowledge
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sharingways, rather than as a useful new tool.The solution to this prob-
lem lies in the ability to stimulate changes in the local corporate culture
so that the employees regard the implementation of Business Insight as
a process to take seriously and earnestly. The ﬁrst step towards achiev-
ing this is to present the employeeswith clear and understandable goals
of what the knowledge sharing system aspires to achieve. It is impor-
tant that everyone within the organization understands why and how
the implementation occurs and where it will leave him/her once it is
over.Theremust be consistency between the goals and aims of the com-
pany and the way these are expressed in operational terms to the orga-
nization. Therefore, the objectives that the management would like to
achieve should be explained in laymen’s terms, without overcomplicat-
ing the situation with ﬁnancial facts or other information that might
cloud the recipients’ perception of the main idea. It is important to ex-
press speciﬁcally how, what, where and when the employees’ lives will
be changed and how these changes will result in an overall healthier
situation for everyone in the ﬁrm. Furthermore, in order to make the
implementation eﬀort even more genuine, implementation should be
done in manageable phases that allow the slow-moving human change
process to keep up. Since the implementation of a global knowledge
sharing system can be a long and complicated process, it is helpful to
divide the aims and goals up into smaller ‘chunks’ that appear more
manageable and easier to achieve.
Second, Business Insight should be implemented in coordination
with other projects and strategies. By nature, humans are limited in
their capacity to attentively focus on multiple tasks within their im-
mediate surroundings simultaneously, especially when the tasks are of
foreignorigin andunfamiliar to that person.Therefore, in order to avoid
employees simply ‘tuning-out’ one or more of the implementation pro-
cesses, it is necessary to consider the circumstances under which the
employees are asked to perceive the diﬀerent tasks. It is crucial that the
employees be allocated time to test and work with the system during
their regular working hours. By asking the employees to work with the
new system during work hours, they will perceive it as an integral part
of their job, opposed to a situation where the employeeswould be asked
to understand the new system on their own time, which would result
in the feeling that the new system is not directly associated to their real
‘job-time’ obligations. A simple way of integrating Business Insight in
the employees’ daily activities would be to make its use mandatory, for
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example by making the log-on and start-up procedures of the local pc
an integral part of the system. Business Insight would thereby become
the unavoidable common start-up page of all potential users, which
would be likely to increase their use of the system.
Third, themiddlemanagers (for iss thesewould typically be the com-
munication managers) must step forward and take on very active im-
plementation roles. It is very important for all the employees within
the organization to be able to identify the instigators of the imple-
mentation process and the position for which they stand. These mid-
dle managers must ﬁrmly pronounce their positions and viewpoints,
often re-declaring them to the extent of repetition. If the employees
are given the opportunity to doubt the position and determination of
the middlemanagers, they are less prone to accept and execute the pro-
posed change ideas. Therefore, the middle managers must have clearly
deﬁned implementation roles and, equally important, must be able to
communicate the ideas that their roles stand for in a manner that is
understandable to the remaining organization. A pivotal task for the
middlemanager is to selectively choose the areas of employee inﬂuence
throughout the implementation process. I support the view that max-
imum employee inﬂuence in the implementation process is desirable,
as it creates a sense of ownership over the new system at the employee
level. However, the middle managers need still to carefully choose the
areas of inﬂuence they delegate so to not confuse or compromise the
lead implementation role that they, as middle managers possess. Stem-
ming froma belief that employees are generally resistant to change, em-
powering them with a sense of ownership will make them more prone
to use and promote the new system internally. Through employee in-
volvement in the change process, the risk of resistance, disbelief and
dissatisfaction with the new systemwill decrease, as the employees will
be able to identify themselves with the new knowledge sharing system
and strategy.
A ﬁnal suggestion for how the implementation eﬀort of Business In-
sight can be taken more seriously throughout various iss subsidiaries
is to create a sense of urgency about the system. Again, by nature, peo-
ple are creatures of habit, and if they can avoid changing their prede-
termined ways, they most often will. Therefore, it is up to the man-
agement to create a sense of urgency in the minds of the employees
so the implementation and use of the knowledge sharing system actu-
ally get conducted and not just talked about. If the employees do not
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feel that either an internal or external force is demanding urgency, the
risk is that the employees will stick to their set ways and, as a result,
the desired implementation eﬀort will not be achieved. The creation
of a ‘burning-platform’ helps push employees to carry out the desired
changes and comply with optimal implementation assertiveness.
6.2 Improve the User-Friendliness of the System
A common objection to the current knowledge sharing system from
most of the interviewed subsidiaries was the lack of a user-friendly in-
terface with which they could conduct their knowledge sharing activi-
ties. If the intended users of Business Insight are met with too much
frustration and disappointment when attempting to use the system
it will inevitably lead to the employees opting for alternative meth-
ods of sharing knowledge, most likely their previous and established
ways. Consequently the need to improve the ease in which information
is retrieved becomes imperative. Obviously, a prerequisite for this is to
avoid the technical problems that currently haunt the system and are
at the source of much user frustration. It therefore becomes imperative
that the headquarters overcome these fundamental technical problems
ﬁrst, before attempting cosmetic improvements. Once these issues are
taken care of, I suggest the following three enhancements to the sys-
tem, which will ultimately improve the user-friendliness of Business
Insight.
First and foremost, there must be an easy overview of topics from
which users can eﬀortlessly advance their quest for information if one
of the topics has captivated their interest. This overview should be re-
newed frequently and act as an iss virtual newspaper, updating the em-
ployees with the latest news and happenings from the various iss sub-
sidiaries.These topics must not necessarily be of interest to all iss sub-
sidiaries, but they must retain some interest to at least some of them.
From the topics, the user should have the ability to easily progress onto
an elaborate explanation, most likely in the form of an article, by sim-
ply clicking on the topic. If the user desiresmore data on the topic upon
completion of the article, relevant contact details to the people the ar-
ticle was about should be readily available.
Second, virtual divisional areas should be created. This is a superb
way to increase cross-corporate cultural communication as the local
functional divisions of the national subsidiaries are allocated an area
where common interests, speciﬁc to a distinct type of division that ex-
138
Improve the User-Friendliness of the System 6.2
ists throughoutmost iss subsidiaries (for example, marketing), can be
shared. The usefulness of this addition is twofold: to increase the level
of topic speciﬁc data shared between the employees towhom the data is
relevant, and to increase the eagerness Business Insight is approached
with as a result of the data being relevant and consequently interesting.
Furthermore, the employees objecting to the central administration of
Business Insight will hereby have the possibility to share knowledge on
a somewhat more decentralized level, circumventing some of the per-
ceived problems fromhaving the headquarters intervening in the actual
knowledge sharing activities.
Third, Business Insight should also function as a library and search
engine, allowing its users to easily look up relevant data but also pro-
vide the contact details of the entire iss staﬀwith access to Business In-
sight. It should be demanded that all intended users of Business Insight
type a personal, one-page description, or mini curriculum vitae, which
can easily be retrieved by any other user of the system by typing a few
ﬁtting descriptions into the search engine. This addition will allow em-
ployees from a locally based subsidiary to easily ﬁnd the exact person,
external to the subsidiary, with whom the user wishes to communicate
and thereby save valuable searching time currently squandered away.
Furthermore, as one more eﬀective feature gets added to the system,
Business Insight’s perceived usefulness will increase.
An excellent way for the management of iss to be on top of the ball
as to what the objections to the interface are, and thereby avoid future
dissatisfactions with the user-friendliness, is to pay greater attention
to feedback.Thismay seem obvious and perhaps even demeaning; how-
ever, I ﬁnd it important to stress the attention that iss headquarters
should devote to the remarks voiced by various iss stakeholders that
can improve the system’s user-friendliness. On top of the central role
it plays in preventing user-frustration, feedback is an excellent way to
check that the intended users of the systemare complyingwith the orig-
inal strategy of implementing the knowledge sharing system. Thereto,
the management can use the feedback to assess the performance of the
diﬀerent subsidiaries and coordinatewhether they need to realign some
of their business procedures in order to become more eﬃcient. A fur-
ther constructive eﬀect of listening and reacting to feedback is the posi-
tive impression it gives employees that their opinion really doesmatter
to the higher managerial levels. Therefore, constantly having a ﬁnger
on the organizational pulse has several beneﬁts for the management of
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the company, as user satisfaction signiﬁcantly increases, while coordi-
nation and monitoring are greatly facilitated.
6.3 Increase the Level of Endorsements from the
Headquarters
The current lack of headquarters endorsement provides the employ-
ees with the impression that Business Insight is not a knowledge shar-
ing tool that they need take too seriously and denies them the proper
kick-start any organization needswhen attempting to implement a new
and encompassing system such as this knowledge sharing system. Con-
sequently, it is clear that the headquarters must take a more pro-active
role in the initial phases of introducing Business Insight.
First, I recommend that the headquarters provide more encourage-
ment and support to the local managers in the form of personal visits
endorsing the system, invitations to managerial corroboration meet-
ings at the headquarters, newsletters, phone calls, etc. Implementa-
tion of a fundamental feature such as this knowledge sharing system
requires much adaptation from all parts of the organization and from
every individual involved in the activities that are being restructured.
Under such circumstances, it is essential for the employees to know,
feel and see tangible proofs that the new system is seriously meant
and a positive addition. Therefore, true support and personal involve-
ment of the top-management in all phases of introducing the system
becomes essential, and shows very strong commitment and provides
the employees with the mindset that they must also prepare for some
changes.
Second, headquarters should push local managers to ﬁnd key em-
ployees within the local subsidiaries to get involved with the successful
integration of the system. Humans like facility and they will go out of
their way to ﬁnd it. This also holds true in the process of successfully
introducing Business Insight: if there is an easy way of doing the pre-
scribed work, the headquarters can be sure the employees will ﬁgure it
out and walk that way. Consequently, it becomes important for iss to
have as many enthusiastic internal promoters of the system at the sub-
sidiary level as possible and make maximum use of them. Employees
who can exert a positive inﬂuence on their co-workers should be turned
into active sponsors of the system and promote its use. Therefore, the
headquarters should stress to the local managers the importance of lo-
cating the key personal within their subsidiaries that can facilitate the
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introductory phases and act as these internal promoters of the system
to other intended users within the subsidiary.
Third, the headquarters can increase the level ofmanagerial endorse-
ments by constructing a detailed reward system to promote the initial
use of Business Insight. Reward systems can help stimulate employees
to focus their eﬀorts on those performances exclusively related to get-
ting the knowledge sharing system up and running. These rewards will
act as extra incentives for the employees to give Business Insight an
enthusiastic trial and hopefully push them over the strenuous intro-
ductory ‘speed-bump’ that often deters some employees from ever giv-
ing a new system an earnest eﬀort. They also act as excellent perfor-
mance measurement tools that can be utilized by the headquarters to
monitor the progress of introducing Business Insight. A possible reward
scheme could take the form of a weekly lottery where the online users
at a speciﬁc yet unknown point in time are allotted a chance at win-
ning a prize, ﬁnancial or else. Alternatively, the rewards can be targeted
at especially good users of the system, be they contributors or users of
knowledge. These are just a couple of generally applicable suggestions;
other schemes could also be developed, depending on the speciﬁc situ-
ation of the potential participants. It is important for the organization
to ensure that these incentives are used exclusively for limited periods
of time, to promote the system during its introductory phases. Once
the employees have grown used to the knowledge sharing concept, the
incentive schemes should slowly be discontinued, as the true beneﬁts
of the system become more apparent and act as the employees’ main
motivation to use it.
Finally, the headquarters must follow up on the progress made by
the subsidiaries in accepting and integrating Business Insight in their
local activities. There is no doubt that Business Insight will have an eas-
ier time getting accepted into some subsidiaries than in others. What-
ever the inherent reasons are that make the introductory phases sim-
pler in some organizations opposed to others is ambiguous and, at this
point, irrelevant.What the headquartersmust focus on is providing the
subsidiaries that are lagging behind in their integration eﬀorts with in-
creased endorsements and support, so they too will be able to enjoy
the beneﬁts the system oﬀers.The subsidiaries that are successful with
integrating Business Insight should be acknowledged with recognition
and remarks applauding their eﬀorts and boosting their self-worth.
This positive recognition from their superiors will provide these sub-
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sidiaries with a feeling that their eﬀorts have not been in vain and that
they are now essentially improved subsidiaries because of their success-
ful involvement with Business Insight.
6.4 Improve the Perceived Cost-Beneﬁt Structure
An inherent problem present in several subsidiaries is that they do sim-
ply not regard Business Insight as a system that is worthwhile putting
any resources into as they feel the beneﬁts the system can bestow them
with are too modest and insigniﬁcant. The consequent result is that
they detach themselves from the knowledge sharing initiative and re-
main entrenched in their established knowledge sharing ways. There-
fore, it is essential that the headquarters convince the intended users
of the beneﬁts the knowledge sharing system possesses.
A necessary precursor for successful knowledge sharing is that em-
ployees across the entire organization are acceptant of the idea that
knowledge sharing can occur only with the compliance and eﬀort of
everyone involved.Therefore, it is of central importance that the head-
quarters get everyone on the knowledge sharing ‘bandwagon’ and aim
at convincing the employees that they gain higher beneﬁts in their
day-to-day work by using the system. In order to achieve this, I rec-
ommend that the cost-beneﬁt analysis the headquarters originally con-
ducted that inspired themanagement to opt for this knowledge sharing
system be made available to the remaining organization. It should be
made highly visible that eﬀective knowledge sharing within the iss
group will be a premium source of competitive advantage that will in-
crease corporate value and help propel iss into an upper echelon of
well-functioning multinational organizations. Only once the beneﬁts
of Business Insight become more visible, will the more reluctant sub-
sidiaries detach themselves from their established knowledge sharing
ways and experiment with the new, recommended ways.
A further technique to enhance the perceived cost-beneﬁt structure
of Business Insight is, much in accordance with the third part of rec-
ommendation 6.3, to attach incentives to the initial use of the system,
thereby enhancing the perceived beneﬁt side of the cost-beneﬁt struc-
ture.The subsidiaries that are hesitant assuming the costs involvedwith
getting acquainted with the system will be more motivated to try if
they see the opportunity to immediately reap certain tangible beneﬁts.
As a result, more subsidiaries will give Business Insight an earnest ef-
fort which, all other aspects aside, will increase the use of Business In-
142
Increase Information about Business Insight 6.5
sight globally. As was mentioned earlier, the headquarters should dis-
continue the incentive schemes after the introductory phases, in order
to avoid letting them become long-run motivational factors to use the
system.
A ﬁnal technique to improve the perceived cost-beneﬁt structure is
to use Business Insight to publicize success stories detailing how some
subsidiaries have started oﬀering a new service to their customers. Pub-
lishing case studies that exemplify how problems that have actually
been encountered can be overcome will decrease the uncertainty fac-
tor related to the establishment of a business line that is new to a spe-
ciﬁc subsidiary. A good case study can sometimes exemplify the do’s and
don’ts of a new business venture and provide more insight, and often
in amore entertaining manner, than amerely theoretical business plan
(much in the samemanner that this book is a good case example about
knowledge sharing for companies other than iss). Failure stories can
likewise be included, alerting employees to the common pitfalls of new
commercial endeavours by illustrating real-life horror stories of failed
business ventures.
6.5 Increase Information about Business Insight
The fact that so many intended users of Business Insight are not aware
of the beneﬁts the system can oﬀer works against the strived for in-
crease in its level of popularity. For that reason, more eﬀorts should be
put, from the headquarters’ side, into disseminating information about
concrete features or functionalities of the system, as well as about the
beneﬁts that they can bring to the users. Notifying the relevant users
whenever there is a signiﬁcant feature or content change is also likely
to stimulate the overall use of Business Insight. Such publicity about
the system, its details and advantages can be transmitted through two
media, the ﬁrst being e-mail. Through the corporate e-mail system, the
headquarters can send e-mails to selected groups of users, advertising
new content that is of interest to the targeted recipients of the mes-
sages. Alternatively, the e-mails can contain extracts from the system,
publicizing functionalities that can improve the working processes and
display the beneﬁts oﬀered by Business Insight. The second medium
that can be used to heighten the level of knowledge relative to the sys-
tem is the local intranet of eachone of thenational subsidiaries. By inﬁl-
trating the current knowledge sharing ways (which are typically related
to the local intranets), the headquarters can place banners and adver-
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tisements to catch the attention of potential userswho are still unaware
of the existence or of the beneﬁts of Business Insight. These advertise-
ments should act as attention-grabbers relaying a small yet useful piece
of knowledge about the system, thereby stimulating the appetite of the
potential users for deploying Business Insight’s more.
6.6 Decrease National Orientation and Free Employees
of a Uniﬁed Mindset
Before attempting to solve this ﬁrst ‘capability’ problem, it is important
to recognize and respect how deeply the consequences of the problem
manifest themselves. Being too nationally oriented and possessing a
mindset that closes oﬀ to new and possibly good ideas implies that the
employees of such an organization are imbedded in a routine that has
great trouble fostering new ideas for improvements. This happens be-
cause the employees grow satisﬁedwith the current order of events; not
appreciating that some fresh additions could positively inﬂuence their
eﬃciency or well-being. Furthermore, such employees are reluctant to
accept inspiration from foreign subsidiaries as they regard anyone pe-
ripheral to their home-grown routine to be outsiders and therefore less
knowledgeable about the local intricacies.Thedeepest and ultimatema-
terialization of this will be that no communication occurs between the
units as separate the knowledge sharing tracks evolve that forestall a
common understanding. In the extreme, it implies that the subsidiary
is a completely closed oﬀ and individual entity.
Rectiﬁcation of this is extremely diﬃcult as it involves modiﬁcation
in the stiﬀest andmost resolute aspect of change management: namely
the human psyche. Employees and their processes are meaningful de-
terminants of the success or failure of a company, and yet, more of-
ten than not, the classical mistake is to concentrate too much on the
technical requirements of the knowledge sharing system, undervaluing
the potential value of the collaborative attitude of the workers. Hence,
insuﬃcient resources often end up being allocated to attempting to
change exactly that which needs changing the most: the mindset of the
employees.
For iss, I propose two strategies that can help free the organization
from this problem. First, the introduction of new and diverse routines
and procedures with which the employees are forced to work will shake
up the conventionalities and forcefully remove some long-established
and perhaps non-productive habits. The management should attempt
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to temporarily switch the roles of some employees, assuring them that
this is neither a demotion nor promotion, but purely a productive
chance for them to take on new tasks and exchange ideas. Depend-
ing on the success, the switched roles can be altered back or kept if all
parties are acceptant towards that idea. The key element for this ﬁrst
strategy is simply to experiment, accepting from the outset that some
of the changes will inevitably not lead to a more productive outcome
but others will. The poor changes will always have the possibility to be
reversed, while beneﬁcial changes can be kept and possibly even spark
up new ideas for further improvements.
The second strategy involves an incremental ﬂow of information
about fellow employees, both within the unit and external to the unit.
Although the knowledge sharing system, Business Insight, is actually
a corporate attempt to meet this need, it is not eﬀective since the em-
ployees whom this strategy is aimed at are the employees reluctant
to use it. Consequently, other methods must be employed in order to
spark the interest that will eventually lead employees to independently
seek more information about their respective counterparts through
the use of Business Insight. Several events can be held in order to ac-
complish this. Group-outings where representatives from various sub-
sidiaries meet and converse, corporate seminars where a forum for de-
bate and discussion for improvements are predominant, and company
trips where employees across national subsidiaries have the opportu-
nity to talk freely and build common interests outside the scope of
regular iss activities, are all initiatives that will expand the common
understanding across subsidiaries and increase the knowledge each has
pertaining to the others. Furthermore, this idea can even extend so
far as to include international career opportunities and exchange pro-
grams where one or more employees work for a limited time frame in
foreign iss subsidiaries. I deem the employees positioned around the
middle manager level as the optimal candidates for such exchanges, as
they are still ﬂexible and willing to learn while also having the ability
to dispense information appropriately. The ultimate goal of this sec-
ond strategy is to broaden the variety of inputs the employees receive
and open up for new and improved ways of conducting business. Nat-
urally, the realization of both these strategies implies supplementary
expenses that iss must take on in the short run; expenses that, how-
ever, will be recuperated through greater knowledge sharing beneﬁts in
the long run.
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6.7 Overcome Language Barriers
Language; often called the forgotten factor because it is easily taken
for granted that the users master a language, yet has a disastrous out-
come when it is later revealed that they do not. Although English is the
working language thatmost iss employees are skilled in, it is far from a
language that themajority of the iss employees feel comfortable using
compared to their native tongue. Consequently, the fact that Business
Insight is in English poses a language barrier problem that iss must ad-
dress. To overcome this problem, I recommend three suggestions that,
when viewed in their entirety, will take iss a big part of the way to solv-
ing the language problem.
First, the advantages of an expensive andup-to-date knowledge shar-
ing system are wasted if the intended users are not able to put the sys-
tem to use. Therefore, iss must oﬀer the employees who do not have
a working ability level of English the means to be able to achieve this,
so that everyone has the possibility to contribute to the system. In the
subsidiaries where English is very poorly spoken, classes should be of-
fered, thereby increasing the working level of English and empowering
the employees with the ability to use Business Insight eﬀectively. The
classes should be oﬀered free of charge, within working hours andmar-
keted as a one-time unique proposal to improve one’s qualiﬁcations.
This will be viewed as a positive commitment from the managerial side
and emphasize to the employees that the new knowledge sharing sys-
tem is meant to be taken seriously. Also, it is felt that such an oppor-
tunity for self-improvement will be positively perceived and hence pro-
vide a form of goodwill directed towards giving the knowledge sharing
system a more earnest attempt.
Second, with the probable exception of the employees with excellent
English language skills, the users should be familiarized with the words
and phrases that are popularly used and frequently repeated. Supplying
the users with a comfortable understanding of the words and phrases
that are often stumbled across while using the system from the outset
will greatly facilitate the ‘getting-acquainted-with-the-system’ phase as
users not only understand the necessary vocabulary, but also get their
motivation boosted as they see their newly taught vocabulary being put
to use.
Third, for national subsidiaries located in linguistic areas that con-
tain a signiﬁcant number of users of Business Insight who have severe
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diﬃculties in working eﬃciently in English (such as the French sub-
sidiary), virtual dictionaries can be incorporated into the system. Such
a tool would allow the user to simply click on a word he does not under-
stand in order to obtain an instantaneous local-language translation,
in a little pop-up window. Furthermore, English dictionaries must be
supplied to all intended users, with the exception of those who already
work on a daily basis in English. It is not necessary to receive consent
from the users that they want a dictionary, as one should automatically
be supplied to every non-native English-speaking user.The reception of
a dictionary will, once again, be perceived as an indicator that the new
knowledge sharing system is to be taken seriously and further help the
implementation process.
Instinctively, I am tempted to believe that the language problemwill,
with time, eventually reduce itself. An increasingly global world and the
fact thatmore new employees speak English today than previously sug-
gest that this problem will at least not increase with time. In fact, with
the introduction of the exchange programs and increased interaction
between the subsidiaries as was advocated in the ﬁrst recommenda-
tion, English abilities across the various subsidiaries should increase.
Thereto, the utilization of the knowledge sharing system, Business In-
sight, will also increase employees’ English abilities; their English ap-
titude will increase proportionally to their usage of the system. Never-
theless, albeit there might be some truth in this instinctive feeling, the
language issue is a cardinal current concern that must be confronted
through the aforementioned suggestions.
6.8 Keep Business Insight Centrally Run But Respect
Subsidiary Priorities
This particular problem poses an interesting dilemma because the sub-
sidiaries themselves do not entirely agree whether Business Insight
should be more or less centrally run. This contradiction is understand-
able since there are sound arguments for either case thus implying
that there is no clear-cut answer. The problem equates itself to the old
dilemma of ‘can’t have your cake and eat it too’ as a decentralized struc-
ture would avoid the clash in stakeholder diﬀerences but compromise
the coordination and knowledge sharing abilities of the subsidiaries.
Consequently, this recommendation demands a twofold endorsement.
First, I ﬁrmly recommend that iss keep Business Insight as a cen-
trally run knowledge sharing system. For knowledge sharing to occur
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optimally, a highdegree of coordination among the subsidiariesmust be
present.This coordination can only come from a headquarters perspec-
tive. A strong central commanding body of the knowledge sharing activ-
ities throughout the entire iss group would have a better vision of the
whole organization and its requirements, opposed to each subsidiary
deciding for themselves what they deem relevant. Furthermore, hav-
ing Business Insight centrally run will provide a common loop through
which all subsidiariesmust pass data.This conformity in the knowledge
sharing process will greatly increase the ease with which global and ef-
fective knowledge sharing can occur as the headquarters receive a holis-
tic view of the entire organization and can, through this, better interna-
tionally coordinate the subsidiaries. In order for the headquarters to be
adequately equipped to handle the colossal obligations inherent to the
coordination of global knowledge sharing, more resources should be al-
located to support the central knowledge sharing department than is
currently the case. I suggest the establishment of a headquarters team
whose sole task involves keeping Business Insight interesting, current
and relevant to all users.
However, within this recommendation now lies the area that the
management of iss must be particularly conscientious with and forms
the second part of this twofold endorsement. Having Business Insight
centrally run implies that the headquarters must possess the ability to
correctly judge what data is appropriate for the entire iss organization
to include on the knowledge sharing system and what is not, regardless
of the fact that the knowledgemay contain no relevance whatsoever to
the headquarters. This implies that the headquarters must respect the
inherent diﬀerence in stakeholders of the subsidiaries and the head-
quarters and include knowledge onto Business Insight that they would
otherwise have deemed extraneous. In order for the headquarters to do
this eﬃciently, theymust gain a further understanding of the priorities
and interests of the various local subsidiaries, so that their screening
abilities do not end up sifting out valuable knowledge.
6.9 Create Business Insight Courses
A powerful, all-encompassing and expensive knowledge sharing system
is of absolutely nouse to the organization if the employees,who are sup-
posed to use the system, do not possess the ability to exploit the great-
ness the system boasts. Therefore, it is extremely important that the
headquarters focus on raising the employees’ knowledge sharing capa-
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bilities that are required to operate Business Insight. Accordingly, I rec-
ommend a few mandatory classes and seminars in all the subsidiaries
to be established. In these classes, the users have the opportunity to
learn how to optimally use Business Insight and see the full extent of
the beneﬁts the system can oﬀer. An expert on Business Insight should
reveal all the intricate beneﬁcial details of the system and how to over-
come what the employees might perceive as shortcomings of Business
Insight. This will also be an excellent method of introducing the em-
ployees to the system and help kick-start their eagerness to use it on
their own accord.
6.10 Conclusion
We have learned that there are many pitfalls when attempting to intro-
duce a global knowledge sharing system across diverse corporate cul-
tures.What seems like a straightforward and unwavering process turns
out to be a complex and entangled procedure, often not yielding the
hoped for eﬀective outcome. For iss this is certainly the case.The nine
recommendations are structured according to the problematic ‘will’ and
‘capability’ areas that currently hinder iss in sharing knowledge opti-
mally across corporate cultures. Carrying out the recommendationswill
take iss a great part of the way to optimizing their knowledge sharing
activities andoverall satisfactionwith the system.However, as is almost
always the case, upon rectiﬁcationof these problematic areas other situ-
ations will arise that will lessen the overall value of the knowledge shar-
ing initiative. Consequently, the nine recommendations will not supply
iss, or any other company looking to learn from iss’s situation, with
the ability to share knowledge across corporate cultures for an inﬁnite
time frame. Constant modiﬁcations and alterations to all aspects that
touch upon the knowledge sharing initiative, which we have learned are
very extensive, must be correctly made.
In sum, it is important to remember that a knowledge sharing sys-
tem and the technological additions that come with it are just tools,
which are supposed to help the organization share knowledge more ef-
fectively but will bring no change to the company unless it has the ap-
proval and cooperation of the entire organization. Regardless of the ex-
tent of the new technology and of the promises that the newly incorpo-
rated knowledge sharing system boasts, it is necessary to have a strong
business focus on change in the organization, process, people and cul-
tures. It is naive to believe that the introduction of a new knowledge
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sharing system, no matter how glamorous it might be declared by its
producers, will bring improvements if the system is viewed solely as a
technical tool and no or little attention is devoted to human capital and
the change process.
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The main purpose of this book has been to investigate the issues per-
taining to knowledge sharing and corporate culture, in order to provide
iss with several recommendations as to how their knowledge sharing
activities can improve across corporate cultures. However, these recom-
mendations lend themselves to a wider scope of companies; iss is by
no means unique, in fact I would argue that the situation presented by
iss is typical of most large organizations trying to enhance corporate
wide knowledge sharing initiatives and hence the revealed insights are
applicable to a much wider audience.
To arrive at plausible recommendations involved an in-depth look
at the knowledge sharing activities and corporate cultures of several
iss subsidiaries; two subsidiaries that were considered good external
knowledge sharers and two that were considered poor external knowl-
edge sharers. The data from these interviews yielded some interesting
results, andwhat seemed apparent from the outset turned out to be not
so straightforward.
I began by introducing the two complex terms of knowledge shar-
ing and corporate culture in a purely theoretical context. The indepen-
dent analysis of each established the underlying fundamental aspects
of the theoretical features, and provided a thorough depiction of the
complex constituents related to knowledge sharing and corporate cul-
ture. After having obtained a harmonized understanding of both terms
and of their implications, I proceeded to Research Question 1: ‘How is
knowledge sharing optimally done across corporate cultures?’ Here we
learned that eﬀective global knowledge sharing requires a two-sided
strategic approach: one focusing on the nature and conditions under
which knowledge is being sent and the other on the environment and
conditions under which the knowledge is being received.
Thenext stepwas to focus on the empirical data and described the in-
tricate details of the local corporate cultures, Business Insights match
with the existing knowledge sharing processes, the ideal knowledge
sharing situation, and the hindrances to the achievement of the ideal
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knowledge sharing situation at all four subsidiaries. This descriptive
section functioned as the bedrock on which the succeeding analysis
and interpretation would be ﬁrmly planted. Although it provided es-
sential background knowledge to the analytical work, the descriptive
section was relatively straightforward.The analysis and interpretation,
however, providedmany clasheswith the theoretical perception of opti-
mal knowledge sharing across corporate cultures, which was surprising
and gave much to contemplate further. It turned out that some char-
acteristics of the diligent knowledge sharing subsidiaries contradicted
the theoretically optimal knowledge sharing proposal set forth in the
answer to Research Question 1, while some characteristics of the less
diligent knowledge sharers actually complemented the optimal theoret-
ical solution. The discrepancies and similarities that appeared between
the theoretical and empirical data helped further put the whole issue
of knowledge sharing across corporate cultures into perspective, and
provided a more cognitive interpretation of the topic. Consequently,
it was the combination of the results explicated in the answer to Re-
search Question 1, the results from the analysis of the empirical data,
and the results from the inevitable clash between these two types of re-
sults that provided the knowledge to be able to describe the problematic
areas of knowledge sharing within iss today, the answer to Research
Question 2. Some of these problems were directly related to the sub-
sidiaries corporate culture, such as having a common or uniﬁed mind-
set and approaching the knowledge sharing initiative non-genuinely.
Other problems relate more to the eﬀorts of the headquarters and
suggest that the headquarters should have paid more attention to the
user-friendliness of the system, the perceived cost-beneﬁt structure
and the level in which they endorse and promote the use of the system.
The study and analysis of both theoretical and empirical issues, com-
bined with the comparison of these, at times diverging, sides enabled
me to come up with several recommendations as to how iss can opti-
mize its knowledge sharing activities across the corporate cultures of
its subsidiaries.
From the theoretical and empirical data, and from the in-depth anal-
ysis, it was established that a necessary precursor for successful knowl-
edge sharing across corporate cultures is not to solely focus on the sys-
tem and the beneﬁts it can provide the few diligent users that have
taken the time to understand the system, but mainly to focus on the
change management and how the knowledge sharing initiative is com-
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municated through the mundane and human aspects of the organiza-
tion. The recommendations have exactly this as their fundamental un-
derlying theme, and it is my ﬁrm belief that this is the only manner
in which the entire organization becomes involved with the knowledge
sharing initiative.
This entails that some subsidiaries of the iss groupmake alterations
and adjustments to their local corporate cultures in order to set the
stage for eﬀective knowledge sharing. To facilitate this, the recommen-
dation is to install a more open and radical mindset; a mindset not fo-
cused on a speciﬁc national orientation that inadvertently forecloses
new ideas and improvements, and to approach the implementation ef-
forts in a sincere manner so the entire organization supports the ini-
tiative. Further facilitators of global knowledge sharing should stem
from the headquarters. Making the knowledge sharing system more
user-friendly, increase level of endorsements, improve the perceived
impression of the cost-beneﬁt structure and increasing the awareness
of the system and its beneﬁts though courses and local intranets are
excellent ways to get the entire iss corporation onto the knowledge
sharing bandwagon and contribute wholeheartedly to the initiative.
The management of iss has understood and accepted that they suf-
fer from poor global knowledge sharing activities across diﬀering cor-
porate cultures. This realization is incredibly important to make and is
a great ﬁrst step towards improving the situation, a stepmanymultina-
tional companies fail to take.The case and point of this book is thus not
only for iss’s beneﬁt. Knowledge sharing across cultures is very diﬃcult
and the illuminationof the intricacies revealed though the iss situation
provides a fantastic backdrop for companies in similar situations who
may not have the luxury of acquiring a research team to illuminate their
speciﬁc situation. Thus, it is my ﬁrm belief that the recommendations
set forth herein also apply to companies other than iss.
7.1 Reﬂection
The process of writing this book has been an outstanding occasion to
learn about the theoretical and empirical aspects of knowledge sharing
and corporate culture, but especially about the practicalities of the in-
troduction and implementation of a global knowledge sharing system.
Very early in the work, during the research of information stage, I re-
alized that the focus topic, the seemingly simple and straightforward
process of sharing knowledge across comparable units belonging to the
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same organization, is more complicated than ﬁrst meets the eye. This
became particularly evident as soon as I started conducting the inter-
views with the various subsidiaries; the theories that should have been
applicable in a given situation according to the theoretical ﬁndings did
not always match-up.
I have also becomemore conscious of the changes allowed for, and the
beneﬁts that can be reaped, by the rapid technological evolution that
has been (and still is) characteristic of the recent many years. Knowl-
edge sharing and related servicing activities that were non-existent for
companies until a couple of years ago seem today to be the way to fol-
low for companies that want to remain competitive. Although I am im-
pressed by the situation brought about by modern technology, I have
had the chance to realize that it is crucial for an organization to make
certain that its employees are involved in the changes. A process that
would bemodiﬁedmerely because of technological reasons, without in-
volving the employees, would be doomed from the beginning. In other
words, I have learned that nomatter how good the intentions are, if the
employees are not convinced to push in the same direction, the organi-
zation will not reach its destination. It is of primordial importance to
recognize the impact of change on people. Another trap to avoid when
getting enthusiastic about technological advances is the danger of en-
tombing 1970’s processes in new millennium technology. One change
rarely comes alone, and the need to realize that simultaneous modiﬁ-
cations have to be made is imperative to the entire change process and
success of the organization.
In sum, I have learned that knowledge sharing across corporate cul-
tures is not the result of any oneperson’s eﬀort or system- it comes from
leadership, determination, focus and passion at every level of the orga-
nization. Furthermore, integrating a knowledge sharing system into an
organization that has diverging corporate cultures is an incredibly com-
plicated task.Theelaborateness of the particularities apparent through-
out any organization must be thoroughly understood before any hopes
can be made that the venture will turn out to be successful.
7.2 Future of Knowledge Sharing
Following new tendencies inmanagerial theories and new environmen-
tal circumstances that allowed for modes of operation that would once
have been considered as revolutionary, the typical organizational struc-
ture evolved considerably over the recent past.The great and diversiﬁed
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conglomerates that once were in vogue were slowly dismantled, and
the resulting smaller entities were sold oﬀ to continue operations in-
dependently, often competing against each other.This general phase of
reorganization was not even completed when a new one began. New
technologies suddenly made industries that had previously never been
related appear as complementary, opening the door to new organiza-
tional synergies. An excellent example of such a case is the combination
of electrical power delivery, telephone services, cable television, and In-
ternet access within a single network, operated by one company. This
redeﬁnition of many industries has sparked a series of organizational
re-mergers, in which independent companies once again joined their
forces to gain a better foothold on the increasingly competitive market.
Having exploited external possibilities to better their situation,multi-
national organizations now frequently turn to alternative, internal pos-
sibilities for optimizing their operations. The growing tendency for
companies to adopt knowledge sharing strategies that are supposed
to transcend the totality of their business operations is a manifesta-
tion of this phenomenon. As organizations grow in size, and as they
geographically spread more and more, making full use of the knowl-
edge resources that the company has acquired or developed is now per-
ceived as one of the main methods to make operations more eﬃcient
and to achieve better results.This generalized organizational globaliza-
tion, however, has created new obstacles (such as the ones linked to
diﬀerences in corporate cultures) to cross-unit communication and to
knowledge sharing.
A series of follow-up studies that are outside the temporal scope of
this book will be necessary, if we hope to ever really knowwhether such
manifestations are just corporate trends that come and go with con-
sultants, or if they have come to stay. We have concentrated our at-
tention on the interactions between corporate culture and knowledge
sharing; there is a need for projects that would focus on the analysis
of the links between knowledge sharing and other parameters, such as
national cultures, languages or geographical hindrances. Studies of the
general knowledge sharing situation of organizations that currently are
in the process of implementing such a strategy, spanning over several
years and involving the recurringmeasurement of selected parameters,
would allow us to observe their actual evolution and to compare it with
their original objectives.
Finally, it would be interesting to determine the intrinsic relevance
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of knowledge sharing strategies and the relative return on the invest-
ments required by the development and implementation of knowledge
sharing systems. A research type that could yield such results would
compare themedium-termperformance of a series of organizations op-
eratingwithin the same industry, somewith a stated knowledge sharing
strategy, some without. This research protocol could be applied to dif-
ferent industries, which would underline any diﬀerence in the degree
of relevance of knowledge sharing processes for diﬀerent sectors of ac-
tivities, an interesting continuation of this book.
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Appendix
Questionnaire About Business Insight and Knowledge Sharing
1. For how long have you had access to iss Business Insight?
6–12 months 54
3–6 months 14
1–3 months 6
Less than 1 month 0
I do not have access 26
2. How often do you access Business Insight?
Never 38
Very rarely (approximately once every quarter) 4
Rarely (approximately once a month) 20
Frequently (approximately once a week) 28
Daily (every day – or every time I turn on my computer) 10
2a. If never or very rarely:Why don’t you use Business Insight more:
There is no information of interest to myself or my organization 3
The information is in English 4
I don’t have time 16
I don’t have access 59
The system is never updated 2
My country has a poor connection to ibi and it takes up too much
time to be connected
6
I do not have a need for the kind of information that is available on the
system
4
The system is confusing and diﬃcult to use and navigate in 6
2b. If rarely, frequently or daily:What are the reasons for using Business Insight:
To follow the share price 6
To keep me updated on what is happening internationally 12
To follow the corporate news 13
To use the Yellow Pages 14
To follow corporate policies and procedures 9
Continued on the following page
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To access corporate manuals and toolboxes 14
To monitor the international projects and communities 7
To ﬁnd information about concepts and best business practices 9
To ﬁnd general information which I can use in my daily work 11
To ﬁnd information to be inspired by 5
I don’t really see the contents, but my pc automatically starts-up the system 0
2c. What is your overall impression of Business Insight:
Very positive 17
Positive 53
Neutral 28
Negative 2
Very negative 0
2d. Which of the following statements illustrates your personal attitude towards ibi:
I think the system is quite good and useful 46
I think the initiative is good but the system should be improved 53
I think the system is a mess and I doubt I will ever use it 1
2e. How do you value each of the following categories in Business Insight –
concerning the quality and availability of the information presented:
Share price 19 37 25 4 15
News 17 56 14 6 7
Yellow Pages 20 23 35 11 11
Links 3 32 41 7 17
Concepts and Cases 13 42 33 2 10
Manuals and Toolboxes 19 45 23 4 9
Projects and Communities 6 39 33 7 15
People and Organization 6 34 43 5 12
Strategy and Performance 6 37 38 7 12
Topic forum 3 9 48 9 21
Search function 8 23 32 18 19
notes (1) very positive, (2) positive, (3) neutral, (4) negative, (5) don’t know.
2f. How do you evaluate Business Insight on the following:
Connectivity 10 46 23 17 4
User friendliness 6 31 30 31 2
Structure 5 33 38 23 1
Continued on the following page
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Design 6 29 41 22 2
Contents 5 56 32 6 1
Response time 6 44 29 20 1
Navigation 2 28 38 30 2
Speed 5 38 30 24 3
Functionality 6 27 40 22 5
notes (1) very positive, (2) positive, (3) neutral, (4) negative, (5) don’t know.
2g. How often do you log-on to the system by using your password and user-id?
Always (whenever I am on the system) 12
When needed (whenever I have to access secured information) 51
Never – why:
– I don’t have a password and user-id 26
– I can’t remember my password and user-id 6
– I don’t need to access secured information 5
3. How well has bi been communicated internally within the organization:
Very well 6
Well 21
Neutral 17
Poor 18
Very poor 7
I haven’t received any communication about bi at all, and I can
therefore not answer the question!
31
Knowledge Sharing in the iss Group
4. How do you view international knowledge sharing within the iss group in general?
Very good 7
Good 14
Neutral 48
Poor 20
Very poor 11
4a. What do you think is the main obstacle for International Knowledge Sharing
within the group:
Culture 8
Language 13
Continued on the following page
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Personal interest and priorities 11
it and Connectivity issues 8
Time 15
Focus on our own ﬁnancial results and not on exchanging information 9
Not a local priority (what people do outside my country is of no interest
to me)
7
No rewards for sharing knowledge 3
No or limited buy-in from management internationally 4
No or limited buy-in from management locally 13
No or limited resources centrally 4
No or limited resources locally 3
No or limited international agenda (e. g. international customers or projects) 1
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